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In April of 2009, the Institute of Asian Research (IAR) 
launched the second phase of the Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution 
Research Project (APDR), entitled “Understanding Coordinated 
Compliance with International Trade and Human Rights 
Standards in Comparative Perspectives.” Awarded by the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada 
under its Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI) Program 
after a competition involving a wide field of applicants, the 
Coordinated Compliance program is the second APDR/MCRI 
project developed at IAR. 
Whereas the initial MCRI project generated an explanatory 
model that enabled reliable forecasting of local compliance with 
international trade and human rights standards, the current Phase 
II project focuses on the relationships between trade and human 
rights compliance policies and practices in Canada and Asia. The 
current project supports research and analysis that will enable 
interdisciplinary scholars and policymakers in Canada and 
internationally to understand better the requirements for 
coordinating trade and human rights compliance. The project’s 
key activities support a fully integrated program of research, 
student training, knowledge transfer activities and publications, as 
well as policy seminars and a public lecture series.   
As Project Director for the APDR project, I have been 
privileged to work with many outstanding scholars exploring 
various dimensions of coordinated compliance. This volume of 
papers emerges from one such collaboration - an international 
symposium on Gender Equality Rights and Trade Regimes, held 
through cooperation with The North-South Institute. The 
symposium drew upon the concepts of “Coordinated Compliance” 
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that is the central issue for our current Phase II MCRI project, as 
well as paradigms of “Selective Adaptation” and “Institutional 
Capacity’” developed in our initial Phase I MCRI project. 
 
 
International trade regimes are centred on normative 
principles associated with liberalism in the European and North 
American tradition. Proceeding from tenets about human equality 
and natural law, the liberal tradition asserts that government 
should be an agency of popular will and should be restrained from 
active intervention in socio-economic relations.2 As expressed in 
international trade standards associated with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), norms of liberalism are manifest in part 
through provisions on transparency (GATT Article 10: government 
responsibility to publish trade laws and regulations); national 
treatment and non-discrimination (GATT, Articles 3 and 13: 
responsibility to avoid protection of local industries); as well as the 
requirements on reducing and eliminating tariffs and trade 
                                                     
1 Potter, P.B. (2009). Coordinating Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility. Hong Kong University Law Journal, 675-698. 
Reprinted (2011) in Tsinghua Faxue (Tsinghua Law Journal), 1, 43-55 (in 
Chinese).  
2 Classic works include Kymlicka. W. (1991) Liberalism, Community and 
Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Cotterrell, R. (1989). The Politics of 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press; Heller, A. (1988). On Formal 
Democracy. In J. Keane (Ed.), Civil Society and the State: New European 
Perspectives. London and New York: Verso; and Lindblom, C.E. (1977). 
Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems. (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977). 
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subsidies.3 These derive from liberal principles accepting the 
theory of comparative advantage, which essentially relegates the 
role of government to promoting efficiency through maximizing 
the utility of a state’s existing or acquired economic attributes, and 
limiting government actions aimed at inhibiting (through tactics 
such as mercantilism and protectionism) economic activities of 
other states.4    
 Whereas international trade regimes tend to focus on 
efficiency, international human rights standards reflect a 
normative orientation toward political and socio-economic justice, 
combining liberal norms with ideals associated with socialism. 
Human rights standards articulated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),5 combine 
priorities of civil and political rights with protection of economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Despite efforts to present these as a 
unified and undifferentiated set of norms, political discourses over 
                                                     
3 See text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in WTO. (2003). 
GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD). WTO. Among the 
many useful treatises on the GATT are Jackson, J.H. (1969). World Trade 
and the Law of GATT. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc.; and Stone, F. 
(1987). Canada, the GATT and the International Trade System. Montreal: 
Institute for Research of Public Policy. 
4 For a skeptical review, see generally Brown, B.S. (1994). Developing 
Countries in the International Trade Order. Northern Illinois University 
Law Review, 14, 347-406. For discussion of the role of governments in 
directing foreign trade policy, see Cohen, B.J. (1991). Crossing Frontiers: 
Explorations in International Political Economy. Boulder: Westview. 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (1966). UN GA 
Resolution 2200A (XXI); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights. (1966) UN GA Resolution 2200A (XXI). 
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rights enforcement reveal conflicts over priorities and timing.6 Yet 
underlying commonalities about political and socio-economic 
justice remain, even if complicated by questions about 
implementation. 
Despite their apparent differences of normative priorities 
regarding efficiency and justice, international trade and human 
rights discourses have multiple related contexts and mutual 
influences. For example, trade liberalization rules restricting 
government assistance to nascent industries have potential 
impacts on human rights issues over labour standards in 
developing economies. As well, human rights imperatives on 
issues of health and environmental protection can affect 
multilateral efforts to entrench efficiency priorities in trade 
relations. Coordination also affects the policy-making context 
within which trade and human rights matters are considered and 
decided. Linkages between trade and human rights outcomes 
merit intensive research on conditions for coordinated compliance 
with international trade and human rights standards. Research-
driven policy proposals on coordinated compliance with 
international trade and human rights standards can offer a range 
of best practices to facilitate international cooperation in a wide 
array of socio-economic and political relationships. 
While there is an emerging recognition of the need to 
explore integration of international trade and human rights 
standards,7 empirical research and policy analysis are lacking on 
                                                     
6 Compare United Nations. (1993). World Conference on Human Rights. 
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (A/Conf/157/23) with Final 
Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on 
Human Rights (Bangkok Declaration) (1993). Human Rights Law Journal, 
14, 370. 
7 Abbot, F.M., Breining-Kaufmann, C., & Cottier, T. (Eds.). (2005). 
International Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and Conceptual Issues. 
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the possibilities of coordinating performance (as opposed to 
integrating content).8 One important reason for this is that the 
“interpretive communities”9 of officials, legal specialists, and 
business and political elites at the heart of local interpretation and 
implementation of international trade and human rights regimes 
are often comprised of very different groups of specialists and 
stakeholders who neither share conceptual perspectives nor 
interact organizationally.10 These entrenched institutional 
arrangements often inhibit development of alternative approaches 
that might support coordinated compliance. The lack of consensus 
over the meaning and purpose of trade and human rights goals 
has compromised local efforts at coordinated compliance.11 For 
example, compliance with international trade standards on 
production tend to privilege consumption,12 local business 
models,13 and reliance on financial and regulatory incentives for 
                                                                                                                       
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Cottier, T., Pauwelyn, J., & 
Burgi, E. (Eds.). (2005). Human Rights and International Trade. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
8 Jackson, J. (2006). Reflections on the Possible Research Agenda for 
Exploring the Relationship between Human Rights Norms and 
International Trade Rules. In F. M. Abbot, C. Breining-Kaufmann, & T. 
Cottier (Eds.), International Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and 
Conceptual Issues (pp. 19-28). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
9 Fish, S. (1980). Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
10 Petersmann, E. (2007). Multilevel Judicial Governance of International 
Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice. Journal 
of International Economic Law, 10(3), 529-551. 
11 Steiner, H. J., & Alston, P. (2000). International Human Rights Law in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Section 
E16. 
12 Barber, J. (2003). Production, Consumption, and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development. Environment, Development and Sustainability,  5, 
63-93. 
13 Barney, I. (2003). Business, community development and sustainable 
livelihoods approaches. Community Development Journal, 38(3), 255-265. 
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private behavior,14  but all too often are unconnected with local 
human rights conditions and policies. International discourses on 
private property and trade liberalization often work to limit the 
range of approaches available locally to promote human rights.15 
Similarly, human rights discourses often tend to confront the 
norms and institutions of international trade as obstacles rather 
than potential contributors to human rights conditions.16    
Better coordination of trade and human rights practices 
will support efforts to build more effective international 
institutions for coordinated implementation of trade and human 
rights standards, a critical need for international law reform.17  It is 
useful therefore to examine conditions for coordinated compliance 
with international trade and human rights standards with 
particular attention to underlying imperatives of efficiency and 
justice. Coordination in trade and human rights compliance can in 
turn facilitate stronger cooperation in trade and human rights 
relations more broadly, such that expanded trade connections can 
be demonstrated to contribute to improved human rights 
                                                     
14 Frame, B., & Taylor, R. (2005). Partnerships for Sustainability: Effective 
Practice? Local Environment 10 (3), 275-298; Kysar, D.A. (2005). Sustainable 
Development and Private Global Governance. Texas Law Review, 83, 2109-
2166. 
15 Petersmann, E. (2005). Human Rights and International Trade Law: 
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields. In T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn, & E. 
Burgi (Eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (pp. 29-94). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
16 Mares, R. (Ed.). (2004). Business and Human Rights: A Compilation of 
Documents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Introduction; Steiner, H. J., & 
Alston, P. (2000). International Human Rights Law in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chap. 16. 
17 Fijalkowsi, A. (Ed.). (2007). International Institutional Reform. The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press; Steiner, H. J., & Alston, P. (2000). International Human 
Rights Law in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. Section C.  
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conditions and vice versa. Coordinated compliance also has 
implications for performance of international treaty standards in 
areas such as security, climate change, and resource and 
technology policy. Thus, building understanding about 
coordinated compliance with international trade and human rights 
standards has intrinsic value for its potential to prevent and avoid 
disputes over trade and human rights and thus reduce costs of 
international cooperation.   
This approach has particular relevance in Asia, where 
conflicting commitments to trade liberalization and human rights 
performance raise questions about the conditions that can support 
coordinated compliance with international standards. By building 
better understanding of the potential for coordination of local 
trade and human rights standards in Asia, we can hope to 
strengthen understanding of a crucial policy challenge in a 
significant region of the world. Understanding the potential for 
unifying contending policy and political constituencies associated 
with trade and human rights in Asia can also help to overcome 
competition for influence and resources among these 
constituencies, which can be counterproductive to efforts to build 
common purposes and cooperation domestically and 
internationally. Such an approach would strengthen the ability of 
economies in Asia to respond to different kinds of trade and 
human rights compliance challenges and to encourage 
coordination of trade and human rights policies and practice.    
 
 
Following the useful introductory essays by Joseph K. 
Ingram and Heather Gibb of The North-South Institute, the papers 
and panel presentations at the NSI symposium were organized 
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according to three themes, poverty reduction, employment, and 
equality rights. In the first panel on poverty reduction, Barbara 
Bailey’s paper, “Coordinating Compliance between Gender Rights 
and Trade: Issues and Opportunities - CEDAW and the Issue of 
Trade Policies,” explored the relationships between trade policy 
and domestic labour markets. Adelle Blackett examined the ways 
in which local labour regulation affects the role of migrant women 
workers, in “Women, Migration and the Care Economy: What 
Regulating Domestic Work Teaches Us about the Relationship 
between Trade and Labour Law.” These two papers helped further 
our understanding of the links between international trade policy 
and local labour markets. 
Turning to issues of gender and labour relations, Arka Roy 
Chaudhuri’s paper, “Trade Reforms and Gender Wage 
Differentials in India,” examined the ways in which labour and 
wage rates in India are gendered by the discourses of international 
trade policy. Similarly, Sophia Woodman examined the local 
contexts in China for women workers, in “Market Logics, Gender 
Discrimination and Economic Liberalization in China.” Kyoko 
Ishida’s paper, “Promotion of Workplace Gender Equality and the 
Impact of the Free Market Principle in Japan,” offered a 
combination of trenchant analysis and useful policy proposals. 
These local case studies on India, China, and Japan combined 
analysis of local knowledge with broader conceptual perspectives 
on coordinated compliance.  
The final panel presented trade and gender equality 
questions in the context of broader themes of coordinated 
compliance. In my short presentation, “Remarks: Coordinating 
Compliance between Gender Equality Rights and Trade,” I 
attempted to examine linkages between trade and gender issues 
and broader themes of coordinated compliance. Les Jacobs’ piece 
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on “Gender, Trade Liberalization, and Tobacco Control in China” 
combined human rights analysis on health with policy treatment 
of regulation of dangerous substances. Heather Curran examined 
linkages between gender and the human right to water in 
“Coordinating Regimes: Integrating Gender and Human Rights in 
International Investment Arbitration.” Linkages between 
regulatory forms and human rights outcomes were addressed in 
Gauri Sreenivasan’s paper, “Trade Agreements and Gender 
Equality Rights: What Role for HRIA?” The linkages addressed in 
the final panel between gender equality rights and trade rules and 
broader conceptual and institutional themes offered important 
context for the symposium and helped point the way forward to 
effective policy and legal reform. 
Taken together, the symposium papers and presentations 
revealed the rich diversity of perspectives and issues emerging 
from the discourse of Coordinated Compliance with regard to 
specific issues on gender equality and trade. The papers revealed a 
fundamental concern over human wellbeing along with an abiding 
commitment to scholarly rigor. I was privileged to participate in 
the symposium and to work with these outstanding scholars. I 
would like to thank especially Heather Gibb of The North-South 
Institute for collaborating on this volume. I would also like to 
thank Erika Cedillo for her editorial assistance, and Rozalia Mate 
for her steadfast administrative assistance and support. 
 
Pitman B. Potter 
Vancouver, BC 
July 10, 2012 
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Joseph K. Ingram 
President and CEO, The North-South Institute 
 
The North-South Institute (NSI) was delighted to have the 
opportunity to collaborate with the University of British 
Columbia’s Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project, and with the 
University of Ottawa’s Human Rights Research and Education 
Centre and the School of International Development and Global 
Studies, to organize the conference, Coordinating Compliance 
between Gender Equality Rights and Trade. The conference built on 
NSI’s long-standing engagement on the interface between gender 
equality and international trade.1    
Few questions can be raised on the idea that trade is an 
important tool for economic growth and development. But 
tensions can exist between governments’ gender equality goals 
and trade policy objectives. Even at the World Trade Organization, 
there is growing recognition that not everyone is benefitting 
equally from more open trade rules: along with the economic 
growth that comes from global trade, there are often widening 
income gaps between rich and poor; and between women and 
                                                     
1 See for example, Higgins, K. (2012). Thinking Equal in Trade Facilitation: 
Mainstreaming Gender in Trade Facilitation and Logistics. World Bank.; Gibb, 
H. (2008). Gender and Regional Trade Agreements. Paper prepared for the 
13th Meeting of the APEC Women Leaders Network, Arequipa, Peru, 
May 12-14, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.nsi-
ins.ca/english/pdf/Gender_RTA.pdf; Gibb, H. (2007) Gender Dimensions 
of IP and Traditional Medicinal Knowledge. Colombo: UNDP Asia-Pacific 
Regional Centre. 
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men. This is not only morally unjustifiable, but ultimately is self-
defeating.   
Research shows that investing in the education of girls and 
women, facilitating their entry into the labour market, and 
ensuring their economic participation, yield results for the global 
economy. As the World Bank has re-emphasized in the 2012 World 
Development Report (Gender Equality and Development), gender 
equality is both a core development objective in its own right, and 
is smart economics. Women now represent 40 percent of the global 
labour force, 43 percent of the world’s agricultural labour force, 
and more than half of the world’s university students. So 
protecting and promoting human rights – more specifically, 
women’s economic and social rights – makes good economic 
sense. Trade that advances inclusive development, trade that 
supports more and better jobs for women and men, is trade that 
can best achieve the global welfare benefits that many of these 
commercial agreements seek to bring about.   
Under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian 
governments have made a commitment – indeed, an obligation – 
to realizing substantive equality rights. The conference 
Coordinating Compliance between Gender Equality Rights and Trade, 
presented an opportunity for trade policy and gender equality 
experts to discuss the interface between the complexity of 
women’s and men’s lives (gender differences) and trade policy, 
underscoring the need for trade policy to take a substantive and 
more holistic approach in its formulation. One suggestion – that 
could be taken up through WTO Aid for Trade initiatives – was for 
ex ante and ex post gender impact assessments of trade policies, that 
could help identify and address unintended discriminatory effects 
of a particular piece of trade policy. Diverse tools are already in 
use to assess ex-ante (and ex-post) impacts from a gender 
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perspective, including: sustainable impact assessments; gender 
trade impact assessments; and poverty and social impact 
assessments. Parties to some trade agreement can use institutional 
mechanisms, for example, working groups and committees 
established under the North America Free Trade Agreement. 
Another window could be through provisions in Canada’s free 
trade agreements with Peru and/or Colombia, which recommend 
“collaborative activities” to examine gender issues, including 
discrimination (in Annex 1 of the labour side agreement).  
Stakeholder groups from different sectors and regions could be 
included in these assessments to ensure a broad range of 
perspectives and information.   
Studies have demonstrated how measures associated with 
trade liberalization can extend far beyond the purview of trade 
and commerce ministries. These unintended impacts can have 
major implications for the potential of trade agreements to reduce 
poverty and inequality – the very aims many of these agreements 
hope to realize. The conference Coordinating Compliance between 
Gender Equality Rights and Trade represented a unique opportunity 
for academics, government officials, and civil society organizations 
to discuss opportunities and challenges for governments and 
international trade organizations in advancing compliance with 
both gender equality rights and trade rules. 
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Heather Gibb 
Research Associate, The North-South Institute 
 
The “governance gap,” between governments’ obligations 
under human rights regimes on the one hand, and their 
increasingly complex commitments under global, regional, and 
bilateral trade agreements on the other, has attracted increasing 
attention in both human rights and trade forums. The United 
Nation’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, for example, has 
raised concerns about how some trade regimes can threaten basic 
human rights to food.1 And in 2010, the Director General of the 
World Trade Organization talked of the need to increase coherence 
between the world of trade and the world of human rights.2 A 
growing body of research on how trade rules can have different 
implications for the livelihoods and wellbeing of poor women and 
poor men has prompted some governments and donor 
organizations to advise gender analysis of trade commitments, 
                                                     
1 See United Nations Human Rights Council. (2009). Promotion and 
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum, Mission to the World Trade 
Organization (UN Doc A/HRC/10/5Add.2); and United Nations Human 
Rights Council. (2011). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Olivier De Schutter, Addendum: Guiding principles on human rights impact 
assessments of trade and investment agreements (UN Doc 
A/HRC/19/59/Add. 5). 
2 See World Trade Organization (WTO). (2010). WTO News: Speeches – 
DG Pascal Lamy: Lamy calls for mind set change to align trade and human 
rights, 13 January 2010. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm 
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much as environmental impact assessments have become 
mandatory in some jurisdictions.3  
The North-South Institute has undertaken research on the 
interface between trade and human rights regimes, including 
gender equality rights, and so was delighted to have the 
opportunity to collaborate with the Asia Pacific Dispute 
Resolution Project at the University of British Columbia, the 
Human Rights Research and Education Centre, and the School of 
International Development and Global Studies at the University of 
Ottawa, in organizing the conference “Coordinating Compliance 
between Gender Equality Rights and Trade.” The conference 
aimed to explore issues raised by the intersection of two 
multilateral regimes: the GATT and WTO trade rules, with human 
rights as elaborated in United Nations (UN) and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) agreements, in particular the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). The objective of the one day forum 
was to identify ways in which policymakers and trade officials, as 
well as donor agencies that provide trade-related assistance to 
developing countries, could better address human rights 
obligations, particularly gender equality rights, in trade 
commitments. The conference was honoured by the presence of 
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of 
Canada, whose keynote address elaborated Canadian 
jurisprudence on gender equality developed under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
                                                     
3 United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality. 
(2011). Gender Equality and Trade Policy Resource Paper. Retrieved from: 
www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/trade/gender_equality_and_trade_
policy.pdf. 
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As a backgrounder for the conference, The North-South 
Institute prepared a Policy Brief on Gender Equality and Trade.4   
The following paper is based on that brief. 
A belief in and commitment to promoting fundamental 
human rights, including equality between women and men, has 
formed the cornerstone of modern institutions for international 
cooperation, starting with the United Nations Charter. 
International and regional agreements on trade and investment, 
however, are somewhat opaque on the matter of equality of people 
and the implications of trade liberalization. The Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) only 
declares that “international trade and economic activities should 
be conducted in such a way as to improve livelihoods and living 
standards for all.” Widely viewed as a tool to promote economic 
growth, international trade agreements can, however, be a double-
edged sword. While trade treaties generate economic winners and 
have the potential to greatly enhance incomes of those on the 
lower end of the economic scale, they also create losers — and a 
disproportionate number are women, 70 percent of the world’s 
poor. 
When trade arrangements further marginalize women, 
who typically work in at-risk economic sectors or are less able to 
change jobs to adapt to new economic realities, everyone loses. It is 
only when everyone can participate actively in the economy that 
long lasting gains are possible. In simple terms, when more 
women are in the workforce, poverty is reduced. More broadly, 
taking human rights into account in trade agreements can in the 
                                                     
4 Gibb, H. (Fall 2010). Gender Equality and Trade: Coordinating Compliance 
between Regimes. The North-South Institute. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/images/documents/Gender%20Equality%20and
%20Trade.pdf 
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long run benefit more people and produce more sustainable 
growth.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates that 
nearly 400 preferential trade agreements have been negotiated 
since the world’s leading trading nations established its 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
in 1948. While global trade talks have stalled, around the world, a 
rush of bilateral and regional trade negotiations has filled the void. 
The accelerated pace at which bilateral and regional trade 
agreements have been negotiated in recent years, as well as their 
sometimes broader coverage, highlight a glaring gap in global 
governance: trade rules too often clash with international human 
rights obligations, including gender equality rights. Not only do 
such inconsistencies challenge the advancement of human rights, 
they also undermine the global welfare benefits that many trade 
agreements seek to bring about. The challenge for policy-makers 
and governments is to make global trade rules and international 
human-rights obligations more mutually reinforcing. 
 
 
 
A focus on the equal rights and gender dimensions of trade 
liberalization allows for a broader view of poverty reduction and 
sustainable economic growth. Currently, the WTO and related 
international financial organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) view poverty 
as strictly an economic development issue. In contrast, 
international human rights bodies consider the root of poverty to 
be much more complex than a lack of income. They attribute it to 
inadequate and/or inequitable access to food, water, health, 
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shelter, education, decent work and personal security — basic 
rights that are guaranteed under several international conventions. 
Following are some key human rights agreements to which most 
WTO members are signatory, whose provisions overlap with these 
governments’ trade commitments.  
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979. 
 
The basic principle of the Convention is to guarantee equal 
outcomes, not just equal opportunities, for men and women. 
Under CEDAW, all state parties must “respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill” women’s rights. They must also ensure that private 
organizations, enterprises, and individuals do the same. UN 
members agreed in the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) to “seek 
to ensure their trade agreements do not have an adverse impact on 
women’s new and traditional economic activities.” Trade 
mechanisms, however, are not structured to address conflicts 
between trade rules and gender equality rights. What follows is a 
partial list of international agreements that affect both trade and 
gender equality rights.  
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), 1966.  
 
This covenant proclaims the “equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights” such as “fair 
wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed 
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with 
equal pay for equal work.” The ICESCR states that international 
donor states should ensure the policies and decisions of 
multilateral organizations, including the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund, and the 
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World Bank, conform to the covenant. However, there are 
potential conflicts between the rights to an adequate standard of 
living, to food, and to the highest standard of health on the one 
hand, and trade agreements including the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) on the other. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health recommends that governments 
conduct right-to-health impact assessments if they engage in trade 
liberalization that affects this area.5  
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992. 
 
This convention recognizes “the need for the full participation of 
women at all levels of policy-making and implementation for 
biological diversity conservation.” In many nations, women and 
men have distinct and inter-related roles and responsibilities for 
natural resources and traditional knowledge, including medicine, 
but this is not reflected in world trade rules or processes. WTO 
trade ministers agreed in 2001 to find ways to interpret and 
implement trade agreements, notably TRIPs, in ways that are more 
supportive of the right to health, but progress has been slow. The 
mandates of WTO and CBD are also somewhat conflicting: the 
WTO addresses private investors’ rights, while the CDB provides 
for the sharing of benefits arising from resources. 
 
 International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions.  
 
In the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
                                                     
5 United Nations Human Rights Council. (2011). Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum: Guiding 
principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment 
agreements (UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add. 5). 
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Work, all ILO members reaffirmed their commitment to respect 
and promote core labour standards, which aim to eliminate all 
forms of forced or compulsory labour, effectively abolish child 
labour, eliminate gender discrimination in employment and 
occupation, and ensure freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining. While bilateral trade agreements 
increasingly include commitments to observe core labour 
standards, the standards themselves say little about gender-
specific workplace concerns such as sexual harassment and the 
increase in employment vulnerability for women that can result 
from trade agreements (e.g., the resulting job losses for women in 
the garment sector that accompanied the phase out of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing). 
 UN International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, 2003. 
 
Poverty, unemployment, and underemployment in developing 
countries are increasingly fuelling temporary labour migration 
from poor to less poor countries. This convention addresses the 
low wages, poor working conditions, sexism and lack of job 
protection and security for these migrants, approximately half of 
whom are women. While the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATs) facilitates the movement of some categories of 
professionals (mainly in male-dominated professions such as 
engineering and architecture as well as business executives) across 
borders, it does not include mechanisms to govern and protect the 
movement of less-skilled workers, such as domestics, where 
women predominate.  
When governments disagree on the interpretation of trade 
rules, the WTO and other trade agreements provide dispute 
resolution mechanisms to deliver legally binding solutions.  
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However, these dispute settlement mechanisms are narrowly 
defined and not concerned with international commitments to 
reduce poverty and gender inequalities. In other words, a trade 
dispute rarely provides an effective forum to address sometimes-
conflicting governments’ trade and human rights obligations. 
 
 
 
 The proposed 1948 Charter for the International Trade 
Organization that never came into being nevertheless included 
significant human rights language. For example, its Article 7 
would have required signatories to “recognize that unfair labour 
conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties 
in international trade and, accordingly, each member shall take 
whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such 
conditions within its territory.” Neither the GATT, which emerged 
as the de facto trade organization after the charter effort failed, nor 
its 1995 successor, the WTO, said much about human rights. These 
trade bodies instead focused on relations between states rather 
than on the economic conditions of the people impacted by trade.   
Still, WTO members recognized in the preamble of their 
agreement establishing the organization that “relations in the field 
of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and 
a large and steadily growing volume of real income . . . ”  
A basic doctrine of the WTO trading system today is the 
principle of “national treatment,” whereby member states may not 
discriminate against imported goods or services in order to protect 
or promote local goods or services. However, in exceptional 
circumstances trading nations have acted in concert to restrict 
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trade. One prominent case was the UN-sanctioned trade boycott of 
apartheid South Africa in the name of human rights. But such an 
approach makes the support of human rights an exception to 
accepted trade rules rather than an integral part of a trading 
regime.  
Furthermore, treating human rights as an exception does 
not provide much guidance for trade negotiators on how they 
might reconcile conflicting norms and interests. At the same time, 
there is a growing recognition that the commitments governments 
make in trade agreements can impact or constrain their ability to 
meet legal obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill 
human rights and gender equality.   
For example, WTO agreements permit national 
governments to establish free-trade zones where foreign investors 
may be exempted from national labour standards. While this has 
meant increased employment for women in some countries, 
studies have identified gender-related barriers in these zones 
including discrimination in hiring, wages, benefits and career 
development, as well as occupational health and safety concerns 
and a failure to accommodate women’s needs with respect to 
pregnancy, maternity leave or childcare.6   
Some new bilateral trade agreements include labour 
chapters in which the parties make legally binding commitments 
to observe ILO core labour standards. However, despite 
proclaiming non-discrimination principles, these standards lack 
teeth in addressing gender equality rights or women’s workplace 
rights in areas such as sexual harassment and physical abuse. In 
                                                     
6 See International Labour Organization. (2003). Employment and Social 
Policy with Respect to Export Processing Zones. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/meeting-
reports/WCMS_078851/lang--en/index.htm. 
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addition, they provide insufficient mechanisms to tackle the 
broader employment implications of trade liberalization (including 
women’s increasing employment in the informal section) on 
women’s rights to livelihoods. Trade departments also tend to 
place less emphasis on implementing mechanisms to promote 
labour and gender equality rights than on intellectual property 
and other protections contained in trade agreements. 
 In trade agreements, “rights holders” are corporations, but 
it is their governments that face economic sanctions under the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Process. When trade rights conflict with 
human rights, trade usually prevails. For instance, again using a 
South African example, the country’s post-apartheid constitution 
guarantees every citizen access to healthcare services. However, a 
prior commitment by the country’s then apartheid-era government 
to open health services to commercial providers under the 1995 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, has effectively restricted 
health care to those who can afford to pay for private services. In 
this way, trade obligations may make it harder for a government 
to fulfill its constitutional obligations to progressively improve 
access to healthcare.7   
Conflicts between trade-agreement provisions and peoples’ 
rights to a livelihood, health care and food have also been 
identified. For example, exports of cheap chicken parts from some 
developed countries have undercut poor local chicken producers 
in developing countries who are mainly women, putting them out 
of work. In Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia, small-scale rice 
                                                     
7 See Gabela, Z. (2009). Trade in Health-Care Related Services in the Global 
Economy: The Perspectives of South Africa and Canada (LLM Thesis). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses database. (UMI No. 
758122917)  
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producers have been squeezed out by surges in rice imports from 
subsidized producers in the United States, Vietnam and Thailand.8   
Human rights observers, civil society organizations, and 
researchers have identified other areas of conflict. For example, 
under the 1994 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights, governments are required to protect the 
intellectual property rights of corporations, including over 
medicinal and aromatic plants. In this way, governance of rights to 
knowledge resources, traditionally managed by rural and 
indigenous populations, is now subject to multilateral and regional 
trade agreements. In contrast, other multilateral agreements such 
as the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity, acknowledge the 
different, often complementary roles of men and women in access 
to knowledge and use of traditional medicines.  
 
 
 
 Under international human rights law, governments have 
duties to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights. 
“Rights holders,” in this regime, are women and men. The widely 
accepted Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with the 
International Covenants on Political and Civil Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide support for these 
principles in their recognition of the equal rights of women and 
men.  
                                                     
8 See Windfuhr, M. (2010). The World Food Crisis and the Right to 
Adequate Food. In M. Gibney & S. Skogly (Eds.), Universal Human Rights 
and Extraterritorial Obligations. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press.   
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CEDAW goes one step further. It defines and elaborates on 
the general guarantees of non-discrimination in those equality 
conventions from a gender perspective.9 The basic CEDAW 
principles underpinning gender equality rights are the prohibition 
of discrimination against women and the active promotion of 
equality between the sexes. As signatories to the CEDAW, 
governments are obliged to ensure that their legal systems prohibit 
direct or indirect discrimination against women. Indirect 
discrimination may occur when laws, policies or programs are 
based on seemingly gender-neutral criteria that in reality have a 
detrimental impact on women.10 Studies have illustrated how 
seemingly neutral trade rules can have very different economic 
and social implications for different groups of people; changes in 
consumption patterns (related to changes in prices of goods and 
services), wages, and government revenues resulting from trade 
agreements can affect women and men differently.11 Gender 
analyses of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
for example, have highlighted how shifts in economic activities in 
the three partner countries disproportionately affected women’s 
                                                     
9 See United Nations General Assembly. (1979). Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Retrieved from: 
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw. 
10 See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
(2004). General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
on temporary special measures.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/ 
index.html. 
11 United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender 
Equality. (2011). Gender Equality and Trade Policy Resource Paper. Retrieved 
from: 
www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/trade/gender_equality_and_trade_
policy.pdf. 
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livelihoods, particularly in the manufacturing and agriculture 
sectors.12  
Both trade and human rights regimes are dynamic. In each, 
signatories commit to make improvements over time, as capacities 
and resources permit. Trade policy makers need to carefully 
examine the relationship of trade agreements to a range of other 
rights, and the best time to consider these competing rights is at 
the negotiation stage.  
There are some indications that this balancing act is 
beginning to happen. For example, recent Canadian bilateral free 
trade agreements include enforceable commitments to uphold core 
labour standards. The WTO-sponsored Aid for Trade Initiative 
also demonstrates a growing awareness of the gender implications 
of trade deals. The initiative is aimed at helping developing 
countries participate on a more equal footing in international trade 
by building their trade related skills and related infrastructure. In 
October 2010, the WTO’s program to promote and monitor Aid for 
Trade examined the impact of trade-related development 
assistance on women, for the first time in its five-year history. 
These examples point to the importance of concrete trade-
related measures that will advance gender equality goals rather 
than exacerbate inequalities. Organizations such as the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, the International Trade Centre and others 
have suggested a number of strategies. One approach is boosting 
awareness at the trade negotiation stage, to ensure negotiators 
have capacity to assess the gender impacts of proposed 
                                                     
12 See Spieldoch, A. (2004). Beijing +10 in light of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement: How Have Women Fared? Center of Concern/U.S. Gender 
and Trade Network. 
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agreements. Others include review procedures for existing trade 
agreements and international trade regimes to ensure that they 
adhere to equal rights principles and adequate monitoring 
mechanisms that can track the impacts of agreements on women 
and other marginalized groups. Gender sensitive project 
identification, development, and evaluation mechanisms for the 
Aid for Trade Initiative are needed to ensure that both women’s 
and men’s trade interests are equally addressed. 
The WTO could be the natural place to lead this process, 
given its expertise in global rulemaking on trade issues. Regardless 
of the source of leadership, however, closing the global 
governance gap requires recognition that the aims of trade rules 
and human rights obligations can be complementary instead of 
conflicting, reinforcing instead of incoherent. Taking action to 
address the different implications of global trade rules for women 
and men could enhance the potential of international trade to 
reduce poverty and inequality. 
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The coordination of compliance between gender equality rights 
and trade policy is challenging to contemplate since, in many respects, as 
framed, implemented and monitored gender/women’s rights are not only 
in diametric opposition to trade policies but it is now clearly established 
that women’s rights are actually undermined by trade policies. In the 
paper, these issues are illuminated and opportunities to achieve a greater 
level of coordination in compliance between these two arenas are 
suggested.   
The main elements of the international bill of rights for women 
(CEDAW) is briefly outlined and the obligation of States Parties to 
ensure the ‘absence of a discriminatory legal framework and that policies 
are not discriminatory in effect’ is highlighted. The impact of neo-liberal 
trade policies on the structure of political-economy at both international 
and national levels as well as the fact that invariably free trade policies 
produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ with women being disproportionately 
impacted, are discussed. Findings from a case study of corn production in 
Mexico under NAFTA and the impacts on women engaged in corn 
production is used to illustrate this claim.        
The impacts on women in Mexico are analysed in relation to 
provisions under the CEDAW and State Party reports to CEDAW in 
2002 and 2006, post-NAFTA. As well, concluding observations and 
recommendations made to the State Party by the CEDAW committee are 
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used to support a claim that the impacts of free-trade policies on the 
erosion of women’s rights seem to be low on the agenda of both parties. 
Points of dissonance between women’s rights and trade policies are 
presented. Strategies for achieving greater coordination between CEDAW 
and trade policies are suggested for consideration. 
 
 
 
I am pleased, in my capacity as a member of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) Committee, to participate in this 
significant dialogue on ways and means for coordinating 
compliance between gender rights and more specifically women’s 
rights, and trade policies; and, express thanks to the organisers of 
this seminar for inviting me to be the voice of that group as we 
explore issues and opportunities in this regard. The coordination 
of compliance in these two arenas is, however, challenging to 
contemplate since in many respects as framed, implemented and 
monitored gender/women’s rights are not only in diametric 
opposition to trade policies but it is now clearly established that 
women’s rights are actually undermined by trade policies. In the 
following lines, my intention is to illuminate these issues and 
suggest opportunities to achieve a greater level of coordination in 
compliance between these two arenas. 
 
 
 
I am sure that you are all aware that the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) described as the international bill of rights for women, 
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is one of eight United Nations treaty-based conventions, with 
defining features that mark it off from other treaty-based and 
charter-based human rights instruments.  
The Convention sets out, in 14 articles, an agenda for 
ensuring non-discrimination against women on the basis of their 
sex, with a focus on three dimensions of equality between women 
and men. The first dimension receives the broadest attention and 
includes provisions related to civil rights and political 
participation; the legal status of women irrespective of marital 
status; women’s right to non-discrimination in education, 
employment and economic-social activities; and marriage and 
family relations.  
The second dimension focuses on the reproductive rights of 
women and the need for co-responsibility in the family to allow 
women to combine family responsibilities with paid work and 
participation in public life. 
The third dimension of the Convention acknowledges that 
the promotion of women’s rights is influenced by culture and 
tradition which, in many respects, reflect patriarchal norms and 
give rise to legal, political and economic constraints restricting 
women’s enjoyment of their fundamental rights and the overall 
advancement of women in society.   
Although the Convention, as formulated, has remained 
unchanged since coming into force in September 1981, over time, 
the CEDAW Committee has formulated a number of general 
recommendations to States Parties which elaborate on specific 
issues related to the three dimensions of the Convention, address 
emerging issues, or address issues that were not explicit in the 
original formulation, such as violence against women. The 
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Convention is therefore a dynamic instrument, continuously 
building on measures to enhance effectiveness.   
Once ratified, it is expected that States Parties will take “all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full 
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, on a basis of equality with men” 
(CEDAW, 1979, Article 3). The General Recommendation adopted 
by the Committee in its 47th session highlights the fact that the 
main obligation of States Parties is to pursue a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women through an evaluation 
of the situation at the time of ratification and the formulation and 
adoption of a comprehensive range of measures towards the 
Convention’s goals. It is underscored that such a policy must 
comprise constitutional and legislative guarantees, including an 
alignment with legal provisions at the domestic level and an 
amendment of conflicting legal provisions so that there is a strong 
focus on the primacy of the Convention in the jurisprudence of a 
State Party and the need for its integration in that system. The 
obligation of States, under CEDAW, is succinctly summed up by 
Balakrishnan and Elson (2008): “It is clear that CEDAW not only 
means the absence of a discriminatory legal framework, but also 
means that policies must not be discriminatory in effect” (p. 7). 
 
 
 
Trade policies govern trade between two or more countries 
and are formulated through intense negotiations which result in 
agreements which set out conditions of the trading relationship 
and have significant implications for economic, social and overall 
national development of the parties involved. Space does not 
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allow for a discussion of the myriad trade agreements that 
currently exist, but some of the principles that undergird these 
arrangements have implications for the promotion and protection 
of human rights and, in particular, women’s rights will be 
highlighted. 
The Association for Women’s Rights in Development 
(AWID, 2002) asserts that: 
Mainstream economic theory teaches that 
international trade is beneficial to all countries and 
their citizens. This belief is based on the idea of 
“comparative advantage“ — each country should 
focus on what it does best and trade for other 
products in order to reach the most efficient 
allocation of resources in the global economy and 
the highest levels of output and growth in all 
countries. It is assumed that trade leads to growth 
which in turn promotes national development and 
reduces poverty. (p. 1) 
 
Neo-classical economists therefore contend that the best 
trade/economic policies are those that maximize benefits and 
minimize costs, and that the greatest efficiency is achieved by 
promoting competitive market economies and neo-liberal 
economic policies which are assumed to operate without any 
government intervention. It is assumed that private ownership 
and market competiveness are likely to be the best mechanisms for 
maximizing economic growth although, under this model, it is 
recognised that there will be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; but, it is also 
assumed that if some people are left behind or made worse-off 
then ‘winners’ can compensate ‘losers’ (Balakrishnan and Elson, 
2008).  
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The structure of political-economy at both international 
and national levels, however, indicates that under neo-liberal 
policies “the process of production produces ‘winners’ who tend 
to resist any redistribution of their gains to those who are losers” 
(Balakrishnan and Elson, 2008, p. 3). 
Solomon (2010) provides data that supports this hypothesis 
and confirms that under economic neo-liberalism there has been a 
sharp increase in global inequality. She states that “measured at 
the extremes, the gap between the world’s richest country and the 
world’s poorest increased from 3:1 in 1820 to 70:1 in 2001.” 
Further, “the ratio between the average income received by the 
richest 5% and the poorest 5% of the world is 165:1” (p. 1). 
In today’s dialogue what is of particular interest is not only 
the income gap between the rich and the poor but more so the gap 
between men and women. In many (poor) developing countries 
the face of poverty is that of a woman – a phenomenon referred to 
as the feminisation of poverty occasioned as it is in many instances 
by neo-liberal policies that call for the privatisation of services, 
including education and health, formerly owned or provided by 
governments; thus, increasing the burden on women, shackled as 
they are with the burden of responsibility for reproductive work 
and the care of children and the elderly. This burden of care is 
further exacerbated by the increasing incidence of female-headed 
households where women are the primary economic provider. In 
the Caribbean, these households range from a high of 58.5% in 
Antigua and Barbuda to a low of 32.2% in Anguilla (Bailey & 
Ricketts, 2003). 
In another paper (Bailey, 2009) I point out that:  
...women in the south have been chief among those 
affected by hegemonic economic policies and 
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programmes orchestrated and managed by male 
economists and government bureaucrats in the 
north and south. (p. 47)  
 
This observation is confirmed by Women Watch, a gateway 
for providing information and resources on the promotion of 
gender equality throughout the UN system, who indicate that  the 
majority of the 1.5 billion people living on US $1.00 per day or less 
are women and worldwide women earn, on average, slightly more 
than 50% of what men earn.  
It is, therefore, now clearly established that neo-liberal 
trade and related economic policies disproportionately affect 
women. The effect is further heightened by the fact that, 
historically, women have been economically disadvantaged as a 
result of social and cultural discrimination which, in many 
developing countries, constrain access to education, technology, 
credit and land – all pre-requisites for engagement in meaningful 
productive enterprises.  
 
 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
came into force in January 1994 creating a trilateral trading bloc 
with the governments of the USA, Canada, and Mexico. The goal 
was to eliminate barriers to trade and investment among these 
countries and particularly tariffs on imports; but, as mentioned 
earlier, in such arrangements there are both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
This then begs the question: who have been the winners and losers 
under NAFTA particularly given the involvement of a relatively 
small developing country with and agriculture-based economy in 
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an arrangement with two more highly developed industrialised 
countries?  
Williams (2004) contends that too often discourses on 
NAFTA focus on the ‘losers’ in free trade and posits that there are 
‘winners’ in all three countries. Using figures that illustrate the 
growth of two-way trade between the USA and Mexico as well as 
the shift from a trade deficit to a US $37 billion trade surplus for 
Mexico under NAFTA, he argues that broadly speaking, as well 
may be the case, there have been distinct benefits derived from this 
agreement. Myles and Cahron (2004) cite a similar situation for the 
benefits that have accrued from bilateral trading between the USA 
and Canada. 
But can the same claims be made for the impact on 
individuals in these countries? Is the picture as rosy where the tyre 
hits the ground and impacts are felt by individuals? Balakrishnan 
and Elson (2008) point out that you cannot separate production 
and distribution and posit that: 
The process of production produces ‘winners’ who 
tend to resist any redistribution of their gains to 
those who are ‘losers’. The way in which the pie is 
produced constrains the way in which it can be 
sliced. (p. 3) 
 
The real test is therefore the extent to which the gains 
described above are equitably distributed particularly to meet the 
needs of vulnerable groups – the less powerful in the value chain – 
some women being a prime group in this regard. In fact, in many 
instances, the gains are realised at the expense of the exploitation 
of women’s productive capacity in paid work as well as their 
unpaid role in social reproduction. A case study of corn 
production in Mexico under NAFTA reported by Gender and 
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Trade (Gender and Trade, n.d.), an initiative of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, illustrates ways in which women are 
negatively impacted when the tyre hits the ground under such free 
trade agreements. 
The following salient points are reported: 
1. corn is one of the four major cereals that make up for more 
than half of the world’s nutrition; 
2. the US is the world’s top producer and exporter of corn 
with 40% of global production; 
3. Mexico has a strategic significance in world corn 
production for being the place of origin and domestication; 
4. in Mesoamerican cultures, the relationship of peasant 
women with corn continues to be strong including 
planting, harvesting, storage, management, drying, 
shelling, grinding and making tortillas; 
5. up until 1993, Mexico was self-sufficient in corn production 
but since NAFTA came into effect, national support 
structures have been gradually lifted and corn prices in 
Mexico have fallen due to competition from imports of US 
corn which compete in the market with low prices as a 
result of government-subsidised crop production in the US; 
6. local production has fallen while corn imports have tripled; 
7. many Mexican corn farmers who traditionally planted local 
genetically diverse species have been forced to leave their 
plots and look for other work. 
 
The report identifies specific impacts of NAFTA on women 
engaged in corn production and describes these as distressing and 
destabilising: 
 Poverty increased by five percent in female-headed 
households since the implementation of NAFTA.  
 Women, more than men, benefitted from non-traditional 
agricultural jobs, gaining 83 percent of the new jobs created 
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in the sector. However, for the same job, women made 25 
to 30 percent less than men explaining why women gained 
more jobs in this sector: they were a source of cheap labour.  
 Of women farmers in Mexico, only three percent had more 
than 10 hectares of land, much less than men, and made up 
the poorest of farmers in Mexico.  
 Additionally women were also burdened with the task of 
fetching, carrying and storing water needed for the harvest 
or for their families, for which they often needed to walk 
long distances. Additionally, the privatization of water 
turned the natural element into a commodity, limiting its 
use and submitting it to market rules, which affected the 
lower income sectors, especially women, who were 
marginalized from production processes and were further 
displaced from their control over natural resources. (p. 4) 
The case study further reveals that post-NAFTA, women 
had to seek alternative employment and found this in four main 
areas with less than ideal conditions of work and remuneration 
than previously:  
1. Women living on two or fewer hectares of land engaged in 
subsistence farming for domestic consumption and for sale, 
informally, at local markets.  
2. Women also found some employment in the fruit sector 
with non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs). 
However, these jobs are highly sex segregated with women 
situated at the bottom of the value chain typically and 
disproportionately engaged in propagating, cleaning, 
sorting, quality control, and packaging. Men typically 
assumed the tasks of supervising, transporting, storing, 
and operating machinery; and women typically earn 25-30 
percent less than men.  
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3. Women also gained employment in maquila factories where 
working conditions were often unsafe, tenuous and 
insecure. Almost 70 percent of the maquila workforce in 
Mexico is composed of women. Sixty-three percent of the 
jobs are without fringe benefits, and 17 percent offer less 
than minimum wage.  
4. Women have also been the latest major entrants into the 
informal economy to supplement household income. Of the 
jobs created since NAFTA, close to 40 percent have been in 
the informal sector. These jobs are not counted in the 
formal economy and are unprotected by labour laws. Most 
women in this sector therefore work long hours and earn 
very little from their businesses. When unpaid household 
labour is included, in both the rural and urban areas, 
women work more hours per day than men with a typical 
working day being more than eighteen hours, exceeding 
that of men by as much as 43 percent. 
 
 
 
Implementation of NAFTA agreements, therefore, 
reinforced the traditional subordination of women in the value 
chain which was already evident in pre-NAFTA corn production, 
but was further entrenched in new areas of work pursued by 
women post-NAFTA. Secondly, the direct impact on livelihoods 
no doubt created indirect impacts that further eroded women’s 
capacity to realise their legal, political, economic and social rights.  
The following summary of the case confirms: 
Mexico previously had programs in place to 
stabilize prices, support farmers and to ensure a 
certain level of national production. When Mexico 
liberalized its agricultural sector, the new policies 
devastated rural employment, increased poverty, 
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and increased dumping and migration. Prices have 
gone up drastically.   
  
Women have had to deal with these shifts in a 
variety of ways. They have found some work as a 
result of liberalization, but their jobs tend to be 
precarious, low-paid and even dangerous in the 
case of the maquiladoras. There are a growing 
number of men and women migrating to the U.S., 
leading to an increase in female-headed households 
in Mexico. Finally, poor families in the rural sector 
are having difficulty making ends meet. Their 
growing challenge to provide healthcare and food 
for their families is exacerbating food insecurity. (p. 
5)   
 
An analysis of the case from a CEDAW perspective reveals 
that the trade liberalisation policies pursued by the Mexican 
government impacted women in relation to all three dimensions of 
the Convention. The following is self-evident: 
1. traditional, stereotypical roles of men and women were 
reinforced especially in relation to work in both the public 
and private spheres (Article 5); 
2. increased levels of poverty no doubt could have 
precipitated some, or all, of the following effects: 
a) exploitation of prostitution of women occasioned by 
increased levels of poverty;  heightened migration due 
to loss of traditional work in corn production (Article 6);  
b) reduced income resulting in more limited access to: 
education for women and their children (Article 10); 
general and reproductive health services (Article 11); 
and decent employment (Article 12);  
c) increased poverty among women especially those in 
rural areas and therefore limited or no access to 
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economic benefits such as bank loans and mortgages 
(Article 13);  
d) limited access to social security and other benefits 
particularly for rural women and women in the informal 
sector engaged in both paid and unpaid work (Article 
14);  
e) limited access to legal services and the capacity to 
manage personal and family matters (Article 15). 
In spite of the extreme impacts of these neo-liberal trade 
policies on Mexican women, it is instructive to note that the State’s 
obligation under CEDAW to ‘condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms and to take steps by all appropriate means 
to pursue non-discriminatory policies,’ including trade policies, 
seems to be low on the political agenda of Mexico. To date, the 
negative effects of free trade on women’s rights also seem not to be 
highly visible on the CEDAW Committee’s agenda. Evidence to 
support these claims is based on a review of Mexico’s fifth and 
sixth periodic reports to the CEDAW Committee in 2002 and 2006, 
respectively, as well as the concluding observations and 
recommendations submitted to the State Party by the CEDAW 
Committee.  
Although NAFTA came into force in 1994, there is only 
passing reference to its direct and indirect impacts in both the 5th 
and 6th periodic reports submitted by Mexico to the CEDAW 
Committee. The content of Mexico’s 5th report (CEDAW, 2002) is 
totally devoid of any reference to free trade or the use of language 
that would suggest an appreciation of the impacts of neo-liberal 
trade/economic policies on women. This might be 
understandable, however, given that the language of the 
Convention is similarly silent on these matters which, at the time 
of formulation, were not as high on the international agenda. In 
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the concluding observations to that report (CEDAW, 2002), 
although the Committee draws attention to the adverse situation 
facing women working in the informal sector, particularly 
domestic workers and those in the maquila industry, no link is 
established between these forms of discrimination and impacts of 
agricultural liberalisation policies:   
…The committee is especially concerned about 
women working in the informal sector, including 
domestic workers, and those employed in the 
maquila industry whose basic labour rights are not 
respected; in particular, the Committee is concerned 
about the pregnancy test demanded by employers 
which exposes women to the risk of being let go or 
fired in the event that it proves positive. (#441) 
 
A similar omission is evident in the recommendation, 
which is equally devoid of any explicit reference to the 
discriminatory effect of these policies and focuses instead on 
discriminatory legislation and the need for legal reform to give 
effect to the labour rights of women:  
The State Party speed up the adoption of the 
reforms that must be made in the Labour Act, 
including the prohibition of discrimination against 
women, in an effort to ensure their participation in 
the labour market on a footing of genuine equality 
with men. It also urges the State Party to give effect 
to the labour rights of women in all sectors. To that 
end, it recommends that the State Party strengthen 
and promote the role of INMUJERES in negotiating 
the Labour Act so as to give special attention to the 
needs of women workers and to implement the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value and 
prohibit the requirement of a pregnancy test for 
maquiladora workers. (#442) 
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In focusing only on legislative measures to address these 
problems, the Committee fails to direct the State Party to the need 
to take ‘all appropriate measures’ including reform of 
discriminatory [neo-liberal] policies, to ensure the full 
development and advancement of women in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields’ (Article 3).   
In Mexico’s sixth periodic report there is a single benign 
reference to NAFTA in terms of the role played by Mexico as a 
member of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 
initiatives and resolutions developed by that body on a number of 
issues including ‘Gender and Consumption in Free Trade 
Processes’ – indicative of a lack of appreciation on the part of the 
State Party of the dissonance between targeted outcomes of neo-
liberal policies and CEDAW’s mandate to promote de facto 
substantive equality between men and women. In its follow-up 
concluding observations (CEDAW, 2006) the Committee therefore 
makes explicit reference to NAFTA and expresses regret that: 
…insufficient information was provided about the 
gender-specific impact on women of 
macroeconomic policies, in particular about the 
effects of regional trade agreements such as the 
Puebla Panama Plan and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. (#20) 
 
In the ensuing recommendation the State Party is urged to: 
…put in place an effective strategy for 
mainstreaming gender perspectives into all national 
plans and to strengthen the linkages between the 
national plans for development and poverty 
eradication and the National Programme for 
Equality of Opportunities and Non-Discrimination 
against Women with a view to ensuring the 
effective implementation of all the provisions of the 
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Convention. The Committee requests the State 
Party to include information about the effects of 
macroeconomic policies, including the regional 
trade agreements, on women, particularly on 
women living in rural areas and employed in 
agricultural activities, in its next periodic report. 
(#21) 
 
In this instance, a more integrated approach is adopted by 
the Committee and the State is asked to ensure that all national 
plans, programmes and policies are non-discriminatory; this is 
highlighted, as well as the need to understand the linkages 
between such development initiatives and poverty eradication. 
The State Party is also directed to examine the specific impacts of 
macroeconomic policies, including trade policies, on women, 
particularly rural women.   
 
 
 
The foregoing discussion points to the fact that there are 
several points of disconnect, at both international and national 
levels, between neo-liberal trade policies and international human 
rights treaties. The following issues are pertinent to the concerns of 
this volume. 
The most critical disconnect is the socio-political ideology 
undergirding neo-liberal policies which de-emphasizes positive 
government intervention in the economy, focusing instead on 
achieving progress by encouraging free-market methods and less 
restricted business operations. Supporters argue that the net gains 
for all, under free trade and capitalism, will outweigh the costs in 
all, or almost all, cases (Neo-liberalism, n.d.). The capitalist 
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economic system is, to a large extent, dependent on a compliant 
and skilled workforce to enhance and maximize production.  
The socio-political ideology undergirding sex-based 
discrimination is patriarchy, which is defined as a set of social 
relations among men that produce male solidarity and female 
subordination and have a material base, namely control of 
women’s labour, in both the private and public spheres 
(Hartmann, 1976). Under this system, women are regarded as 
secondary wage earners and are primarily relegated to the private 
domain for social reproduction of the skilled workforce, primarily 
male, required to maximize production, and as demonstrated in 
the Mexico case study, when engaged in paid work in the public 
domain, are exploited to maximize gains.  
Neo-liberal, capitalist economic models therefore flourish 
where patriarchal structures and norms, which dictate the 
subordination of women and the undervaluing of their paid 
labour, prevail, illustrating the inter-locking nature of these two 
systems and the way in which they are mutually reinforcing. Neo-
liberal trade policies, therefore, not only undermine the 
achievement of women’s human rights, but also through both 
direct and indirect effects, exacerbate sex-based discrimination and 
erode the rights enshrined under all dimensions of CEDAW. For 
this reason Hartmann (1976) opines that the ‘mutual 
accommodation between patriarchy and capitalism has created a 
vicious circle for women’ (p. 139). 
Given this disconnect, it follows that the concepts and 
language of the discourse that relates to free trade and human 
rights stand in opposition and could even be described as being 
antagonistic. In the case of neo-liberal trade policies, the frame of 
reference is macroeconomic principles: accumulation of capital, 
profit and loss, free market, competition, privatisation and winners 
Barbara Bailey 
20 
 
and losers. At the other end of the spectrum, the human rights 
discourse draws on a framework of philosophy and ethics, and 
deals with much broader issues related to equality, equity, 
fairness, vulnerability, and social, political and economic justice.  
Further, a stark contrast is evident in the legal regime 
governing trade agreements and human rights treaties such as 
CEDAW.  In the former case, States must accept the entire package 
of WTO rules or none at all (AWID, 2002). In the latter case, article 
28 of the CEDAW (1979) allows for States to make reservations at 
the time ratification or accession although #28.2 cautions that ‘A 
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present 
Convention shall not be permitted’. 
By becoming Parties to international trade and human 
rights agreements and treaties, under international law, States 
assume the responsibility to transpose related obligations into 
domestic legislation and measures compatible with obligations 
under these instruments. Trade agreements and human rights 
treaties, once adopted, become public international law, but, in 
both instances, the onus is on the State to develop national 
implementing legislation to operationalise the applicability of the 
agreements and achieve full incorporation of obligations into the 
domestic legal system as well as the policy arena. Another 
disconnect between these two domains is an apparent difference in 
the gravity placed on this commitment by governments. 
Regrettably, in the case of CEDAW, the translation of 
commitments into the domestic legal and policy frameworks does 
not readily take place so that, in many instances, States have to be 
pressed to account for their actions in this regard during the 
interactive dialogue between the State Party and the Committee 
and in follow-up recommendations set out in concluding 
observations. For the most part, there are no imposed 
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consequences for States that do not comply. Under the newly 
constituted follow-up procedure (CEDAW, 2010a) it is possible, 
however, where a follow-up recommendation is ‘not 
implemented’ by a state, for various actions to be taken, and where 
the situation warrants, for the Committee to launch an inquiry; 
but, to date, no precedent has been set.  
On the other hand, where States Parties do not comply 
with trade-panel rulings, another country can bring a case against 
them in a dispute-settlement panel and, if found guilty of a 
violation, have to comply or face sanctions. Such a country could 
risk substantial economic loss from withdrawal of trade 
concessions. The system is therefore not one of negotiation, as 
occurs in the CEDAW Committee, but is a litigation based 
enforcement system (AWID, 2002). Compliance with human rights 
obligations would, therefore, no doubt be viewed by governments 
as being less binding than trade agreements, resulting in less 
political will and commitment to a human rights agenda. For this 
reason, White (2004) opines that: 
Multilateral, regional and bilateral trade rules now 
have significantly sharper ‘teeth’ than other 
international commitments, a fact which gives 
States Parties a strong incentive to adjust their laws 
and policies to conform to trade-panel decisions, 
even at the expense of other international 
commitments or other compelling domestic 
policies. (p. 45) 
 
There is strong evidence in support of this observation. 
Firstly, there are a number of countries who have ratified the 
CEDAW that to date have not submitted an initial report on 
implementation of the Convention. Added to this, several 
countries also fail to submit periodic reports as required every four 
years. As at May 2010, there were nineteen countries that had not 
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submitted initial reports and many more had overdue periodic 
reports (CEDAW, 2010b). Secondly, at the national level, the 
positioning and resourcing of the machinery responsible for 
implementation of trade agreements are very differently 
positioned and resourced within government structures, while 
women’s machineries are frequently marginalized and under-
resourced in terms of both financial and human capacity. 
 
 
 
Given the dissonance between trade policies and human 
rights treaties, and more specifically the CEDAW, outlined in the 
preceding section, actions, informed by these issues, would need 
to be adopted, at both international and national levels, if a greater 
level of congruence and coordination is to be achieved in the 
implementation and monitoring of obligations under these 
agreements. The following are proposed for consideration: 
1. Structures and processes need to be created to facilitate an 
interface between the international bodies responsible for 
developing and monitoring trade policy and human rights; 
but, for there to be meaningful dialogue among mandate-
holders in the two arenas as well as between mandate-
holders and States Parties in either arena, they would need 
to be familiar with the concepts and the language of the 
discourse in both domains. The UN High Commissioner 
has, in fact, already produced a number of reports on trade 
and investment clarifying that international trade and 
investment agreements must be consistent with the human 
rights obligations of States (Balakrishnan & Elson, 2008, p. 
4), indicative of a move in this direction. Such an interface 
could be operationalised through cross-representation of 
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mandate-holders on monitoring bodies at the national and 
international levels. 
 
2. The under-resourcing of human rights agendas could be 
alleviated by economic growth accruing from free trade 
and the availability of increased resources for supporting 
the promotion and enjoyment of human rights. However, 
given the ‘natural’ tendency for the objects and outcomes of 
these arenas to be counter-discursive and counter-effective, 
this linkage would not be automatic and would need to be 
deliberately manipulated through a deliberate policy 
decision backed by the political will to move in that 
direction.  
 
3. Added to this, it is suggested that in trade agreements a 
human rights perspective places an obligation of conduct 
on governments to introduce safeguards or compensatory 
measures to protect discriminated groups from losses or 
the worsening of the situation of such groups after trade 
liberalization. Further, this obligation also extends to 
powerful trading partners if they also did not include 
safeguards in the agreement or limited access to markets in 
ways which minimized gains from trade (Balakrishnan & 
Elson, 2008, p. 17). In cases where women are 
disproportionately affected, the CEDAW Committee 
should hold States Parties responsible for answering to and 
addressing such negative impacts hence the need for 
competencies in the treaty body to analyse and speak to 
these issues.  
 
4. Governments should be required to monitor the potential 
and real impacts of trade rules and policies on the 
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enjoyment of human rights by individuals and groups – in 
particular the vulnerable, marginalized and socially 
excluded – through the use of human rights impact 
assessments to guide trade rule and policy making so that 
the progressive liberalization of trade promotes the 
progressive realization of human rights (Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR). 
 
5. Human rights bodies, and CEDAW in particular, should, in 
turn, consider the inclusion of ‘free trade and investment’ 
as a cross cutting theme to be addressed in country reports 
in relation to the range of women’s rights that can, 
potentially, be negatively impacted by such policies as well 
as an issue to be raised in concluding observations.  
 
 
 
The overall aim of coordination between gender rights and 
trade is to promote a human rights-based approach to trade. In the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website 
(OHCHR) this is described as: 
…a conceptual framework for the processes of trade 
reform that is normatively based on international 
human rights standards and operationally directed 
to promoting and protecting human rights. 
 
It is further stated that (OHCHR): 
Human rights law is neutral with regard to trade 
liberalization or trade protectionism.  Instead, a 
human rights approach to trade focuses on 
processes and outcomes – how trade affects the 
Barbara Bailey 
25 
 
enjoyment of human rights – and places the 
promotion and protection of human rights among 
the objectives of trade reform. In short, adopting a 
human rights approach to trade brings individuals 
and communities squarely into the processes of 
negotiating and implementing trade law.   
 
 
I would, however, proffer that adopting a human rights 
approach to trade has to be a two-way stream. It cannot be enough 
to pursue a strategy ‘to place the promotion and protection of 
human rights among the objectives of trade reform’ (OHCHR, 
n.d.). The fact is that human rights bodies have themselves not 
given adequate attention to the impacts of such policies on the 
promotion and protection of the rights for which they have 
oversight. To create a synergy for change, reform is required on 
both sides.  
In relation to CEDAW, I would suggest that this would 
best be achieved through the development of a General 
Recommendation that systematically examines the impacts of 
trade policies on women in both the North and the South and, 
based on this analysis, make recommendations that States Parties 
can pursue in an effort to ameliorate the negative and 
disproportionate impacts on women. I use this opportunity to 
make this suggestion for further consideration and possible 
support of such an initiative.  
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This presentation explores the intersection between gender, 
migration and care, offering an analysis from a trade policy perspective. 
It considers the traditional focus of trade multilateralism on the 
productive economy, and the impact of the shift both toward services and 
subsidies.  In respect of the productive economy, it considers how the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value guided a normative line 
drawing exercise in the construction of the European Economic 
Community. In respect of social reproduction, it considers the 
contemporary transnational movement of domestic workers to deliver 
market-enabling care services. It identifies the interface between trade and 
care as a contested site for the mediation of the social in the economic. 
 
 
 
The following presentation focuses on intersections 
between gender, migration and care, analyzing them from a trade 
perspective. My focus is on trade policy – as reflected in existing 
regulatory frameworks - rather than on a technical analysis of 
trade law. My goal is to develop an analysis of what trade policy 
includes and excludes. The paper considers the multilateral 
trading system on its founding as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its evolution on the conclusion of 
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the Uruguay Round into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It 
reflects on what is considered to be a legitimate trade issue and 
what is considered to fall outside trade’s boundaries. It is 
concerned to identify distributive impacts, including gender 
impacts. 
Trade policy has focused on the productive economy. 
During the life of the GATT, the multilateral system emphasized 
the terms under which commodities were exchanged across 
national borders, moving away from the ‘discrimination’ of 
extractive colonial preference (Gardner, 1947). The multilateral 
system disciplined the exchanges according to non-discrimination 
principles of national treatment, most favoured nation status, 
increasing transparency, the elimination of quotas through 
progressive tariffication, and the reduction of tariff levels. The 
focus on the production of goods was to the exclusion of ‘non-
productive’ or reproductive labour. One would have expected no 
less. The exclusion is consistent with the broader economic 
landscape and concerns. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx 
considered that while socially valuable and even noble, 
reproductive labour and social reproduction fall outside of the 
productive economy linked to consumption (Marx, 1887, p. 447-8; 
Smith, 1910, p. 294-5). 
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the scope of 
multilateral trade policy has expanded beyond traditional 
understandings and beyond a focus on production and trade in 
goods, to embrace the regulation of the valuable trade in services. 
It includes a recognition in Mode 4 of the GATS that the 
movement of persons to provide services falls within the 
boundaries of multilateral trade. The scope also includes a 
deepened attempt to characterize the notion of a subsidy and to 
apply that more broadly to the way that governments make 
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choices within their borders that may advantage particular sectors 
or particular industries. The breadth and depth of the current 
agreements of the WTO are at the heart of core global governance 
challenges.  So too are persisting exclusions.  
 
 
 
It might at first seem surprising that migrant women 
domestic workers should be relied upon to highlight the persisting 
exclusions. Consider, however, that 50% of all migrant workers are 
women, and 80% of all female migrants are domestic workers 
(Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). In other words, 
at least 40% of all workers who cross national borders engage in 
paid reproductive labour.1  In the contemporary landscape, many 
domestic workers are highly educated women, qualified as nurses 
and teachers, who travel across national borders to provide what is 
under-valued but certainly not unskilled, and “subsidized” care in 
private households. They travel from lower-income to higher-
income regions in the same country, and countries in the same 
region, or from economically underdeveloped to economically 
emerging regions of the global South. Increasingly they travel from 
South to North, leaving their own families behind, in what is 
referred to as ‘global care chains,’ to underscore the parallel global 
production chains for goods (Yeates, 2009).  
Domestic workers do not travel as do judges, academics 
and policy makers, under conditions of relative privilege. They 
relocate due to macro-economic processes of ‘care work extraction’ 
                                                     
1 It is important to recall that men also engage in domestic work, 
including migrant domestic work (McGregor, 2007).  Moreover, this total 
does not include other forms of paid care work, notably the migration of 
nursing personnel, which is also heavily gendered (Yeates, 2010). 
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linked to the ‘exhaustion of state care resources by structural 
adjustment policies that mandate the servicing of the foreign debt 
and … the depletion of the labour supply of care workers from the 
global south as they move to the global north’ (Salazar Parreñas, 
2005, p. 14). They face multiple forms of structural disadvantage 
associated with restrictive immigration controls (Quebec Human 
Rights and Youth Rights Commission, 2011). They may leave paid, 
skilled formal economy employment in their home country. Global 
wage inequality underpins the decision to accept occupational 
segmentation into precarious, low-status work abroad in which 
there may be a labour ‘scarcity,’ to send remittance resources back 
home. Moreover, even the contribution of remittances to 
development requires greater scrutiny when the impact of social 
dimensions - notably care deficits – is considered. For example, 
data suggesting that children from high migration areas are likely 
to migrate themselves before finishing school, despite the existence 
of the remittances paying for that schooling, require research and 
policy attention (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010). But my main point 
is that their disadvantage is systemic, and structured in part by the 
world trade system’s exclusions.  
In liberal trade theory, as opposed to the current world 
trade system, the liberalization of factors of production would 
include the movement of persons (Unger, 2007). The current world 
trade system takes the ‘birthright lottery’ (Schachar, 2009) as a 
given in a world constructed around state sovereignty and 
political possibility. Immigration law is anchored outside of trade, 
although ‘[f]rom a trade standpoint, limits on immigration, where 
immigration is necessary to cross-border trade in services, are 
barriers to that trade’ (Trachtman, 2009, p. 241). Despite limited, 
temporary movement of essentially (but not necessarily) “skilled” 
natural persons as an aspect of the trade in services under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Mode 4 is linked 
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to and compensates developing countries for Mode 3’s 
liberalization of commercial presence (investment) (Trachtman, 
2009, p. 63). Mode 4’s approach to national treatment and market 
access is dependent on positive disciplines entered into by states 
through a scheduling of commitments. The GATS provides the 
legal construction of a regime that confirms the predominant 
exclusion of the movement of persons from the world trading 
system.  It is less the ideal of free trade from a liberal perspective 
and more the real politik of a sovereignty-based international order. 
But beyond invisibility in trade law, global migration across 
(inevitably) porous international borders stands as a stark 
reminder of the challenge to the legal and political ideal of 
sovereignty in an era of deep global interdependence. People 
move; they move regularly through restrictive immigration 
schemes or irregularly and perilously to cross state borders.  
Increasingly the literature that looks at this informality recognizes 
the extent to which market economies of the North depend on 
labour market informality to service those industries, such as 
agriculture, that are in direct competition in terms of trade with 
the South. Migrant domestic work spotlights the growing 
dependence on the market-enabling, care work transborder trade 
in care (Blackett, 2011a). 
 
 
I am committed to the project of finding ways to make 
trade law and policy compatible with human rights protections. 
Some of the most challenging work on this interface offers an 
internal critique that pushes trade policy to be consistent with 
itself – including on the movement of persons (Unger, 2007). But, 
let me step back and talk a little bit about embedded liberalism 
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and an understanding of why we do not have a fully liberal trade 
system, but rather a system that reflects particular bargains 
established over time and the kind of compromises on which those 
negotiating the GATT in 1947 were able to commit. A report was 
prepared, interestingly, by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) for what was soon to be constructed as the European 
Economic Communities, the Group of Experts on the “Social 
Aspects of European Economic Co-operation,” presided by the 
Swedish Nobel Laureate, trade economist Bertil Ohlin (Ohlin 
Report, 1956). The Ohlin Report was broader in scope than social 
Europe, in that it considered ‘global’ trade and employment and 
some of the “problems” arising generally out of the liberalization 
of trade. The Ohlin Report looked cautiously at the notion of 
unfair competition through low wages, and despite its prudent 
approach, highlighted the potential of one unjustified inter-
industrial wage difference, which was the gender wage 
differential. That differential was said to arise on the basis of a 
failure to apply principles of equal pay for work of equal value. 
France at the time had legislation that recognized the notion of 
comparable worth and the ILO had recently adopted the Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). The Ohlin Report 
recommended that an instrument enshrining the principles in 
Convention No. 100 should be adopted; that ultimately resulted in 
the negotiated Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. And, what is so 
interesting about that example is that there was no magic line-
drawing exercise that dictated that this particular principle, from 
amongst all others, needed to be accentuated. Yes, there were 
women in low wage sectors, textiles in particular; yes, there was 
concern between France and Italy; and yes, it could be established 
that there would be an impact. However, the shift took place 
because a normative line in the sand had already been drawn, 
internationally and nationally. In other words, France had already  
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acknowledged that there was a regulatory problem - a gender 
differential pre-trade if you will - and was prepared to act on that 
to root out the differential in domestic law, consonant with 
international law. And, it became important in entering into a new 
economic community to think about the application of the labour 
principle to other members (Blackett, 2012). 
  
 
 
The Ohlin Report’s recommendation contemplated women 
working in the productive economy, producing textiles and 
clothing, although Article 119 was most famously applied by a 
flight attendant in respect of the provision of services in the airline 
industry. But let us consider the insight in relation to the market 
for care work. Many social democratic economies have assumed 
that the need for paid domestic work in modern households 
would basically be eliminated, that with more egalitarian (and 
public institution based) care policies alongside time saving 
technological innovations in domestic consumer goods – the 
vacuum cleaner, the washing machine… – societies emerging from 
modern welfare states would become more egalitarian, and would 
eliminate the need for somebody to come into the home to provide 
care. The contemporary story has not ended in greater leisure and 
greater egalitarianism. Rather, some studies find that with the 
pressures of regional integration, the direction has been toward an 
increased, or resurgent, supply as well as demand for personalized 
care by dual income households (Calleman, 2011). Privatized, 
individualized, indeed transnationally ‘subsidized’ care is not an 
egalitarian social policy but it coincides with a more complex 
policy mix linked to demographic change, aging of populations, 
and claims of identity, autonomy and dignity associated with 
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receiving care in the home by persons living with disabilities. The 
rise of these demographic factors at very least coincides with the 
dismantling of the social welfare state, and with a growing 
commoditization of – and transnational trade in - care services. 
Much of the literature that focuses upon migrant domestic 
workers’ working conditions suggests that their actual 
responsibilities in many contexts approximate nursing care or 
formal teaching. In Canada, those responsibilities may match the 
domestic workers’ formal training in their home country, as well 
as their former work experience; indeed, there is an ‘educational’ 
requirement of successful completion of the equivalent to a 12 year 
high school degree plus at least six months of training in a 
classroom setting in areas such as early childhood education, 
geriatric care, pediatric nursing or first aid. Continuous work 
experience of one year (including at least six month with the same 
employer) is a potential alternative to the six months of training 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), 2011). Yet it is fair to 
state from the conditions surrounding the Canadian domestic 
workers’ scheme that specialized training is hardly compensated 
in the remuneration, which is at best the standard minimum wage, 
assuming the unlikely condition that domestic workers are only 
required to work ‘normal’ weekly working hours2 (ILO, 2009). 
Moreover, the Canadian live-in caregiver program requires foreign 
domestic workers to live in their employer’s house. The 
requirement fosters much of domestic workers’ labour market 
disadvantage, confining them to the ‘boundarilessness’ of long 
hours and isolation.  That same live-in requirement – one that few 
Canadians and permanent residents of Canada would accept – is 
                                                     
2 See Regional Wages (2012), Working Conditions and Advertisement 
Requirements for the Live-In Caregiver Program (LCP), available at 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/foreign_workers/advert
Req/wageadreq.shtml#tphp.  
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framed as the justification for the ‘positive labour market opinion’ 
necessary to establish that there is a need for a foreign worker to 
fill the position (CIC, 2011).   
Consider, moreover, that most countries in the 
industrialized North do not actually have formalized schemes for 
domestic workers; migrant domestic workers generally navigate 
labour market irregularity and informality in the global North and 
in the global South (Chen, 2011). Abject, systematic neglect of 
labour law enforcement – when the laws do and can apply - may 
contribute to forced labour conditions, (ILO, 2009) and 
contemporary forms of slavery and servitude (UN Special 
Rapporteur, 2010). 
The global phenomenon of migrant domestic workers 
providing care services across national borders enables and 
sustains ‘citizens’ (labour) force participation. Migrant domestic 
workers contribute to the economy while also providing the social 
reproductive labour (care, education) necessary for the next 
generation of market actors. How can we think about those 
persons who move across borders at their peril, in the absence of 
any recognition within the WTO framework of what some have 
referred to as a “generalizable” principle of reasonable labour 
market access (Lee, 2006)? 
 
 I increasingly consider that in the field of migration, we 
need to think carefully about how to craft an alternative mediation 
of the social in the economic, which includes social reproduction 
through the delivery of care services. Under Europe’s post-War 
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embedded liberal bargain, the trade-production nexus was a basis 
upon which domestic social policy distributions were built. That 
embedded liberal bargain was ultimately unstable in the face of 
liberalized financialization and weak labour harmonization 
(Giubonni, 2006). It is suggested that the transnational ‘human 
rights’ line-drawing underscored in the Ohlin Report offers a hint 
at the necessary rethinking of global distributive justice, 
particularly as it relates to migration, development, and 
international solidarity. That rethinking must frame the conditions 
under which people move to provide services, including to 
provide care.  
For example, historic standard-setting at the ILO level has 
led in June 2011 to the adoption of a new binding treaty 
(Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 
2011) and a non-binding supplementary recommendation 
(Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers, 2011). The standard setting seeks to establish a distinct, 
human rights-based framework for asserting equal treatment via 
specific labour regulation for domestic workers. It normalizes 
working hours, calls into question the reliance on a live-in 
requirement, establishes the need for equal treatment, reinforces 
the freedom of association, and offers specific guidance on 
adapting labour regulatory frameworks to the specific 
circumstances of domestic workers while preserving their right to 
equal treatment. It promotes clarity and fairness in contracts; 
foresees social protection, occupational safety and health 
mechanisms; emphasizes meaningful enforcement; and foresees 
multilevel governance approaches and international cooperation. 
It also seeks to regulate against the abuses of employment 
agencies. Crucially, and unlike other UN and ILO instruments 
relating to migrant workers, the new Convention and 
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Recommendation apply equally to all domestic workers (Blackett, 
2011b).   
To conclude, standard-setting offers one discrete starting 
point through which to understand compliance. I take the call for 
reasonable labour market access to be linked to providing decent 
work standards and creating a space for a range of international 
organizations, including the ILO, to work collaboratively to think 
about both the relationship between sectoral liberalization of 
movements and ensuring that labour conditions are respected 
across the board. 
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The paper analyses the evolution of the gender wage differentials 
in India from 1987 till 2005 and how it was affected by trade reforms 
undertaken during this period. Exploiting the variation in pre-industrial 
composition of district and the variation in the quantum of tariff rate 
reduction across industries, the paper analyses how district tariffs, 
constructed as employment weighted average of tariff rates of industries 
located within a district, affects male and female wages differentially. The 
estimates reveal that tariff rate reductions led to a 1.7 percent drop in 
mean male wages with no effect on mean female wages. These results 
imply that tariff reductions led to a 7.2 percent drop in the average 
gender wage gap. Further analysis using unconditional quantile 
regressions show that most of these effects were driven by changes at the 
lower end of the wage distribution where tariff reductions led to an 
increase in female wages and decrease in male wages. 
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Women form one of the most disadvantaged socio-
economic groups in India. Although there is a general feeling in 
India that there has been an improvement in the material and 
social conditions of women over the past two decades, the 
empirical evidence so far has been mixed and scanty. Hence, there 
is a need for rigorous economic analyses of gender discrimination 
so as to explain the current trends of such discrimination, the 
factors behind it and possible ways to overcome the menace of 
discrimination. One important manifestation of gender-based 
discrimination is the gender pay gap in the labour market. In this 
paper I study the changing nature of the gender pay gap in the 
wake of the process of market reforms started in the early 1990s in 
India.    
The 1990s were a crucial period in the history of India. In 
1991, the first wave of market reforms (some reforms on a much 
smaller scale had been introduced in the 80s) were introduced and 
subsequent waves of reforms have been pursued thereafter. The 
reforms did away with the License Raj (investment, industrial and 
import licensing), ended many public monopolies, lowered tariffs 
on imports and opened up most sectors of the economy to private 
and foreign investment. These reforms were instrumental in 
unshackling the Indian economy – India recorded an average 
growth rate of around 9% in the last five years compared to the 
Hindu Growth Rate1 it experienced in the pre-reforms era. The 
decade also saw a rise in caste and gender movements with 
disadvantaged castes slowly asserting themselves in the political 
arena. The gender equality movement also picked up in this 
                                                     
1 The Hindu Growth Rate refers to the low levels of growth that India 
experienced in the time period 1950-1990 (an average of 3.5%). 
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period; seats were reserved in the Panchayats (village councils) for 
women and a movement was launched to reserve seats for women 
in the Union Parliament.    
In his seminal work, Becker (1957) argued that 
discrimination unrelated to workers’ productivity is costly and 
may not be sustainable in a competitive market. Applying Becker’s 
theory to the gender pay gap framework, since discriminating 
employers would not hire the profit-maximizing level of female 
employees, they cannot, in the long run, survive in a competitive 
market against non-discriminating employers. Non-discriminating 
firms should expand and discriminating firms contract, until the 
wage gap between men and women with the same skills is 
eliminated.   
Tariff reforms might be one such channel through which 
discrimination might decrease. As the government reduces tariffs 
across traded industries, it leads to an increase in the 
competitiveness of the traded sectors, which might translate into a 
reduction of the gender wage gap (Black & Brainerd, 2004). 
However, other empirical work has challenged this notion 
that discrimination might reduce in the face of competition from 
increased trade (Berik, Rodgers, & Zveglich, 2004; Menon & 
Rodgers, 2009). As liberalization makes the market more 
competitive, economically weaker groups, such as women, will 
lose in the wage bargaining process. Hence, female workers might 
find themselves at a disadvantage in a period of creative 
destruction, essentially entailed by a process like economic 
liberalization (Kotwal, Ramaswami, & Wadhwa, 2011). Also, if 
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trade is skill biased in nature and if women have lower levels of 
skills than men, we might see an increase in the gender wage gap.2   
In this paper, I study how the trade reforms in India in the 
1990s affected the gender wage gap in India. Following Topalova 
(2005), I calculate the district level tariffs as employment weighted 
average of the tariffs faced by industries located within a district. 
Then, I examine the effect of these district tariffs on wages by 
running regressions of log wages on this measure of district tariffs 
and an interaction of a female dummy and the district tariff 
variable. Since my district tariff variable is an employment (1987 
levels of employment) weighted average of tariff rates of 
industries located within a district, I am able to exploit the 
variation in the pre-reform industrial composition across districts 
in India and the quantum of tariff rate liberalization across 
industries to identify the effects of tariff reforms on wages. The 
results suggest that the trade reforms had a significant impact on 
the gender wage gap and in fact it accounted for about 14 percent 
of the change in the gender wage gap that occurred during the 
period 1987-2005. Unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo, 
Fortin, & Lemmiuex, 2009) estimates show that the above effects 
are mainly driven by changes at the lower quantiles of the wage 
distribution. There is modest empirical literature that looks at the 
effect of trade on the gender wage gap. Artecona & Cunningham 
(2002), Berik, Rodgers & Zvelich (2004), and Black & Brainerd 
(2004) all use the same strategy of comparing the effects of trade 
on the residual gender wage gap in concentrated industries with 
the effects in competitive industries. However, these studies have 
different findings regarding the effects of trade on the gender pay 
gap according to the countries they study.   
                                                     
2 See Epifani & Gancia (2008) for evidence on skill bias of international 
trade. 
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In the Indian context, Menon & Rodgers (2009) and Dutta 
& Reilly (2005) look at the effect of trade reforms on the gender 
wage gap. Menon & Rodgers (2009) find that increased trade 
liberalization is associated with larger wage gaps in India’s 
concentrated manufacturing industries. Dutta & Reilly (2005), 
using import/export shares and tariff rates as measures of 
international trade, find that trade-related measures are not 
important determinants of the industry-level gender pay gap and 
“appear to have exerted a relatively benign influence on the 
evolution of the industry gender pay gap in India over the last two 
decades.” However, a key shortcoming of all these papers is that 
they concentrate only on the manufacturing sector. By doing so, 
they ignore the agricultural and mining sectors which might be an 
important omission in the case of India since, unlike other 
developing countries, India also pushed for trade reforms in the 
agricultural sector and because agriculture occupies an important 
place in India’s economy. Moreover, by only looking at traded 
industries and conducting regressions at the industry level, the 
studies might be missing important spillover effects across 
industries on individuals working in other traded and non-traded 
industries. This is precisely the gap in the literature that I address 
and thus hopefully give a more comprehensive account of the 
effect of trade on female wages relative to male wages.   
This paper is also related to the broader empirical literature 
that looks at different developmental effects of India’s trade 
reforms. Topalova (2005) finds that in rural India, districts where 
industries were more exposed to trade reforms experienced lesser 
reductions in poverty than districts where industries were less 
exposed to trade reforms. Edmonds, Pavcnik, & Topalova (2009) 
suggest that, although there were substantial increases in school 
attendance and decreases in child labour in urban India between 
1987 and 2000, yet among urban areas these benefits were 
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attenuated in those with employment concentrated in industries 
losing tariff protection with India’s 1991 tariff reforms. This paper 
contributes to the debate about globalization’s effects on 
developing countries like India by analyzing how wage 
differentials by gender were affected by the tariff reforms in India 
in the last two decades.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, I 
present a brief review of the Indian trade reforms. Section III 
discusses the empirical methodology employed in the paper, while 
Section IV describes the data used in the study. Section V presents 
the main results of the paper, and finally Section VI provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
After gaining independence in 1947, India embarked on a 
path of central planning. The first three decades of central 
planning were marked by very low rates of growth, averaging 
around 3.6 percent annually. Topolova (2005) characterizes India’s 
trade regime as “amongst the most restrictive in Asia, with high 
nominal tariffs and non-tariff barriers, including a complex import 
licensing system, an ‘actual user’ policy that restricted imports by 
intermediaries, restrictions of certain exports and imports to the 
public sector (‘canalization’), phased manufacturing programs that 
mandated progressive import substitution, and government 
purchase preferences for domestic producers.”  
It was during the 1980s under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi that certain reforms3 began in India’s 
                                                     
3 The discussion on India’s reforms that follows draws mostly from 
Tendulkar (2007), Joshi and Little (1996), and Panagriya (2004). 
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economy. Import licensing restrictions were eased, quantitative 
restrictions were converted into tariffs, and by 1990 industrial 
licensing requirements were also eased and 31 sectors were 
exempted from industrial licensing. These trade liberalization 
measures accompanied by expansionary fiscal policy raised the 
growth rate in India from the “Hindu” rate of approximately 3.5 
percent during 1950-1980 to 5.6 percent during 1981-1991. 
However India’s trade regime was still quite restrictive. In 1990-
1991, the highest tariff rate stood at 355 percent, the simple average 
of all tariff rates was at 113 percent, and the import-weighted 
average of tariff rates at 87 percent. Also, only 30 percent of total 
imports could be imported under an open general license 
(Panagriya, 2004). 
 However, India was soon hit by a balance of payments 
crisis in 1991. In the previous few years, India had tried to cope 
with its increasing fiscal deficit by resorting to commercial 
borrowing in the international capital market and by attracting 
deposits from non-resident Indians (NRI) by offering them more 
attractive terms. These sources of financing were not only more 
costly in terms of debt-servicing obligations, but also more volatile 
as these were subjected to expectations about foreign exchange 
risks. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 
in general also affected India adversely as these countries were 
important trading partners of India.   
The looming crisis was precipitated by two exogenous 
shocks to the economy. The first was a political crisis. After the 
1989 national elections, India experienced a period of political 
instability marked by the falling of two non-Congress4 
                                                     
4 The Indian National Congress is one of the main national political 
parties of India and has been in power at the central government for 
about 52 years out of the 65 years that India has been independent.  
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governments in quick succession, leading to a mid-term election in 
May 1991 (Tendulkar, 2007). On top of these events, Rajiv Gandhi 
was assassinated during the election campaign of the 1991 
elections. These events of political instability severely undermined 
investor confidence in India. The other exogenous shock to the 
economy was the Gulf War, which led to a spike in oil prices. This 
resulted in the doubling of the oil import bill from US$ 3 billion in 
1988-1989 to US$ 6 billion in 1990-1991, which amounted to a jump 
from a quarter of export earnings to one third. The Gulf War also 
led to a serious dip in the remittances sent by Indians working in 
the Gulf. These exogenous events led to heavy pre-redemption 
withdrawals of NRI deposits and a reduction in the availability of 
commercial borrowings as expectations of an imminent 
devaluation of the rupee gained ground. In the face of this capital 
outflow, the government increasingly resorted to short-term 
borrowings. However, even this became difficult to obtain when 
international credit rating agencies in the USA and Japan 
downgraded India’s credit rating.  
To overcome this crisis, the Indian government requested a 
stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The IMF support was conditional on a program of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. Thus, in June 
1991 India announced a comprehensive set of fiscal, industrial and 
trade reforms. These reforms included reductions in subsidies, 
disinvestments in Public Sector Units and the dismantling of the 
industrial licensing system. 
Concurrent with the above reforms, sweeping trade 
reforms were also carried out. The share of products subject to 
quantitative restrictions decreased from 87 percent in 1987-1988 to 
45 percent in 1994-1995. In April 1992, all 26 import-licensing lists 
were eliminated and a “negative” list was established (from which 
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most intermediate and capital goods were excluded), the items in 
such list could not be imported. Average nominal tariffs fell from 
more than 80 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1997, and standard 
deviation also fell by around 50 percent during this time period 
(Figures 1 and 2).  Figures 1 and 2 also reflect the two main 
guiding principles of the tariff reforms which were outlined in the 
Chelliah Report of The Tax Reform Commission constituted in 
19915  – i.e. reductions in the average level and in the dispersion of 
tariff rates.  
Since my empirical strategy exploits the variation in the 
pre-reform industrial composition of a district and the variation in 
tariff rates across industries, exogeneity of the tariff reforms is a key 
requirement of my empirical strategy. Thus, my empirical strategy 
would fail to identify the causal impact of the trade reforms on the 
gender wage gap if, for example, the decrease in tariffs were just a 
continuation of a secular trend or if there were any unobservable 
factors (economic, political and social factors) which are correlated 
both with the degree of protection enjoyed by an industry and 
wage differential across gender. Thus, it would be difficult to 
prove a causal effect of tariff reforms if unobserved time varying 
factors that are correlated with overall wages or gender wage 
differentials affected the quantum of tariff reduction.  
However, the nature of the 1991 trade reforms done in 
India suggests that the reforms were carried out primarily due to 
exogenous reasons, namely external pressure from international 
lending agencies (Goyal, 1996). As mentioned earlier, the guiding 
                                                     
5 The main recommendations of the Chelliah Report were: a) reduction of 
the general level of tariffs; b) reduction of the spread or dispersion of 
tariff rates; c) simplification of the tariff system; d) rationalization of the 
tariff rates along with the abolition of numerous exemptions and 
concessions; and e) abolition of the practice in making changes in 
effective rates through notifications.  
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principles behind tariff reforms were reductions in the average 
level and standard dispersion in tariffs, and these were ultimately 
implemented. Across the board, tariff reforms were carried out 
and there is no evidence which suggests that particular industries 
were targeted for tariff reductions. Topalova (2005) examines this 
issue in great detail. Her paper shows that there was uniform 
movement in tariffs across industries, there is no correlation 
between future tariffs and current productivity, and that changes 
in industry tariffs appear uncorrelated with important 
characteristics of the industry that might indicate political 
protection such as employment, output, average wage, 
concentration and share of skilled workers. All these results give 
further credence to my empirical strategy of exploiting the 
variation in the pre-reforms industrial composition of a district 
and the variation in tariff rates across industries.  
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, my empirical strategy exploits the 
exogenous nature of the Indian trade reforms. To test if tariff 
reforms have affected wage differentials by gender, I run 
regressions of the following type:  
 
 
 
In this formula, i indexes individuals, d indexes district and t 
indexes time periods. Yidt is the log wages of individual i in district 
d in the time period t, while µt and θd are time fixed effects and 
district fixed effects, respectively. Female is a female dummy, 
Tariffd,t  is the district level tariff measure, and Tariffd,t*Female is 
the interaction term of the female dummy and the district level  
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tariff measure. Xit is a vector of individual controls, which includes 
a marital status dummy, three religion variables, a quadratic in 
potential experience, total children in the family, a caste dummy 
and four education variables. The parameter β on the interaction 
term of the tariff measure and female dummy is the main 
parameter of interest – this captures the differential effect that 
tariffs had on female wages relative to male wages. In this 
specification, identification of the policy parameter comes from 
variation in the pre-reform industrial composition of districts and 
the variation in tariff rates across industries. Thus, I essentially 
compare individuals in districts with industries which were more 
exposed to tariff reforms to districts with industries that were less 
exposed to tariff reduction to get the effect of tariff reform. As this 
comparison is also done across gender, I get the effect that district 
tariffs had on female wages in comparison to male wages.   
Following Topalova (2005), I construct the level of tariffs 
that a district faces as follows:  
 
 
In constructing the tariff measure, I assign zero tariffs to all 
industries in the non-traded sector – i.e. services, retail and 
wholesale trade, and construction.   
The important thing to note is that the above methodology 
does not tell us the effects of tariff reforms on the gender wage gap 
per se. Rather, it tells us how districts which had industries more 
exposed to tariff reforms fared in terms of the wage differential 
across gender to districts whose industries remained protected or 
less exposed to tariff reforms. The other important aspect of this 
methodology is that, since the tariff measure is calculated as an 
average for all workers in the district, it captures the effect of trade 
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reforms not only on workers in the traded sectors (agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing) but also on all other workers in the 
non-traded sectors within a district; thus, it captures any spillover 
effects of tariff reforms.   
One important concern with the above tariff measure is 
that it is influenced mechanically by the size of the non-traded 
sector, which might bias our estimates. For example, if workers in 
non-traded industries are on a differential growth path than those 
in traded industries, my tariff measure might capture this 
differential growth rather than the effect of trade reforms. Hence, I 
also use the following as my district tariff variable to ascertain if 
the above is indeed a concern:  
 
Traded Tariffd,t  only depends on workers in the traded sectors; 
thus, there will be no mechanical effect of the non-traded sector in 
a district on this measure. When I use the traded tariff variable in 
my regressions, I restrict my sample to workers only in the traded 
sectors.  
I also estimate equation (1) at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution using unconditional quantile regressions 
pioneered by Firpo, Fortin, & Lemmiuex (2009). These regressions 
help us to estimate the effect of an independent variable on 
various quantiles of the unconditional distribution of the 
dependent variable.6  Looking at the effects of tariff reforms on the 
gender wage gap at different quantiles of the wage distribution is 
important because there might be important differences in the 
effects of tariff reforms at various points in the wage distribution 
                                                     
6 Unconditional quantile regressions are explained in greater detail in the 
Appendix.  
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that we fail to capture by only looking at mean effects. Standard 
wage decompositions by the Oaxaca-Blinder method (Oaxaca, 
1973; Blinder, 1973) using unconditional quantile regression 
estimates, show that the total gender wage gap decreases as one 
moves up the wage distribution in both time periods (1987-1988 
and 2004-2005). The other interesting fact is that the wage structure 
effect (the unexplained part) of the gender wage gap had increased 
over time and more so at the upper quantiles.7  These are some of 
the interesting facts that I want to capture in my quantile analysis 
to determine if trade reforms are responsible for these kinds of 
effects.  
 
 
 
In this study, I use household survey data and tariff data. 
The household survey data is provided by the National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO), India’s governmental data collection 
agency. The data used corresponds to the Employment-
Unemployment Schedule of the 43rd and the 61st rounds of the 
NSS surveys conducted during 1987-1988 and 2004-2005, 
respectively. These are the quinquennial rounds, which have 
employment information on more than 100,000 households 
covering the whole of India, constituting a nationally 
representative sample survey. These surveys have detailed 
information on employment characteristics and demographic 
characteristics of individuals. I use only the urban section8 of these 
surveys for my analysis. I include only individuals who are in the 
                                                     
7 These results are from an earlier work of mine. See Roy Chaudhuri 
(2010). 
8 I only use the urban samples because there are problems with the wage 
data in the rural sample of the 43rd round. Specifically, a lot of wages are 
missing or reported as zero. 
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working age category – i.e. in the age group 16-65. I also include 
only those individuals who are characterized as working for 
regular wages during the reference period of the sample. Thus, I 
exclude self-employed individuals, unemployed individuals, 
students and retirees from the sample. As I am comparing the 
gender pay gap across time, I use the consumer price index for 
urban industrial workers9 to deflate 2004-2005 relative to that of 
1987-1988 wages.  
I have annual tariff data at the six-digit level of the Indian 
Trade Classification Harmonized System (HS) code for 1987-2001 
and 2004-2005. Petia Topalova (2005) collected the data for 1987-
2001 from various publications by the Ministry of Finance. I 
extracted the tariff data for 2004-2005 from the UNCTAD-TRAINS 
database. I then matched more than 5000 product lines of the HS 
code to the 3-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC)-87 code 
using the concordance of Debroy and Santhanam (1993). Industry 
tariffs were then calculated as the simple average of all products 
matched to that industry.  
Since district names and boundaries have changed in quite 
a few places over the period 1987-2005, I used Census Atlases to 
match districts across time periods. I also used the concordances 
supplied by the NSSO to consistently map the industrial 
classifications across time since the 1987-1988 survey had used the 
NIC-70 codes, while the 2004-2005 survey had used the NIC-98 
codes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 These figures are taken from the website of Reserve Bank of India, the 
Central Bank of India. 
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Descriptive Statistics   
Tables 1 and 2 (See Tables and Figures section) contain the 
descriptive statistics of log wages and individual worker 
characteristics, while Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics of 
the district tariff measures. Looking across Tables 1 and 2, we see 
that there has been an increase in real wages for both men and 
women over time with a simultaneous increase in dispersion for 
both male and female wages. The descriptive statistics of the 
demographic variables suggest that there has not been any major 
change in the nature of the work force over time.   
If we look at the numbers in Table 3, they confirm the 
nature of the tariff reforms suggested by the figures 1 and 2 that 
we described earlier. There has been a large change in the means 
of both district tariff measures, accompanied by even larger 
changes in the dispersion of these tariff measures over the time 
period 1987-2005. Since the measure ‘Traded Tariffd,t’ is weighted 
only by traded workers, it is much larger in magnitude than scaled 
tariffs which are weighted by all the workers in a district.  
Regression Estimates   
Table 4 contains the results of estimation of equation (1). 
Columns (1) and (3) contain estimates for the entire sample using 
scaled tariffs as the relevant tariff measure, while columns (2) and 
(4) are based on regressions which have as its sample only workers 
in traded industries, with traded tariff being the relevant tariff 
measure in these columns. For the sake of brevity, the table 
contains estimates of coefficients of only the district tariffs variable 
and the interaction term of the female dummy and district tariffs. 
In the regressions in columns (3) and (4), I also include a set of one-
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digit occupation dummies. All of the regressions are weighted 
using sample weights and clustered at the district level.  
All the estimates in Table 4 are significant except the 
estimate for district tariffs in column (3). In all of the specifications, 
the district tariff variable is estimated to have a positive sign, while 
the interaction between the tariff measure and the female dummy 
has a negative sign. This means that, while the tariff reductions 
had led to a reduction in male wages, females fared better – the 
negative sign on the interaction term means that in comparison to 
male wages, decreases in tariff rates had a beneficial effect on 
female wages.  
To understand the economic significance of these estimates, 
I performed the following calculations: since my dependent 
variable is log wages, the estimates of the coefficients can be 
interpreted as percent changes in the dependent variable given a 
unit change in the independent variable. The average district faced 
an 8.72 point drop in scaled tariff rates in the period under study. 
Thus, the estimates in column (1) suggest that district tariffs had 
led to a 1.7 percent drop in mean male wages, whereas overall 
there was more than a 35 percent increase in mean male wages in 
the same period. Given that district tariffs had no effect on mean 
female wages (-0.002+0.002=0), this drop in male wages implies 
that tariff reductions led to a 7.2 percent drop in the average 
gender wage gap.10  Thus, the estimates suggest that tariff rate 
reforms are responsible for a significant decrease in the gender 
wage differential.  
Turning to the unconditional quantile regression estimates 
in Table 5, we see that the estimates for district tariffs are 
                                                     
10 Percent change in the gender wage gap=8.72*0.002*(ym/ym-yf)*100 
where ym=36.93, yf=27.93. 
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significant only at the 10th quantile while estimates for the 
interaction term are significant at the 10th and 90th quantiles. 
These results suggest that the effects of the district tariffs at the 
mean that we saw in Table 1 are mostly driven by the effects at the 
lower quantiles of the wage distribution. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is also large at the lower quantile in comparison to the 
estimates at the upper quantiles and the estimates at the mean in 
Table 1. Summing up the two estimates in column (1), they suggest 
that at the 10th quantile of the wage distribution, tariff rate 
reduction not only reduced the gender wage gap by adversely 
affecting male wages but it also led to an increase in overall female 
wages (-0.009+0.003= -0.006). Thus, while males suffered an 
absolute decrease in their wages at this lower quantile of the wage 
distribution, females actually experienced an absolute increase in 
their wages due to the reduction in tariff rates.  
Discussion of Results  
The estimates in the two tables together suggest that 
although reductions in tariff rates had a negative impact on male 
wages, it actually decreased the gender wage gap and in fact 
increased female wages, particularly at the lower quantile of the 
wage distribution. One of the reasons why we saw such a 
reduction in the gender wage gap could be because tariff reforms 
led to a decrease in the level of discrimination faced by female 
employees by increasing competition in the spirit of Becker’s 
theory of taste-based discrimination. Inability of firms to 
discriminate in a competitive environment fostered by tariff 
reforms would lead to a rise in female wages and possibly a 
reduction in male wages if it was true that male workers were 
previously earning rents which are now being captured by female 
workers. Although direct evidence to prove that tariff reforms led 
to a reduction in discrimination of female employees is hard to 
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establish, quite a few studies examining the U.S. labour market 
have shown that increased competition does lead to a reduction in 
the gender wage gap (Ashenfelter & Hannan, 1986; Hellerstein, 
Neumark, & Troske, 2002). 
Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) did one of the earliest 
studies in the literature where they analyzed gender 
discrimination in the banking industry. Using firm-specific data, 
the authors found a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between market concentration (assumed to proxy 
product market competition) and relative employment of women. 
Black and Strahan (2001) also studied the banking industry; they 
found that deregulation reduced rents enjoyed by banks and 
significantly improved the relative wages of women. This suggests 
that the ability to discriminate in sharing rents with different 
groups of workers was affected by deregulation as rents declined. 
The improvement in female relative wages occurred both because 
women's occupational status improved after deregulation and because 
male workers' wages fell more than female wages. Hellerstein, 
Neumark, and Troske (2002) found that among plants with high 
levels of product market power, those employing more women 
were more profitable, with no such relationship existing for plants 
with low levels of market power; these results are consistent with 
sex discrimination in wages in the short run in markets where 
plants have product market power. 
The reduction in male wages following tariff rate cuts, 
particularly at the lower quantile of the wage distribution, can be 
due to the process of creative destruction that happened during 
this period of trade reforms when old jobs were lost and new jobs 
were created. Kotwal, Ramaswami, and Wadhwa (2011) discuss 
how employment in the organized sector was reduced after 1997, 
while that in the unorganized sector rose. According to the 
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authors, one of the plausible reasons behind this phenomenon is 
that “competition had intensified in India’s manufacturing sector 
by the late [1990s] as a result of easier entry and declining tariffs 
through the decade. Firms looked for ways to cut costs and given 
the rigid labour laws, sub-contracting and use of contract labour 
afforded firms lower labour costs and greater flexibility.” The 
authors point out the high turnover rates during 1999-2004 and go 
on to show that among large firms in the organized manufacturing 
sector, the only type of labour that saw an increase was contract 
labour. Thus, if it is true that the loss of permanent jobs moved 
people into contract labour, there might be a wage reduction for 
these workers; if this process occurred more for males, then we 
would see a reduction in male wages.  
Kumar and Mishra (2008) use variation in industry wage 
premiums and trade policy across industries and over time to 
estimate a negative and robust relationship between changes in 
trade policy and changes in industry wage premiums over time. 
The authors also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India 
since the reduction in tariffs within an industry is associated with 
an increased wage premium for unskilled workers, but a reduced 
wage premium for skilled workers. If women have lower levels of 
skills than men, particularly at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, then these results suggest a decrease in the gender 
wage gap caused by an increase in female wages and decrease in 
male wages, results which are consistent with the ones found in 
this paper. Although I control for education and potential 
experience in the regressions, there are other components of skill 
that I might be missing, such as actual labour market experience or 
soft skills. It has been shown that both potential labour market 
experience and soft skills are important determinants of labour 
market status of individuals.   
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This paper establishes that in urban India among male 
wage earners, individuals living in districts which had industries 
more exposed to tariff reforms experienced a reduction in wages 
compared to individuals living in districts which had industries 
less exposed to tariff reforms in the period between 1987 and 2005. 
Over this same period, gender wage differentials also decreased in 
response to tariff reforms. The other interesting fact that emerges 
from this analysis is that these effects are mostly driven by the 
effects at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution.  
Although the above analysis has been successful in 
establishing the effect of the trade reforms in India in the last two 
decades, questions remain about the exact channels through which 
these effects were seen. A sectoral analysis, as well as analyzing 
the changes in the gender wage differentials in a supply-demand 
framework, might shed light on the exact channel through which 
tariff reforms affected the gender wage gap; this area remains on 
the agenda for future research.  
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable 
in all the regressions is log of daily wages. While the regressions in 
columns one and three are estimated for the entire sample using 
scaled tariffs as the relevant tariff measure whereas the regressions 
in columns two and four are restricted to only those workers in the 
traded sectors and thus I use the traded tariffs as the relevant tariff 
measure. In addition to the above regressors, all regressions 
include a female dummy, a marital status dummy, three religion 
variables, a quadratic in potential experience, total children, a caste 
dummy, four education variables, state, district, state-time and 
time dummies. The regressions in columns three and four also 
include a set of one-digit occupation dummies. All regressions are 
weighted by sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level. 
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Note: These regressions are estimated using Unconditional 
Quantile Regressions (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemmiuex, Unconditional 
Quantile Regressions, 2009). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in all the regressions is log of daily wages. 
The tariff measure used is scaled tariffs.  In addition to the above 
regressors, all regressions include a female dummy, a marital 
status dummy, three religion variables, a quadratic in potential 
experience, total children, a caste dummy, four education 
variables, district and time dummies. All regressions are weighted 
by sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the district 
level. 
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Unconditional Quantile Regressions (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemmiuex, 
2009)  
In this study, I am interested in the effects of the different 
covariates on the quantiles, denoted qτ, of the marginal 
(unconditional) distribution, FY (y) of log wages.11  As an example, 
suppose I would like to estimate the effect dqτ (p) /dp of being 
married, p = Pr[X = 1], on the τth quantile of the distribution of 
wages, where X = 1 if the worker is married, and X = 0 otherwise, 
and Y represents wages. In the case of the mean μ, the coefficient β 
of an OLS regression of Y on X is a measure of the effect of being 
married on the mean wage, dμ (p) /dp. Also, the same coefficient β 
can be interpreted as an impact on the conditional mean due to the 
nature of the expectation function. However, the coefficient βτ from 
a single conditional quantile regression, (Koenker & Bassett, 1978; 
Koenker, 2005), βτ = F
−1Y (τ |X = 1) − F
−1Y (τ |X = 0), is usually 
different from dqτ (p) /dp = (Pr[Y >qτ | X = 1] − Pr [Y >qτ| X = 0]) 
/fY (qτ ), the effect of being married on the τth quantile of the 
unconditional distribution of Y. Hence, we need to use a different 
method to estimate unconditional quantile regression coefficients.   
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) use the concept of the 
influence function to estimate unconditional quantile regressions. 
The influence function IF(Y; ν, FY) of a distributional statistic, ν 
(FY), represents the effect of an individual observation on that 
distributional statistic. Adding back the statistic ν (FY) to the 
influence function yields the Recentered Influence Function (RIF). 
For the Recentered Influence Function, the expectation is equal to 
                                                     
11 In the discussion that follows, I draw heavily from Firpo, Fortin, & 
Lemmiuex (2009). 
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ν(FY). For the τth quantile, the influence function IF (Y; qτ, FY) is 
equal to (τ−I {Y ≤ qτ}) /fY (qτ). As a result, RIF(Y; qτ, FY) is equal to qτ 
+ IF (Y; qτ, FY). When the distributional statistic is a quantile, the 
conditional expectation of the RIF (Y; qτ, FY) modeled as a function 
of the explanatory variables E [RIF (Y; qτ, FY) |X] = mτ (X) can be 
viewed as an unconditional quantile regression. Firpo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (2009) show that the average derivative of the 
unconditional quantile regression, E [m´τ (X)], corresponds to the 
marginal effect on the unconditional quantile of a small location 
shift in the distribution of covariates, holding everything else 
constant. The above method can be easily implemented as an OLS 
regression. The dependent variable in a quantile regression is RIF 
(Y; qτ, FY) = qτ + (τ−I {Y ≤ qτ}) /fY (qτ). This can be computed by 
estimating the sample quantile, qτ , estimating the density fY (qτ) at 
that point qτ using kernel methods, and forming a dummy 
variable, I {Y ≤ qτ}, indicating whether the value of the outcome 
variable is below qτ . Then, if we run an OLS regression of this new 
dependent variable on the covariates, we get the unconditional 
quantile regression coefficients.  
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China’s state project of economic liberalization has embraced 
markets as a disciplinary force in a search for efficiency. A key element of 
the resulting restructuring has been eliminating supports for 
reproductive labour from productive institutions, dividing the sphere of 
work from that of welfare. In the Mao era, collective institutions 
combined these activities in one multipurpose “small society.” From a 
vantage point in the successors to these collectives, the residents’ and 
villagers’ committees, this chapter explores the effects of the division on 
welfare work and subsistence occupations from a gender perspective. It 
shows that while women face marginalization in the formal labour force 
and the globalized economy, at the same time, their public obligations are 
being extended as they provide the caring labour in their own families 
and in “society” to fill the substantial gaps in social provision caused by 
the liberalization project. Women may be seen as surplus labour, but 
without their diligent and mostly invisible efforts, the impacts of the 
social dislocations attendant on economic restructuring would likely have 
become intolerable. Despite its ratification of the CEDAW, China’s 
current legal framework does not provide adequate mechanisms for 
addressing the pervasive discrimination women face due to their 
association with the “unproductive” field of care and welfare. 
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The state project of economic liberalization that was 
launched under the banner of “opening and reform” by Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s embraced markets as a disciplinary force 
in a search for efficiency. Among the aims of the liberalization 
project has been purging support for reproductive labour from 
productive institutions, creating new divisions of labour and 
space. The attendant changes have reshaped the gender order in 
ways that have disadvantaged women due to their association 
with the “non-productive” activities of care and welfare. This 
chapter presents some examples of how these market logics have 
played out on the ground in urban and rural Tianjin, China.  
 
 
 
In the pre-reform period, welfare functions were not seen 
as a separate sphere of activity, but incorporated into collective 
institutions. Although the rural and urban state and collective 
production units in pre-reform China were very different—some 
scholars have gone so far as to claim that there were "two societies" 
(Whyte, 2010)—they shared some key common features.1  While 
focused on production, they were multipurpose institutions, 
expected to cover all the needs of their members, regardless of 
their individual capacity to contribute to the productive 
                                                     
1 For the few people in urban areas outside work units, collectives 
attempted to provide similar levels of security and incorporation, 
although with fewer resources. In 1978 on the eve of reform, of a 
nationwide urban workforce of 100.44 million, 74.2% belonged to state 
owned work units, while 20.4% were in collective and “other” work units 
(Bray, 2005, p. 144). 
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endeavours that were their principal raison d’être. Although the 
term “small society” is generally used to describe the “work units” 
(danwei) to which most urbanites belonged by the end of the Mao 
era, in many ways both rural and urban entities aspired to such a 
comprehensive purpose. Welfare functions — conceived broadly 
as both provision of services and benefits and accommodations 
accorded to family care-givers—were thus an integral part of these 
institutions. Incorporating each citizen into a designated state-
mandated institution that was responsible for them, politically, 
socially and economically, was another common purpose. Once so 
allocated, "workers" or "peasants" generally had security of tenure, 
and distribution within each unit was highly egalitarian. There 
was thus no separation between "work" and "welfare." Of course, 
these attributes represent an ideal, rather than a reality for 
everyone in all urban and rural units, where differing resources 
and status made their actual achievement variable (Hassard, et al, 
2006; Li & Li, 2010). 
The post-Mao project of economic liberalization under the 
“four modernizations” involved a restructuring of these 
arrangements. It led to the dissolution of the communes in the 
countryside in the early 1980s and a massive restructuring of state-
owned industry in urban areas in the 1990s. Large numbers of 
people were laid off from jobs in state-owned enterprises, with 
women being disproportionately affected (Liu, 2007). Employment 
under contract was introduced to replace the life-time employment 
of the “iron rice bowl” (Hassard, et al, 2006). A return to family 
economy in the countryside meant a retreat from collective 
endeavours, including equitable distribution among collective 
members.  
So what are the gendered contours of the new regime(s) for 
welfare and livelihood emerging from these changes? I explore 
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this question from a perspective, based on research in four 
different communities in Tianjin Municipality. The study is based 
on ten months of ethnographic fieldwork in two urban residents 
committees (RCs) and two rural villager committees (VCs) in 2008 
and 2009; as well as analysis of relevant documents and regulatory 
regimes. I observed the daily work of these “basic level 
organizations” of the Chinese state2 with a particular focus on how 
they dealt with the livelihood and welfare needs of people 
disadvantaged by lack of income or employment, by disability or 
ill-health, or a combination of these, and how these activities were 
shaped by the institutional character of the RCs and VCs. Given 
their role as the frontline organizations in the provision of welfare, 
RCs and VCs were a key site for the production and circulation of 
norms about gender, age and appropriate employment for 
differently situated people (Woodman, 2011).  
 
 
 
 In the past, gender distinctions relating to employment and 
public engagement operated mainly within these collective 
institutions (Liu, 2007), but also typed certain occupations as 
feminine and masculine, as was the case across the socialist bloc 
(Verdery, 1996). Although they were certainly not equally valued, 
production and reproduction were enveloped in the socialist 
project and in its institutional frameworks (Barlow, 2004). In the 
work unit system, care responsibilities (largely by women) were 
                                                     
2 These two types of institutions are parallel entities in the 1982 
Constitution. While RCs have existed since the 1950s, providing 
employment and services for the small minority of urbanites left outside 
the work unit system, VCs were first set up after the dissolution of the 
communes, but replaced pre-existing entities called production brigades 
that were the lowest level of accounting in the commune system. 
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informally accommodated, and so collectives subsidized care 
indirectly, by continuing to pay wages to people who were 
spending a lot of their time and energy providing care (Liu, 2007). 
This was also true of rural collectives. 
By contrast, in the reform era, economic liberalization has 
constituted public and private care and welfare as “burdens” to be 
systematically expelled from “productive” organizations. 
Increasingly such functions are now situated in institutions 
separate from the productive sphere, off-loaded onto families, or 
provided through the market, thus involving both privatizing and 
socializing reproductive work. This has also meant the drawing of 
new boundary lines between “work” and “welfare,” separating 
“economy” from “society.”  
The effects of this separation have been distinctly gendered 
but also vary by class, location and occupational sector.  In terms 
of gender, a circular process can be observed in which the 
privatization (or familialization) of care labour contributes to 
increasing discrimination against women in the labour market 
while the expanded burdens of care this places on them, both at 
home and in their communities, further justify discriminatory 
attitudes and practices. While placing a greater burden of public 
care on women, at the same time they have greater entitlement to 
miserly welfare benefits due to their disadvantaged labour market 
position, which in turn is partly attributable to their perceived care 
burdens.  
The legacy of the incorporation of care into productive 
institutions means that there is little or no infrastructure for public 
care, apart from within residential “social welfare institutions” that 
are aimed at the “orphaned”—those with no family members to 
care for them, including disabled and elderly adults and children. 
These institutions are seen as a last resort, not necessarily because 
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of stigma, but because conditions are presumed to be poor and a 
person who is separated from their social network cannot call on 
any obligation of others to care for them. 
In the context of post-Mao China, the idea of “society” is 
being consciously revived and “constructed” as a strategy for 
making up for deficits in welfare spending. This aspect of the 
liberalization project has been affected under the rubric of 
“socializing welfare,” with the objective of discouraging welfare 
dependence on the state (Wong, 1998, p. 71). It is society that is 
supposed to absorb the “burdens” sloughed off to make Chinese 
firms competitive in the global economy, and thus this project—as 
conceptualized both in official discourse and scholarly 
prescriptions—compares practice in China to an imagined ideal of 
Western capitalist "efficient" practice. The statistical rationality that 
has become hegemonic in the post-Mao era assumes that the 
economy and society are subject to general laws, which become 
the “regulating rules of history and society,” and measures China 
against an “advanced” Western other (Liu, 2009, p. 52, 58). 
The care deficit attendant on these shifts is recognized 
implicitly in the exhortatory discourses about promoting care and 
volunteering in “society,” and envisaging RCs and VCs as “a big 
family.” These discourses were apparent in both RCs and VCs. 
They were routinely enacted through projects of gift giving and 
visits around holidays and major life events, as well as in norms of 
neighborliness and mutual aid that were part of the stated aims of 
these institutions. These norms created gendered expectations that 
fell largely on the shoulders of women, particularly the middle-
aged and older. During my fieldwork, the RCs were counting all 
“volunteers” and there was talk in the media that they should all 
be “registered,” indicating how the state seeks to mobilize female 
citizenship in this fashion. For the VCs, care burdens were 
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centered squarely in a traditional gendered division of labour in 
the family.  
 
 
In this “socialization” of welfare, the RCs and VCs have 
taken on an increased importance. The RCs provided some job 
opportunities themselves, and were the lowest level of operation 
of the urban labour departments, providing re-employment 
services to the local unemployed.    
The effects of these processes may be observed through the 
experience of the RC workers themselves. All of the paid staff in 
the RCs I studied were female,3 as were the overwhelming 
majority of RC workers and volunteer activists I met. Based on 
limited data, this picture seems to reflect national trends.4  The RC 
workers were hired into what they called “government purchased 
positions,” mostly after being laid off, while labour officials called 
them “public interest positions.” Previously, RC positions had 
been unpaid, and the hiring of these workers was an aspect of the 
local state’s response to the mass layoffs of the late 1990s. All the 
workers in the RCs I studied had been hired under programs of 
what might be called welfare jobs. But these positions were not 
workfare jobs: they required specific skills and involved a 
competitive hiring process including passing written and oral 
                                                     
3 In both places there were additional RC members who were not actually 
employed, but participated in their work on a volunteer basis (all retired 
people), or ex officio (for example, in one place, the local community 
police officer). There were a few retired men in this category. 
4 In 2000, 90 percent of RC workers nationwide were women (Read, 2000, 
p. 806-820), while a 2002-2003 survey of such workers in Shanghai and 
Shenyang found, respectively, 86 percent and 92 percent female 
workforces (Lu & Li, 2008, p. 181-192). 
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exams, and more recently, computer skills. One woman who came 
to the Progress office to ask about a recruitment notice she had 
seen for such positions was asked if she knew how to use a 
computer. No, she said. Well then, she was told, you might as well 
not bother to apply. 
Currently, the municipal government sees increasing the 
number of these “welfare jobs” as a solution to persistent 
unemployment among certain groups. In Tianjin, these groups 
include people in the “40/50 age group,”5 women between 30 and 
50 with heavy family responsibilities and, starting in 2009 in the 
wake of the world financial crisis, college graduates without work 
experience. But since there are only a few posts in each 
neighbourhood, each new set of candidates displaces those in 
previous categories of need.  
Regardless of how long they had been on the job—some for 
10 years—RC workers were paid at minimum wage (820 yuan6 
gross per month in Tianjin at the time of my fieldwork, with about 
100 yuan more for party cadres) with only basic social insurance 
coverage. The subsistence wages clearly signalled the low status of 
the work. Identification with their past privileged status as work 
unit members combined with a common disregard for their 
current jobs meant most of the RC workers continued to speak of 
themselves as “laid-off workers.” When I asked Sister7 Wu at 
Progress why she still called herself that, she said, “Well, this isn’t 
a real job; it’s only minimum wage.”  
                                                     
5 This group is comprised of women over 40 and under 50, and men over 
50 and under 60. The distinction is related to the different retirement ages 
for men and women, discussed below. 
6 About $120 CDN; $1 = 6.8 yuan at the time of my fieldwork.  
7 “Sister” is a common term of address for adult women in China.  
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The inadequacy of middle-aged women as workers was a 
common theme of discussions around retirement and 
employment. Although all the RC workers I encountered had 
graduated from high school or junior college, their generation’s 
“lack of education and skills” was often cited as a reason for their 
need for work-as-welfare. Government policies aimed at helping 
the “40/50 people” conceptualized women over 40 as difficult to 
employ, confirming employers’ preferences for younger workers 
as logical and natural. As a labour official put it, “the bodies of 
these 40/50 people are beginning to weaken, and they can’t keep 
up with the pace of the market economy. They are getting old.” 
Government policies relating to retirement also contribute to such 
views: for women in the category of “worker,” the retirement age 
is currently 50, while for men it is 55 (Wang, 2003). 
For working class women, the “common sense” of the 
market reflected in these policies had severe effects. Starting in 
early middle age—even in their 30s—women were deemed 
unsuitable for “productive” work and thus relegated to spheres of 
care and support. This was widely internalized, with women in 
their 40s talking about how their bodies and minds were decaying 
in ways that made them unable to keep up with the market's pace 
or learn new technological means of participating in its activities. 
These divisions implicitly categorize certain types of labour as 
more challenging and more valuable, and certain bodies as more 
appropriate for the marketplace. Women are then made available 
to provide cheap or low-cost labour that fills the gaps created by 
very low levels of state spending on welfare.  
However, younger women, too, are subject to 
discrimination on the basis of their caring roles. Although the 
overwhelming majority of urban women will only have one child 
(and have abundant family childcare due to underemployment 
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among their mothers’ generation) some employers refuse to hire 
even highly qualified young women because they will have to pay 
for maternity leave (currently only three months, and partly paid 
through social insurance in most major cities) (Tatlow, 2010). Legal 
scholars and women activists in China have pointed to how the 
emphasis in the law on “protecting” women has been used as an 
excuse not to hire them in the first place (de Silva de Alwis, 2010; 
Ogletree and de Silva de Alwis 2002).  
 
 
 
While their association with care work disadvantages them 
in the labour market, in the sphere of welfare benefits, this 
association increases their eligibility to the miserly welfare benefits 
that are available to people without employment. Most notable is 
the “minimum livelihood guarantee,” a cash benefit that is 
provided to people whose income is below a certain minimum 
level. The eligibility criteria for this benefit are distinctly gendered, 
and also reflect the divide between “productive” and “non-
productive” labour. 
While the national regulations on this benefit and the 
Tianjin implementing rules on the minimum guarantee establish 
an unqualified right to assistance for those whose income falls 
below a certain level—set at 400 yuan per urban person, and 200 
yuan per rural person in Tianjin at the time of my field work—they 
later go on to qualify this.8  In Article 7 of the Tianjin Measures for 
                                                     
8 Art. 2 of the State Council’s Regulations on Minimum Livelihood Guarantee 
for City Residents, effective Oct. 1, 1999, reads: “All those urban residents 
who are holders of non-agricultural hukou [household registration] for 
whom the per capita average income of all family members living 
together is below the standard for the city residents minimum livelihood 
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the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee, eligible recipients are defined 
in terms of three negatives: of income, of ability to labour and of 
family or other obligated support. In practice, the determining 
factor establishing eligibility was not income or need, but the 
designation that a person had “lost the ability to labour.”  
This designation defines “labour” as wage labour or other 
productive work, thus implicitly making reproductive labour into 
a form of non-work. People’s ability to generate income through 
the market thus becomes an objective measure of their relative 
labour value, and the conditions for receiving assistance a matter 
of a person’s status, rather than a result of social or economic 
conditions. Individuals are defined in terms of relative “lack,” in a 
fashion comparable to the way lack is measured in Chinese terms 
such as “civility” and “quality” (Yan, 2003; Anagnost, 2004). 
Though inherently devaluing, the urban discourses of lack 
were generally not stigmatizing in the sense of excluding people 
from community membership or resulting in social exclusion of 
other kinds. Crucially, these determinations did not imply a 
judgment of moral lack—in contrast to the way the poor are seen as 
“contractual malfeasants” in the context of US market 
fundamentalism (Somers, 2008)—but a measurable deficiency of 
the body and mind. Contrary to what is generally claimed about 
welfare benefits being stigmatizing in China (Wong, 1998; Saich, 
2008), people did not speak negatively about those who received 
them. 
                                                                                                                       
guarantee have the right to receive basic material support for their 
livelihood from their local government.” Art. 2 of Tianjin Measures for the 
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee, July 6, 2001, repeats this text, but specifies 
that all “residents and villagers who are holders of permanent hukou” in 
the city have this right.                                                                               
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While there is significant continuity from both traditional 
and pre-reform ideas in targeting welfare to those seen as lacking, 
previously the lack was familial (Wong, 1998, p. 138, 166). Now the 
condition is individualized and calculable, relating to 
combinations of age, disability and gender, and having varying 
degrees. It is clearly associated with certain types of bodies. People 
over the government-set retirement ages are deemed a priori to 
have lost the ability to labour. Thus in practice, women below 40 
and men below 50 were excluded from minimum livelihood 
guarantee eligibility, unless serious illness or disability made them 
unable to work.  
 
 
 
With its focus on global competitiveness, the liberalization 
project’s opposition between work and welfare also prioritizes 
certain types of economic activity, and marginalizes others, 
notably those most closely associated with the gendered space of 
the social: subsistence and service work. 
The post-Mao period has involved the (re)formation of 
markets in goods, labour and services, which were almost 
completely eliminated during certain periods of the Mao era. 
Official, expert and popular ideas about the appropriate scope and 
function of markets have been central to changes in the shape of 
productive institutions, as well as in the reform of systems of 
welfare provision. Marketization has also been the arena for a 
constant struggle between popular efforts to engage in new or 
previously-forbidden income-generating endeavours and activities 
of state officials and agencies, local and national, to regulate, 
patrol, contain and sometimes ban them. Markets are shaped by 
contestation over regulatory powers and the appropriate use of 
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different kinds of spaces. The character of local markets, whether 
for labour, goods, or services, is especially important for the many 
people who have been separated from the security of collective 
production units. 
Social policy texts and some academics in China and 
beyond insist that the work unit is dead, but in the everyday 
imaginary, reflected in daily conversations at my field sites, it 
remains a central concept defining the desirable life. Its actual 
demise has been overstated; the most prestigious, favoured 
employment involves permanent attachment to a work unit which 
provides many of the same benefits as in the past. The most sought 
after positions are in the civil service, large government-owned 
companies and universities and research institutes.9  In Tianjin, a 
significant minority still work within such units: approximately 31 
percent of urban employed people and 65 percent of rural 
employees.10   
But the number of people whose work is separated from 
collective units has clearly been on the rise: recent figures put rates 
of “informal sector” employment (including self-employment) in 
                                                     
9 During my fieldwork, all the university teachers I met told me that the 
top choice of occupation for their graduating students was civil service 
jobs. A second choice was often continuing study and hoping for better 
luck in the next round of civil service exams, or a career in academia. 
10   In Tianjin Municipality, 5.031 million urban and rural people counted 
as “employed” in 2008, out of totals of 9.08 million and 2.68 million 
respectively. Of the 3.094 million urban employed, 875,000 were working 
in the state-owned sector, and 79,000 in the collective sector, while 2.172 
million were working for private firms (I added the state-owned and 
collective to get the total in work units). For rural Tianjin, the number of 
total employees was 1.864 million, while the number in township and 
village enterprises was 1.21 million, with only 76,000 in private firms. 
Rural people working in agriculture would not be counted as 
“employees” (State Statistical Bureau, 2009, p. 91, 112-113).    
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China above 50 percent, with women making up the majority 
according to some studies (Huang, 2009; Cook, 2008).11  While 
most of these informal sector workers are rural-to-urban migrants, 
this type of work has been the solution to problems of livelihood 
for many, if not most, urban laid-off workers. Women make up 65 
percent of those in the field of “community services”—essentially, 
small, local businesses in urban neighbourhoods (Cooke, 2006). 
Despite some official recognition of the importance of 
smaller and less formal businesses in providing opportunities for 
income-generation, these mainly exist in a marginalized space.12  
The feminized domestication of subsistence activities, such as 
small-scale agricultural production or local businesses that provide 
community services, is analogous to what Sassen terms the 
“feminization of survival” (2000).  
Policies of local and national governments that shape 
markets can also contribute to restricting women’s choices when 
they have to find ways of making a living through the informal 
economy. Official visions of markets privilege formal over 
informal economic activities; sectors with large capital inputs over 
small-scale, independent businesses; and “modern” endeavours 
over agricultural work or traditional occupations. These 
distinctions are replicated at the local level in the policies of local 
governments and VCs. Increasingly, small-scale traditional 
agriculture is seen as the province of women and old people, thus 
part of the sphere of the home and domesticity and associated 
with women. 
                                                     
11 Huang (2009) uses the ILO definition of informality: workers who do 
not have job security, few or no benefits and are not protected by labour 
laws fall into this category.  
12 As Hanser (2008) notes, the State Statistical Bureau even stopped 
collecting statistics on private businesses with less than 60 employees in 
1999, so this sector is statistically invisible. 
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Advocates for the rights of women in China are very active 
in NGOs, semi-governmental organizations, legal aid, academia 
and government. They have succeeded in preventing the complete 
rollback of gender equality as a central plank of state policy, for 
example, arguing against calls in the 1980s for women to leave the 
job market altogether and return home (Wang, 2003). They have 
also been able to push the government to incorporate promises of 
gender equality and efforts to combat gender discrimination into a 
number of laws and policies (for a recent overview, see de Silva de 
Alwis, 2010). China was one of the first states to ratify the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and has enacted various laws 
aimed at protecting women from discrimination, notably the Law 
on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI) from 
1992, revised 2005. In the same year the LPWRI was revised, China 
ratified the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 
No. 111 (Discrimination [Employment and Occupation] 
Convention). 
However, as noted above, the “protection” framing of 
women’s rights often actually serves as a rationale for 
discriminating against them. Laws such as the LPWRI do not 
allow for individuals or groups to challenge discriminatory 
practices through legal action. Incorporating such a mechanism for 
redress was a major demand of women’s groups in China when 
the LPWRI was being revised in 2005, but their suggestions were 
not accepted. Also, these laws do not recognize indirect 
discrimination, so, for example, outcomes would not be sufficient 
proof of discrimination. The CEDAW Committee has repeatedly 
called on China to incorporate the Convention definition of 
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discrimination into Chinese law, but the National People’s 
Congress failed to do this when it last revised the law (de Silva de 
Alwis, 2010). In addition, Chinese authorities often do not collect 
sufficient sex disaggregated data, and the data that do exist are not 
made available in exercises such as the review of China’s 
compliance with CEDAW, despite repeated requests from the 
CEDAW Committee for such information. 
Canada and other states concerned about gender 
discrimination in China can use the CEDAW Committee’s 
concluding comments as benchmarks for advocating for change. In 
particular, the collection of sex disaggregated statistics, the 
incorporation of a definition of discrimination consistent with that 
in CEDAW, and amending laws to provide for legal remedies for 
individuals and groups experiencing discrimination can be put on 
the agenda during bilateral talks and trade negotiations with 
China. 
 
 
 
This essay has shown how, in multiple ways, women’s 
association with the work of care and welfare, and the way these 
activities are perceived as an inherent drag on the productive 
economy, means that women are seen as contributing less to the 
project of developing China’s economy. While women face 
marginalization in both the formal labour force and the globalized 
economy, at the same time, their public obligations are being 
extended, as they provide the caring labour in their own families 
and in “society” to fill the substantial gaps in social provision 
caused by the liberalization project. Women, particularly older, 
lower class women, may be seen as surplus labour but they are 
certainly not surplus to requirements. Without their diligent and 
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mostly invisible efforts, the impacts of the social dislocations 
attendant on economic restructuring would likely have become 
intolerable.  
In many respects, the distinctions described here reflect 
global trends. The “feminization of subsistence” apparent in China 
parallels the global shift towards a “feminization of survival” 
(Sassen, 2000, p. 503), while the oppositions outlined here echo 
emerging divisions in the globalized economy and reflect its 
competitive logics (Ling, 1999; Zimmerman, Litt, & Bose, 2006; 
Elias, 2008). At the same time as women’s invisible work of paid 
and unpaid care is increasingly in demand, it is devalued and 
distinguished from the prestigious occupations associated with 
global circuits of capital (Sassen, 2006).  
In the breakneck pace of social change in China, these 
emerging divides are far from uncontested, and they do not map 
simply onto divisions of labour of differently-situated men and 
women. Even within the limited territory of Tianjin, distinct 
practices and logics can be discerned. But a consistent theme 
across the divergent practices is devaluing of space and labour that 
is marked as feminine. 
Persuading people to accept new divisions of space and 
labour has required a great deal of “thought work,” a socialist 
form of governance put into service of forming a citizenry 
appropriate for a capitalist economy. New logics of activism in the 
form of "volunteering" press women into service for the needs of 
the state's goal of maintaining "stability." The calculus of 
deficiency involved in assessing welfare eligibility as well as 
marginalizing certain types of economic activities individualizes 
the reasons for people’s disadvantage, rather than viewing this as 
the result of a series of policy choices. Such assessments exclude a 
complex and situational picture of need, in particular making the 
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interdependence of people and different spaces and types of 
labour less visible. These state strategies make efforts to combat 
discriminatory policies and practices more difficult, but as women 
activists in China have shown, internationalization has also 
brought in new logics that help them mount challenges to such 
trends (de Silva de Alwis, 2010).  
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This paper discusses whether promotion of workplace gender 
equality in accordance with the United Nations Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
and promotion of free trade competition are compatible in Japan. 
CEDAW is one of the conventions on fundamental international human 
rights, whereas free trade competition is a fundamental principle of 
international economic law. While it is undisputable that both are 
important international norms, can we truly comply with these norms 
simultaneously in the same depth? In order to answer this question, this 
paper explores the issue from the viewpoint of CEDAW. I review how 
CEDAW has been implemented domestically; how the Japanese labour 
market has been liberalized reflecting the principle of free trade, and how 
this liberalization of labour market has given the impact of workplace 
gender equality. The year of 1985, when Japanese government ratified 
CEDAW, was the first step for Japanese female workers to achieve equal 
working conditions with male workers. The government implemented 
“the Equal Employment Opportunity Act” for the first time, and 
discrimination against women in private employment was prohibited. 
While laws and regulations to promote female workers’ status have 
increased since 1985,  
 
 
 
* This paper was originally prepared for the MCRI Research Design Workshop 
on December 16-18, 2010, in Bali, Indonesia. I thank all participants of the 
workshop for their helpful comments and I also thank Ms. Erika M. Cedillo for 
her kind support on this paper. 
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the stream of deregulation at the labour market seems to have a 
significant impact on employment of female workers. As a tentative 
conclusion for this paper, I argue that there is a gap between aspiration 
and reality: while compliance with CEDAW in the workplace and 
promotion of free trade are theoretically compatible, in reality promotion 
of free trade has had a negative impact on the promotion of workplace 
gender equality in Japan. 
 
 
 
 In this paper I discuss whether promotion of workplace 
gender equality in accordance with the United Nations (UN) 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and promotion of free trade competition are 
compatible in Japan. CEDAW is one of the conventions on 
fundamental international human rights, whereas free trade 
competition is a fundamental principle of international economic 
law. While it is undisputable that both are important international 
norms, can we truly comply with these norms simultaneously in 
the same depth?   
In order to answer this question, this paper explores the 
issue from the viewpoint of CEDAW. I conducted six pilot 
interviews with a government agency, the corporate personnel of 
commercial firms, a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
working on improvement of the status of women, and a journalist 
working on this issue; as well as a literature review. In the 
conclusions offered to this complex question in this piece, I argue 
that there is a gap between aspiration and reality: while 
compliance with CEDAW in the workplace and promotion of free 
trade are theoretically compatible, in reality promotion of free 
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trade has had a negative impact on promotion of workplace 
gender equality in Japan. 
 
 
 
Ratification of CEDAW by the Japanese Government and its 
Implementation in the Workplace from 1985-1999. 
 The UN General Assembly adopted the CEDAW in 1979 
for the purpose of promoting the equality of rights for women, 
which is a basic principle of the United Nations (UNDPI, 1999). 
Upon ratification by twenty Member States, the Convention 
entered into force in 1981. Japan ratified the CEDAW in 1985 
without reservations. As a State Party to CEDAW, Japan is legally 
obliged to “condemn discrimination against women in all its 
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay 
a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this 
end, undertake … (f) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise” (CEDAW, 1979, art. 2, emphasis added). Namely, the 
Convention obliges state parties to eliminate discrimination 
against women not only by public agencies but also by private 
individuals, such as corporate employers. 
In order to implement CEDAW domestically, the Japanese 
government took various measures. In particular, with respect to 
promotion of gender equality in the workplace, the government 
took several legislative actions between 1985 and 1999 (Gender 
Equality Bureau, 2011a, p. 58). In 1985, the government enacted the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) (Koyō no bun’ya ni 
okeru danjo no kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō ni kansuru 
hōritsu) to remedy the discrimination against women in private 
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employment. This Act was the first Japanese law to prohibit sexual 
discrimination in private employment.  EEOA allowed women to 
compete with men for career track positions with opportunities for 
promotion. EEOA also prohibited employers from posting help-
wanted advertisements segregated into male and female 
categories, except when such advertisements did not limit the 
employment opportunities of women. However, EEOA was not so 
effective in remedying workplace discrimination against women in 
reality for the following reasons: (1) EEOA did not provide any 
sanctions and relied on employers’ voluntary efforts; (2) different 
treatment of men and women in employment such as “women 
only” was not prohibited on the ground that it did not limit the 
employment opportunity of women; and (3) an employer’s 
consent was required to initiate mediation to solve labour disputes 
under the scheme of EEOA.  
Later, in 1997, EEOA was largely reformed to strengthen 
prohibitions on discrimination against women mainly by making 
the following revisions: (1) different treatment of women itself 
became illegal discrimination; (2) equal treatment of women and 
men in employment and promotion became mandatory as 
opposed to voluntary; (3) employees were given the ability to 
initiate labour dispute mediation under the scheme of EEOA 
without the consent of the employer; (4) the government had the 
power to disclose the names of vicious employers as a sanction; (5) 
the government began supporting employers who adopted 
positive actions to improve the status of women; and (6) the 
revised EEOA imposed a new obligation on employers to pay due 
consideration to prevent sexual harassment at the workplace 
(Aizawa, 2005, p. 68). 
In 1991, the government enacted the Child Care Leave Act 
(Ikuji kyūgyōtō ni kansuru hōritsu), triggered by the so-called “1.57 
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shock” – the average birthrate in Japan reported in 1990. This Act 
granted employees who had a child under one year old the legal 
right to take childcare leave. It also obliged employers to take 
necessary measures to enable their employees to take care of their 
children without leaving the workplace, such as a system of 
shorter working hours. The Act was reformed and renamed the 
Act on the Welfare of Workers Who Take Care of Children or 
Other Family Members Including Child Care and Family Care 
Leave (Ikuji kyūgyō, kaigo kyūgyōtō ikuji mataha kazokukaigo o okonau 
rōdōsha no fukushi ni kansuru hōritsu) in 1995 to grant employees the 
right to take leave when the employee has to take care of one of his 
or her family members (not necessarily a child under one year 
old).   
The government also adopted the “New National Action 
Plan for the Year 2000” (seireki 2000 nen ni mukete no shin kokunai 
kōdō keikaku) in 1987 for the first time and revised it in 1991, aiming 
to achieve a “gender-equal society.”  In the next year, the 
government appointed a Minister of Women Problems (fujin 
mondai tantō daijin) for the first time, and the Office for Gender 
Equality and the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender 
Equality were established in 1994. In 1997, the Council for Gender 
Equality was legally established in the General Administration 
Office of the Cabinet and, based on its deliberations, the Basic Act 
for Gender-Equal Society (danjo kyōdō sankaku kihonhō) (hereinafter 
Basic Act) was finally enacted in 1999. 
The Basic Act is a “basic law (kihon hō)1” to declare the 
basic policy to promote a gender-equal society.  Article 1 provides 
the purpose of this Act as follows:  
                                                     
1 This type of laws regulates the major important fields of national policy. 
Its characteristic is that these laws are recognized as merely a program of 
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In consideration of the urgency of realizing an 
affluent and dynamic society in which the human 
rights of both women and men are respected and 
which can respond to changes in socioeconomic 
circumstances, the purpose of this law is to 
comprehensively and systematically promote 
formation of a Gender-equal Society by laying out 
the basic principles in regard to formation of such a 
society, clarifying the responsibilities of the State 
and local governments and citizens, and also 
stipulating provisions to form the basis of policies 
related to promotion of formation of a Gender-
equal Society.   
 
The Basic Act stipulates five basic principles in building a 
gender-equal society (Articles 3-7): (1) respect for human rights of 
men and women; (2) due consideration for gender neutrality in the 
social system and customs; (3) equal participation of men and 
women in policy making and political decisions; (4) balancing of 
family life and other activities; and (5) international cooperation. 
From the review of the legislative and administrative 
activity from 1985 to 1999 stated above, enactment of the Basic Act 
was one substantial achievement for realizing a gender-equal 
society, which Japan undertook, to achieve by ratifying CEDAW. 
The fifth principle of the Basic Act – international cooperation – 
means that formation of a gender-equal society in Japan should be 
promoted in a harmonized manner with international efforts 
including CEDAW. Article 19 of the Basic Act also states that, “to 
promote formation of a Gender-equal Society based on 
international cooperation, the State shall make efforts to take 
necessary measures for exchanges of information with foreign 
                                                                                                                       
the policy and thereafter several independent laws are issued in order to 
implement the policy showed in the basic law. 
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governments and international institutions, and the smooth 
promotion of international mutual cooperation related to 
formation of a Gender-equal Society.” Accordingly, the Basic Act 
strengthens a concrete legal ground for the government to take 
necessary measures to implement various policies to comply with 
CEDAW.  
As part of its obligation under CEDAW, Japan must submit 
periodic reports to the Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter “Committee”) every 
four years.  The Committee reviews Japan’s periodic reports and 
publishes observations on them. Under Article 19 of the Basic Act, 
the Japanese government has an obligation to take account of the 
observations the Committee publishes and adopt the necessary 
measures to follow recommendations given by the Commission.  
In August 2009, the Committee published the concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report submitted by Japan, 
which is discussed in section III. 
Current Scheme to Promote Gender Equality 
In 2000, the government approved by Cabinet decision the 
“Basic Plan for Gender Equality” (danjyo kyōdō sankaku kihon 
keikaku) (hereinafter “Basic Plan”) (Gender Equality Room, 2000), 
the first plan based on the Basic Act. The Basic Plan is composed of 
three parts: Part 1 states basic principles in promoting a gender-
equal society, Part 2 states basic policy directions and concrete 
policies to be implemented, and Part 3 explains how to execute the 
Basic Plan. In Part 2, the Basic Plan refers to “securement of equal 
opportunity and treatment of men and women in the area of 
employment.”  It states as follows:  
“In the present conditions of advanced 
globalization and intensive international 
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competition, it is necessary to advance policies to 
secure fair competition. This also results in 
promoting social participation of women because 
these policies help individuals to bring out their 
abilities regardless of gender. However, upon 
change of economic structure, we are concerned 
that employment becomes temporarily unstable, 
which may have a negative impact on women.  
Therefore, we should advance policies to establish a 
safety net and to prevent a situation where women 
are differently treated on the basis of gender.” 
 
The Basic Plan proposes four concrete policies to promote 
gender equality in the area of employment: (1) promotion of 
policies to secure equal opportunities and treatment of men and 
women in the area of employment; (2) promotion of policies for 
health management of mothers; (3) support women so that they 
can manifest their aptitude; and (4) adjustment of labour 
environments reflecting various working styles. 
Up to December 2010, the Basic Plan has been revised three 
times. The Third Basic Plan (Gender Equality Bureau, 2010a), 
approved on December 17, 2010 and also composed of three parts, 
has the same short title (“securement of equal opportunity and 
treatment of men and women in the area of employment”) in Part 
2. This time the Basic Plan includes concrete target numbers such 
as ratios of female managers in private corporations and ratios of 
female labourers in the market, which is discussed in section III. 
The following figure shows the current national machinery 
to promote a gender-equal society, which means that the 
mechanism shown below is a system to check and promote 
compliance of CEDAW as well. 
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Source:  Gender Equality Bureau. (2011b). National machinery for the promotion 
of gender equality. Retrieved from http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/ 
category/prom/index.html. 
 
 
Current Status of Women and the Impact of Labour Market 
Deregulation on Women  
Reality of Workplace Gender Equality in Japan 
The framework to secure compliance with CEDAW, which 
is stated in Part II, seems to have been well established and 
organized, and the environment to secure workplace gender 
equality seems to have been put into place.  However, the reality 
of female labour surprisingly lags behind even today (Gender 
Equality Bureau, 2010b, p. 26)2.  Although 41.9% of the labour 
force in Japan consisted of women in 2009, the average wage level 
of full-time female employees was only 69.8% of that of male 
employees. While only 22.3% of men earn less than 3 million yen 
                                                     
2 Summary of the White Paper is also available in English (Gender 
Equality Bureau, 2010c). 
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among those who have continued to work for a year, 66.4% of 
women fit in this category. Not many women hold “leadership 
positions” in corporations: only 4.9% of department managers, 
7.2% of section managers, and 13.8% of sub-section chiefs are 
women. Further, about 70% of full-time female workers leave their 
workplaces permanently after their first childbirth, even though 
24.2% of them answered that they “wanted to continue to work.”  
The above data is also reflected in an international 
assessment of gender equality of the state. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) annually publishes an index 
called the HDI (Human Development Index), which indicates the 
level of human development in each country, and the GEM 
(Gender Empowerment Measure), which indicates the level of 
female participation in politics and economy. According to the 
2009 figures published by the UNDP, while Japan’s HDI ranked 
10th among 182 countries, its GEM ranked 57th among 109 
countries (UNDP, 2009, p. 186). 
Based on this situation, the government’s Third Basic Plan 
of 2010 puts target numbers to promote gender equality at 
workplace:  (1) the ratio of women who hold a department 
manager or higher position in private sectors should be raised 
from 6.5% in 2009 to around 10% in 2015; (2) the ratio of private 
sectors that introduce any positive action to promote workplace 
gender equality should be raised from 30.2% in 2009 to over 40% 
by 2014; (3) the employment rate of women between age 25 and 44 
should be raised from 66% in 2005 to 73% by 2020; (4) the ratio of 
women who continue to work after having the first child should be 
raised from 38% in 2005 to 55% by 2020, and so on (Gender 
Equality Bureau, 2010a). 
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Concluding Observations by the CEDAW in 2009 
The Concluding Observations of the CEDAW: Japan 
(CEDAW, 2009) also point out slow progress on Japan’s female 
employment situation. It first criticizes that some concerns 
expressed by the Committee in previous concluding observations 
in 2003 have been “insufficiently addressed,” and it notes that the 
situation of women in the labour market is one of the fields that 
have not been addressed in particular (CEDAW, 2009, para. 15).3  
In addition, the CEDAW (2009, para. 27) states that it “notes with 
regret that no temporary special measures are in place to accelerate 
de facto equality between men and women or to improve the 
enjoyment by women of their rights in the State Party, in particular 
with regard to women in the workplace and the participation of 
women in political and public life,” and “the Committee urges the 
State Party to adopt… temporary special measures, with an 
emphasis on the areas of employment of women and participation 
of women in political and public life, including women in 
academia, and with numerical goals and timetables to increase 
representation of women in decision-making positions at all 
levels” (CEDAW, 2009, para. 28, emphasis added). Now, the 
Japanese government has been asked to provide “detailed written 
information on the implementation of the recommendations” as to 
what kind of temporary special measures are to be taken within 
two years (CEDAW, 2009, para. 59).  
                                                     
3 Even in its previous observations in 2003, the Committee stated that it 
“urges the State party to amend its guidelines to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law and to increase its efforts towards accelerating the 
achievement of de facto equal opportunities for women and men in the 
labour market through, inter alia, the use of temporary special measures 
in accordance with article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention.” (CEDAW, 
2003, para. 370). 
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The Concluding Observations by the CEDAW Committee 
in 2009 clearly point out that in the workplace, Japan does not 
sufficiently comply with the Convention regardless of the 
existence of seemingly well-established national machinery. In 
order to explore the reasons for this, the discussion below deals 
with the labour policy shift and its impact on the labour market. 
Impact of Deregulation of the Labour Market 
The deregulation of the labour market has been a global 
trend since the 1990s (Araki, 2007) and the Japanese labour market 
is no exception. In the case of Japan, deregulation policy (kisei 
kanwa seisaku) in general was strongly promoted during the 1990s 
as a national policy, which also accelerated deregulation of the 
labour market. In particular, the Koizumi Cabinet (2001-2005) 
aggressively promoted deregulation with the slogan of “the reform 
without sanctuary” and labour market regulation was also a target 
area for deregulation.  
In May 2001, the Koizumi Cabinet adopted the Cabinet 
decision “Three Year Plan for Promoting Deregulation Reform” 
(Kisei kaikaku suishin sankanen keikaku) (Cabinet, 2001). In this plan, 
one of the fundamental purposes for the reform is stated as 
“realizing an internationally open economic society.” The basic 
policies for the reform are, among others, “economic regulation 
should be free in general and social regulation should be kept to 
the minimum,” and “regulation should be based on international 
harmonization.” The basic direction of the Koizumi Cabinet was to 
eliminate regulations that impeded competition, which was called 
“New Liberalism” and was also a global trend for a few decades 
(Drabek & Laird, 1998). 
Under the Three Year Plan, the field of employment and 
labour relations was also listed as a target field which should be 
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deregulated (Araki, 2007). The Comprehensive Deregulatory 
Commission submitted the first report on promotion of 
deregulation in July 2001. The report proposed to review the 
regulation of dispatching workers as a regulatory reform so that 
the reform enabled smooth labour movement in the market. 
Accordingly, the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker 
Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working Conditions for 
Dispatched Workers (ADW) (Rodosha hakenhō) was revised in 2004 
to largely eliminate the regulations on dispatching workers. The 
ADW was originally established in 1986 to legalize worker-
dispatching services in sixteen designated areas of services that 
were stipulated in the law (Takanashi, 2007, p. 26-48). Since its 
enactment, the ADW was revised four times before the 2004 
reform to relax regulation step by step. The most significant reform 
before 2004 was the revision of 1999, by which the ADW adopted 
the “negative-list system” meaning that worker-dispatching 
services could be used for all kinds of occupations as a basic rule 
except for the areas of services that were listed in the law. The 
reform of 2004 further accelerated this tendency to liberalize the 
worker-dispatching market. The revised ADW legalized 
dispatching services for manufacturing industries that were in the 
area of services that predicted a great demand of temporary 
workers, and expanded the period of accepting dispatching 
workers from one year to up to three years.4  As stated, this reform 
was conducted in order to strengthen the competing power of 
private sectors located in Japan and to contribute to the promotion 
of free competition among corporations, as well as to meet the 
needs of diverse working styles of workers. 
After the reform of the ADW in 2004, the number of 
dispatched workers was dramatically increased from 500,000 in 
                                                     
4 The 2004 revision also clarified rights and duties of both dispatching 
and dispatched entities. 
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2003 to 850,000 in 2004 (Statistics Bureau, 2011). The total number 
of dispatched workers continued to increase until the Lehman 
Shock5 happened in 2008. As a natural result, corporations shifted 
to decrease the number of regular employees that were much more 
expensive than non-regular employees. In 2007, one third of total 
employees (excluding directors) became irregular employees in 
Japanese private sectors (Statistics Bureau, 2011). However, 
women served as an adjusting valve to an appreciable extent: 
68.7% of irregular employees (temporary workers, part-time 
workers, contract employees, etc.) were women. The ratio of 
regular employees to non-regular employees for men was 81.7% to 
18.3% in 2007, whereas that ratio for women was 46.5% to 53.5%.  
The graph below shows how the demand for dispatching workers 
has been largely filled by female employees. 
 
 
                                                     
5 On September 15, 2008, the US investment bank Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, which had a significant impact even on Japanese economy and 
unemployment rate raised due to this event. 
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Source: Statistics Bureau. (2010). Labour Force Survey. Historical data 10 - 
Employee by age group and type of employment - Whole Japan. Retrieved April 
30, 2011, from http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/longtime/03roudou.htm 
 
 
The graph shows that, at least in the workplace, the 
government’s policy to promote free competition resulted in an 
increase of female workers who are employed on an irregular basis 
and used as an adjusting valve. In the end, this imposed the large 
number of female employees, as a group, to stay in the lower 
status for their full employment life. 
 
 
 
While the Becker (1971) model of discrimination argues 
that increased market competition will reduce discrimination in 
the long run, deregulation of the labour market does not seem to 
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promote a gender-equal workplace in Japan (Yamamoto, 2007)6.   
Japan has certainly globalized in terms of international trade since 
1985, when it ratified the CEDAW.  However, the wage gap 
between male and female workers has been kept considerably 
large, even expanding from 1985 to 1997, as can be seen in the 
graphs below. Do these data and the above discussion show that 
globalization impedes promotion of gender equality in the 
workplace in Japan, meaning that CEDAW and promotion of free 
trade are incompatible in Japan? 
 
 
Source (available only in Japanese): Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
(2010). Basic Survey on Wage System (Chingin kōzō kihon tōkei chōsa). Retrieved 
April 30, 2011, from http://stat.jil.go.jp/jil63/plsql/JTK0400?P_TYOUSA=R1&P_ 
HYOUJI=C0050&P_KITYOU=0 
 
 
                                                     
6 Yamamoto (2007) also argues, based on empirical data, that increased 
international competition is positively associated with wage 
discrimination against women in all industries. 
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Source (available only in Japanese): Ministry of Finance. (2010). Change of the 
total amount of import and export (Yushutsunyu sōgaku no suii). Retrieved April 
30, 2011, from http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/nenbet.htm. 
 
 
Promoters of a gender-equal society, however, have a 
different view. One NGO official expects positive impacts of 
globalization on workplace gender equality: 
Only those corporations that have diversity in 
workplace can survive global competition this 
century because those corporations that can catch 
up with the rapid change of society can survive, 
and diversity including existence of women at 
workplace can definitely help the corporation to 
flexibly catch up with the global trend.7   
 
The leaflet of the Gender Equality Bureau also states, 
“female participation in decision-making in the workplace raises 
productivity of corporations” (Gender Equality Bureau, 2010a, p. 
6), and thus contributes to survive global competition. Indeed, as 
Becker’s (1971) theory indicates, gender discrimination costs the 
corporation the loss of competitive power in various aspects.  The 
                                                     
7 Interview with the official of Japan Women’s Innovative Network, in 
Tokyo (December 6, 2011). 
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corporation loses highly talented female employees, and has to 
bear the cost of finding competitive male employees and the cost 
of recruiting advertisement.  In that sense, free trade competition 
should promote gender equality in the workplace based on 
reasonable behaviour of private sectors. 
However, there is a gap between these promoters’ 
comments and reality. While these statements take workplace 
gender equality as a measure to survive global competition, the 
real society sacrifices gender equality for global competition. What 
makes this gap between the aspiration and the reality?  How can 
we implement the aspiration into practice?  In order to explore the 
answer, further research is necessary on the viewpoint of free 
trade, case studies of successful corporations, and gender-issue 
awareness of Japanese workers in general. 
 
 
 
In this working paper, I discussed whether compliance 
with CEDAW in the workplace and promotion of free trade are 
compatible. As a tentative conclusion, theoretically both norms are 
compatible, but in reality discussion shows that promotion of free 
trade has had a negative impact on promotion of gender equality 
in the workplace in Japan. In order to explore the way to 
implement the aspirational theory into practice, further research is 
necessary.  
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As Principal Investigator for the “Coordinated Compliance 
APDR/MCRI” project at UBC, Pitman Potter offers a range of 
conceptual perspectives about the project and its application to this 
conference on gender equality and trade. Dr. Potter notes that 
coordination of international trade and human rights compliance faces a 
number of conceptual, organizational, and political challenges. These are 
evident in the relationship between gender equality rights and 
international trade policy. Dr. Potter suggests that the paradigms of 
“Selective Adaptation” and “Institutional Capacity” can further 
understanding of local normative and organizational contexts in which 
international standards on trade and human rights are interpreted. He 
presents a series of examples where trade standards and human rights 
protection may find commonality, and encourages the conference to 
consider ways to encourage international trade and human rights 
communities to attend to similar opportunities for coordination in the 
area of gender equality and trade policy. 
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I appreciate the opportunity to share with you some 
thoughts about the coordinated compliance project that we are 
implementing under the Major Collaborative Research Initiatives 
program at SSHRC. This is the program that brings us here today. 
I hope the theme of our program – coordinating compliance with 
international trade and human rights standards on gender equality 
- will resonate with you.  We have heard a number of comments 
today that suggest we need to start thinking more carefully about 
how to coordinate trade and human rights compliance in the area 
of gender rights as well as other areas. We have been working 
together to consider the permeability of boundaries between trade 
relationships and human rights relationships, and we need to start 
a process of integration.  
 
 
 
As many have noted this morning, the coordination we 
seek is unfortunately quite challenging, for conceptual, 
organizational, and political reasons. First of all, there are many 
conceptual differences and assumed trade-offs between the 
international trade and human rights regimes. All too often, 
human rights standards in areas such as labour, health, and 
housing are seen as inconsistent with trade goals of efficiency, 
economic growth and private property rights. Conversely, trade 
policy in areas such as transparency, the rule of law, subsidies and 
dumping, and IPR are sometimes seen as threatened by human 
rights advocacy and criticism. Efforts could be made to address 
this issue through interdisciplinary research and analysis that 
builds confidence and awareness about coordinated compliance. 
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As well, coordinated compliance has been elusive because 
the officials and specialists who manage interpretation and 
implementation of trade and human rights standards operate in 
different organizational worlds. Certainly there are efforts, in 
academia in particular, to build interdisciplinarity generally, and 
more specifically to build knowledge about relationships between 
trade and human rights. But once we get into trade ministries and 
trade policy think tanks, for example, there is precious little 
organizational and individual interchange with those handling the 
human rights brief, either within government or outside.  And be 
mindful that when we talk about trade, as we said this morning, 
the trade-in-goods focus of the GATT has been expanded under 
the WTO into services and IPR and investment, trade-related 
investment and so on. So when I use the term trade, it is a big 
animal. Conversely, specialists in human rights organizations have 
little time and, to be frank, limited interest in making time to 
master the details of trade policy and practice. Responses to this 
challenge might include expanding the role of human rights 
assessments of trade policy initiatives and trade impact 
assessments of human rights initiatives, so as to encourage better 
exchanges of perspective between the two sectors. 
The effectiveness of research and monitoring, however, 
depends in part on the resolution of the third reason for non-
coordination of trade and human rights compliance, namely the 
political economy. The dominance of neo-liberal economic 
perspectives, and of the firms and organizations that endorse and 
support them, has tended to relegate human rights to secondary 
status.  Privileging the imperative of market-based efficiencies in 
economic exchange has meant generally that human rights are 
considered to be a hopeful, perhaps even encouraged, but 
nonetheless secondary outcome from economic prosperity. Simply 
put, the efficiencies of trade policy are seen to contribute to the 
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generation of surpluses that then can support public goods like 
human rights. The difficulty here is that the policies necessary to 
generate trade efficiencies may also undermine protection of 
human rights. It seems to me that if we attempt to address trade 
and human rights issues separately, the current political economy 
of privilege and power is going to diminish attention to the human 
rights side and privilege attention to the trade side. As several 
have noted already at this conference, we have already seen 
examples of this dynamic of incomplete and distorted 
enforcement. We are invited to consider instead that human rights 
are sufficiently fundamental and that they should not be relegated 
to secondary status dependent on the success of trade policy. We 
are invited, therefore, to consider that human rights protection 
should be a primary imperative, not to displace trade, but as a 
necessary complement. 
 
 
 
We continue to develop and refine the paradigms of 
“Selective Adaptation” and “Institutional Capacity,” which enable 
us to understand better the local normative and organizational 
contexts in which international standards on trade and human 
rights are interpreted.  In the normative analysis of “Selective 
Adaptation,” we focus on what Stanley Fish termed, “interpretive 
communities,” inquiring how they are grounded in local cultural 
environments, and examining the ways that these local cultural 
environments colour the interpretation and implementation of 
non-local standards in the areas of trade and human rights.  
Throughout this morning’s discussion, we have seen and heard an 
appreciation of that contextualization. In the area of gender 
dimensions especially, the ideology of patriarchy remains critical 
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and generates political-economical relationships and practices 
locally that pose fundamental challenges to the ways that 
international standards on trade and human rights grounded on 
liberal norms are going to be interpreted locally. 
As I have indicated elsewhere (Potter & Biukovic, 2011), 
Selective Adaptation operates in contrast to expectations about 
convergence that suggest development toward a globally unified 
system of institutional practices and values; Selective Adaptation 
explains variations in local reception of non-local standards by 
reference to the extent of normative consensus.1 Selective 
Adaptation suggests that local implementation of non-local 
standards depends on the extent to which their underlying norms 
are received by local interpretive communities (Fish, 1980). 
Interpretive communities comprised of government officials, 
socio-economic and professional elites, and other privileged 
groups exercise authority of political and/or professional position, 
specialized knowledge, and/or socio-economic status to interpret 
non-local standards for application locally.2  In the course of this 
process, interpretive communities selectively adapt non-local 
standards for local application in light of their own normative 
outlooks.  
The process of Selective Adaptation involves dynamics of 
perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception of the 
content and operation of international law standards determines 
the ways that interpretive communities will interpret and apply 
them (Kennedy, 1994). Perception may involve relatively simple 
elements of translation of international trade and human rights 
                                                     
1 For discussion of the intersection of norms with identity and 
community, see Unger, 1975 and Etzioni, 2000. 
2 In the China context, see Miller & Liu, 2001 and Fewsmith & Rosen, 
2001. 
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standards, or reveal more complex factors of cognition, ranging 
from diversity of understanding to cognitive dissonance and 
denial. Complementarity describes how apparently contradictory 
phenomena are combined in ways that preserve essential 
characteristics of each component, and yet may allow them to 
operate together in a mutually reinforcing and effective manner 
(Bohr, 1963; Seliktar, 1986). Complementarity between 
international and local practices and values informs the dynamics 
of local accommodation and resistance to international standards. 
Legitimacy concerns the extent to which members of local 
communities accept the purposes and consequences of selective 
adaptation (Weber, 1978; Scharpf, 2000; Turner & Factor, 1994). 
Legitimacy may involve factors ranging from personal preferences 
born of individual circumstances and interests to broader social 
perspectives of idealism, nationalism, and identity that inform 
responses to procedural or substantive dimensions of international 
standards.  
Turning to the issue of “Institutional Capacity,” we 
encounter questions that are familiar for many here today. 
However, in the locations that we have been looking at, 
particularly China, but also Japan, Indonesia, and India, the 
institutional capacity brief also has to be contextualized to local 
conditions. Mindful that governance institutions are often 
transplanted in form – whether we look at the Chinese legal 
system; the Indonesian reichstadt; or India’s professional civil 
service – the transplanting of foreign administrative forms does 
not necessarily bring with it the same sort of cultural attitudes, 
internal dynamics and behavioural conditions that are attached to 
those institutions in the places from which they emerged.  So, you 
have an institutional capacity issue too, and this can help us 
address this whole question of coordinating the trade and human 
rights regimes, and this is what our project is really about. We are 
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looking at Indonesia, India, China, Japan, and Canada with local 
case studies and so on. Some of the work you have heard of this 
morning is supported by that project, and you will hear some 
more in a few minutes.  
 
 
 
In our coordinated compliance program, we work to 
identify specific pairings (we refer to them as “dyads”) in which 
trade disciplines and human rights disciplines may find 
commonality. This effort to identify opportunities for coordinated 
compliance has more than conceptual significance. Coordination 
of compliance invites consideration of practical approaches to 
questions around implementation. As we can all appreciate, it is 
not enough simply to check off a box on a project review or an 
audit form that says you have dealt with gender, or to check off a 
box to say that you have dealt with human rights. We also need 
mechanisms that render that box-checking meaningful for people 
whose lives are affected. But first, we need to explore specific 
aspects of international trade and human rights standards to 
determine where potential for coordination might be found.  
One useful example involves transparency. As many in the 
trade policy area know, transparency under Article X of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade requires publication of 
laws and regulations. Transparency also involves participation in 
rule making.  Accompanying provisions on the rule of law in 
GATT Article X provide for review of administrative action. While 
the application of these standards is focused on matters related to 
imports and exports, this qualification is extremely broad and 
might well entail engagement with a wide range of human rights 
relationships that emerge in the course of the production value 
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chain. For example labour relations - especially in export-oriented 
factories - would appear to fall within the ambit of trade-related 
matters and thus may well be an appropriate subject area for the 
application of transparency standards. To the extent that 
publication of relevant laws and regulations supports greater 
awareness and enforcement of labour standards, the enforcement 
of trade standards around transparency might well support 
protection of human rights in labour relations. Similarly, to the 
extent that rule of law provisions on review permit to appeal 
against administrative decisions affecting customs matters (and 
potentially other matters affecting imports and exports), this may 
potentially allow organizations supporting, for example, women’s 
labour rights opportunities to further their cause through the 
courts. And, as we consider trade compliance under the 
GATT/WTO umbrella, let us also think about human rights 
compliance under ILO umbrella. As we examine processes for 
implementing GATT Article X disciplines on transparency and the 
rule of law, let us also include in our assessment the impacts on 
labour rights and the rights of women.  
The example of intellectual property rights is similar. IPR 
issues were addressed this morning - examining tensions between 
strict IPR enforcement on the one hand, and providing affordable 
medical care for the rural poor on the other. In this case, the 
perspective of coordinated compliance may serve as cautionary 
principle focusing attention on potential obstacles to human rights 
protection stemming from trade policy standards. Coordinated 
compliance may also point the way to productive avenues by 
which IPR protection may work to support broader public access 
to health care, such as compulsory licensing of technology for 
limited application to urgent public need. If our analysis of IPR 
enforcement from a trade policy perspective takes specific account 
of its impact on access to health care, we are able to consider more 
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directly then whether intellectual property rights are being 
protected in an appropriate way.  
A similar dyad deals with corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility, the blending of internal and 
external accountability systems for firms. The relationship between 
financial reform and micro-credit is another example, which 
examines the ways in which a supervision of large financial 
institutions affects the availability of micro-credits to facilitate local 
economic wellbeing. Human rights issues like environmental 
protection or housing rights may also be paired with specific trade 
policy disciplines such as national treatment or anti-subsidy 
standards. There are no doubt many others of these dyads, but 
what we are trying to do here is identify a specific operational 
mechanism by which we can look at trade agreements and say, 
what are the human rights impacts, and actually start folding the 
expectations about those impacts into the assessments of the trade 
agreements. Similarly, we could do the same with human rights 
agreements, so that when we look at issues on gender equality, we 
look at its impact on trade or international economic relations.  
In our approach, to coordinated compliance, we are 
inspired by the solution reached some years back concerning 
Fermat’s last theorem, which proposed a proof for a variant on the 
Pythagorean theorem  (xn + yn = zn).  But the proof was lost and its 
rediscovery had long been a challenge for mathematicians. 
Andrew Wiles and Richard Taylor resolved the mystery through 
what was basically a process of elimination involving elliptical 
curves that in essence excluded all other possible outcomes except 
the outcome that proved the theorem (Singh, 1997). In a way, that 
is what we do with coordinated compliance, because once we 
identify the ways where enforcement of GATT disciplines and 
enforcement of human rights standards is complementary and 
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mutually sustaining, then that allows us to start carving out more 
intentionally the areas where trade-offs have to occur. It may very 
well be the case that trade-offs do have to occur and that trade 
disciplines need to be adjusted in order to specifically 
accommodate human rights standards. That may happen, and 
likely will happen, but we need to triangulate well enough to be 
able to identify precisely the opportunities where that occurs. This 
comparative project on coordinated compliance is one way to do 
that. So, the project is about much more than simply theory, 
although we certainly have developed a fairly detailed theoretical 
paradigm with formulae and the rest. Equally importantly, 
however, it is providing us specific practical ways to coordinate 
compliance and performance with international trade and human 
rights standards through this dyad process that I suggested. 
Understanding the dyads, I think, allows for concrete 
operationalization of the international trade-human rights 
coordination process and thus provides us details for the human 
rights assessments that we have been hearing about today.  
I think I just have a couple minutes and I have not gotten 
the hook yet so I will say a few words on lessons learned. 
Certainly the relationship between trade and human rights and the 
challenge of coordinating it better are really issues of organization, 
issues of staffing and resources. For example, might we consider 
the possibility that trade ministries around the world establish, at 
the deputy minister level, a human rights coordination office? This 
might work positively to facilitate lateral communication about 
human rights coordination within the boundaries of trade 
agencies. Conversely, human rights NGOs might well be 
encouraged to establish trade policy departments, for facilitating 
appreciation of the role of coordination. The paradigm of 
“Institutional Capacity” may assist in building understanding on 
these organizational issues. 
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As well there are issues around sharing of knowledge and 
values. As I have said, trade specialists and human rights 
specialists have mastered different discourses. They have studied 
out of different books. Building bridges across this divide would 
be helpful. There are also issues of ideology, and I think the point 
that was made this morning so eloquently was that ideologies of 
patriarchy support ideologies of capitalism. Perhaps we can use 
coordinated compliance to find alternative approaches such that 
dynamics of liberation can support practices of economic justice. 
Coordinated compliance on international trade and human rights 
standards may offer ways of dealing with those ideological issues. 
At the root of this process may lie the dynamics of normative 
interchange. We need to understand the normative worlds that 
inform both the WTO and the human rights treaties including 
those centered on gender as well as the more general discourses of 
conventions of civil and political, and economic, social, and 
cultural rights. The normative world in which these discourses on 
trade and human rights exist is not necessarily the normative 
world of implementing economies. We need to understand the 
relationship between international standards and local norms, and 
understand how local norms mediate reception of those 
international standards. Our dynamic of “Selective Adaptation” 
can assist with this. 
As we build understanding, so too do we build the capacity 
to act, analyze, and perhaps suggest ways that are relevant to 
resolving issues of coordinated compliance. And so we can find 
ways to encourage the international trade community to look at 
potential coordination with human rights protection, and for 
human rights advocates to look for opportunities to coordinate 
with international trade policy. I have already mentioned a few 
examples on the gender side that I think might be a way to do this. 
For example, use of GATT/WTO transparency rules to encourage 
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publication of international standards on women’s rights locally – 
and with regard to CEDAW. This may also extend to gender issues 
in labour, health, and environment, contributing to building local 
norms supporting better protection of women’s rights. Local 
enforcement of GATT/WTO rule of law standards regarding 
issues such as judicial review of government decisions can 
potentially be applied to judicial review of government decisions 
affecting women, therefore expanding the horizons of the trade 
brief, and having some impact on protection of women’s rights.  
As well, re-examination of GATT/WTO trade subsidies rules – the 
Subsidies Code in particular - might allow us to provide 
government support for women’s equality through subsidies for 
women’s health costs as well as for protection of living wage 
standards. Reconsideration of immigration policy to balance the 
trade imperatives of competitive labour costs with the human 
rights needs of migrants and society might also support certain 
kinds of home-care needed by women and families working in 
export-oriented firms – essentially providing a benefit to the cost 
of export production.  
We are not there yet, but I think it would be useful to 
examine the application of coordinated compliance to a range of 
gender and trade issues. On these and many, many other 
questions, coordinated compliance discourse can support human 
rights protection even while supporting international trade 
standards.   
Thank you very much. 
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Rights-based health initiatives have, in recent years, become an 
important pillar of the global health agenda. A major theme among 
advocates of these rights-based health initiatives is that the human rights 
toolkit has the potential to be a powerful and effective constraint on the 
pressures towards trade liberalization in international organizations like 
the World Trade Organization.  The paper describes the important role 
gender plays in the global effort to develop tobacco control measures based 
on international law; measures that reflect the fact that the tobacco 
industry is centred around a small set of transnational cigarette 
companies that benefit from trade liberalization. The specific focus is on 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), which came into effect in 2005. The WHO 
enacted this international law using its treaty creating capacity for the 
first time. Its purposes include the regulation of trade liberalization in 
tobacco products. The regulations are grounded on the right of all persons 
to the highest standard of health. My point is that an international 
human rights approach to global health has been effective in 
strengthening gender-specific provisions of the new tobacco control 
regime. The implementation of the FCTC in China provides a concrete 
illustration of this argument. 
 
*The research for this paper has benefited immensely from support from the 
SSHRC MCRI Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project. 
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Rights-based health initiatives have, in recent years, 
become an important pillar of the global health agenda. A major 
theme among advocates of these rights-based health initiatives is 
that the human rights toolkit has the potential to be a powerful 
and effective constraint on the pressures towards trade 
liberalization in international organizations like the World Trade 
Organization (See Hunt, 2004; Forman, 2008). But skeptics 
question whether a rights-based approach to global health 
genuinely has this promise. Reubi (2011, p. 626) argues, for 
example, “the international human rights framework’s poor record 
at protecting people and its numerous inherent problems should... 
make us cautious about embracing it as the solution to the ill 
effects of market fundamentalism.” This skepticism suggests to me 
that there is an onus on advocates in the health and human rights 
field to make more transparent how human rights frameworks can 
be effective at constraining trade liberalization.   
In this paper, I explore how concerns about gender and 
health from a human rights perspective play a role in the global 
initiatives focused on tobacco control. Few doubt that human 
rights-based approaches to global health have helped to draw 
attention to gender as an important factor for consideration 
(Merry, 2006). Within the international human rights community, 
it has long been recognized that rights violations are rarely gender 
neutral. As Paul Farmer (2005, p. 231) has long observed “human 
rights can and should be declared universal, but the risk of having 
one’s rights violated is not universal.” The rights-based initiatives 
in global health where attention to gender has gained the most 
traction are AIDS/HIV, reproductive health, violence against 
women, and discriminatory practices in access to health care. The 
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role of gender in rights-based global health initiatives to combat 
chronic diseases is less familiar. The paper describes the important 
role gender plays in the global effort to develop tobacco control 
measures based on international law, measures that reflect the fact 
that the tobacco industry is centred around a small set of 
transnational cigarette companies that benefit from trade 
liberalization. The specific focus is on the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC), which came into effect in 2005. The WHO enacted 
this international law using its treaty creating capacity for the first 
time. Its purposes include the regulation of trade liberalization in 
tobacco products. The regulations are grounded on the right of all 
persons to the highest standard of health. My point is that an 
international human rights approach to global health has been 
effective in strengthening gender-specific provisions of the new 
tobacco control regime. The implementation of the FCTC in China 
provides a concrete illustration of this argument.    
 
 
 
Tobacco use is globally the single biggest cause of chronic 
disease, in particular, cancer, stroke, and heart diseases. 
Worldwide, tobacco use causes more than 5 million deaths 
annually and those numbers are expected to rise to 8 million in the 
next fifteen years (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), n.d.). Although historically many countries had their own 
domestic cigarette companies, over the past three decades the 
tobacco industry has become increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of six transnational companies. Four of these companies –
Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Imperial 
Tobacco, Indian Tobacco Company – are privately owned and 
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publicly traded.  One company, Japan Tobacco, is 50% owned by 
the Japanese Government. The other one, China National Tobacco, 
is owned entirely by the Chinese Government. The concentration 
of the tobacco industry in these six companies makes clear why it 
now makes sense to characterize the market for cigarettes as a 
global one. 
 Tobacco usage is not, however, uniform across nations. In 
advanced industrial societies, cigarette users have been on a steady 
decline. In Canada, for example, tobacco use among adults has 
declined from 25% of the population in 1999 to 17% of the 
population in 2010 (Health Canada, 2010). Similarly, in the United 
States, smoking declined from 24.1% of the population in 1998 to 
20.6% in 2008 (CDC, 2009). This contrasts to smoking trends in 
developing countries, which saw a dramatic increase in smokers 
from 1971 until 2001, followed by a levelling off. There are at 
present about 1.2 billion smokers, approximately 800 million live 
in developing countries. Chart I represents the estimated number 
of smokers worldwide and their distribution. 
Chart I 
 
Source: Action on smoking and health (ash). (2007). Ash Research Report - Tobacco: 
Global Trends. Retrieved March 22, 2012, from 
http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_562.pdf 
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Global cigarette production has continued to grow each 
year. Over the past decade, the increase has been 16.5%, which 
means on average 800 billion more cigarettes per year (The 
Tobacco Atlas, n.d.). In other words, the expanding global market 
has been in developing countries and this is where the money is 
(Joey, 2008). Access to these markets through trade liberalization is 
fundamental for transnational cigarette companies.   
 
 
 
In the mid 1990s, the World Health Organization began to 
expand its traditional focus on infectious diseases to include 
chronic diseases. And it is in this context that the WHO 
concentrated much of its efforts on tobacco control. In 1999, the 
new Director-General of the WHO Gro Harlem Brundtland (1999) 
explained both why tobacco control has urgency and why a 
transnational organization like the WHO should be in a leadership 
role: 
Tobacco-related diseases are spreading like an 
epidemic and are likely to be killing 10 million 
people a year around 2020.  Into the next century, 
tobacco will climb the ladder to be the leading cause 
of disease and premature death worldwide… we 
have the evidence. We know what works. 
Tightening legislation against advertising, 
increasing tobacco taxes and controlling the 
marketing of cigarettes will make a difference for 
the health of future generations worldwide… this is 
not a challenge confined to independent States.  It is 
a global challenge. (para. 37) 
 
What was unusual for the WHO was how Bruntland proposed to 
meet the global challenge of tobacco control. 
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The World Health Assembly, the legislative assembly of 
the WHO, has had the power to create international treaty law 
since its inception in 1946, but had for fifty years never exercised 
that power. This changed when the WHO decided that an effective 
way to meet the global challenge of tobacco control is through the 
development of international law. In 2004, the WHO enacted the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and it entered 
into force on 27 February 2005. The WHO FCTC creates an 
obligation for parties to "reduce continually and substantially the 
prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke" by 
adopting and implementing "effective legislative, executive, 
administrative and/or other measures" (WHO, 2003, p. 5-6). There 
are now 176 countries that are parties to the convention, and 10 
more such as the United States have signed the convention but not 
yet ratified it. This makes the FCTC one of the most successful 
international treaties in history. Several countries in the Asia 
Pacific region, most notably Japan and China, have been early 
strong supporters of the FCTC. 
From a human rights perspective, the FCTC is significant 
because the preamble states clearly that the foundation for the 
legislation is the right to health, citing both the WHO Preamble 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) statement of the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health provision. Tobacco control is presented, in other 
words, as a human rights issue. As the Forward states, “The FCTC 
is an evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people to 
the highest standard of health” (WHO, 2003, p. v). 
What is the relevant evidence when it comes to global 
tobacco control? From the perspective of the WHO, cigarette 
companies have thrived in the neoliberal era of trade liberalization 
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and the global movement of capital and goods. The treaty (WHO, 
2003) states,  
The FCTC was developed in response to the 
globalization of the tobacco epidemic. The spread of 
the tobacco epidemic is facilitated through a variety 
of complex factors with cross-border effects, 
including trade liberalization and direct foreign 
investment. Other factors such as global marketing, 
transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship, and the international movement of 
contraband and counterfeit cigarettes have also 
contributed to the explosive increase in tobacco use. 
(p. v) 
 
The significance of a rights-based approach to the global health 
epidemic created by the tobacco industry is that its available 
toolkit includes international treaty law, which is seen by the 
WHO as an instrument to regulate trade liberalization and foreign 
investment.  
The FCTC is designed to reflect precisely the themes 
Director General Brundtland identified in 1998. It includes 
provisions on tobacco advertising, health warnings on cigarette 
packages, higher taxation, prohibitions against sales to minors, 
regulations on illicit trade, as well as some commitments to 
supporting smoke cessation. What these provisions reflect is the 
viewpoint that global tobacco control should include a focus on 
international trade liberalization and that the regulation of this 
trade is grounded in a human rights concern.   
It is important from an international law perspective that 
the FCTC is only a framework convention, not a fully entrenched 
international convention – this means that it is a work in progress, 
with what are being called Protocols in particular aspects of the 
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convention. Since 2005, the Secretariat of the FCTC has slowly 
been filling out the substantial content of the convention and the 
obligations of states that have ratified it.  In practice, much of this 
work has been carried out with support from the Framework 
Convention Alliance on Tobacco Control (FCA), the major 
international non-governmental organization working on the 
development and implementation of the WHO FCTC. Indeed, the 
head of Japan’s leading tobacco control organization once 
commented to me that it is the FCA, not the FCTC per se, that has 
had a dramatic impact on the evolution of tobacco control in Japan 
and he suspects elsewhere in Asia since 2005. 
 
 
 
Global health policy has in recent years, as I noted above, 
become increasingly shaped by human rights concerns, in 
particular, the right to health. What is distinctive about the role of 
human rights in global health policy is the emphasis on non-
discrimination and equality as regulative norms in its 
development and implementation (Gruskin & Tarantola, 2005, 
p.11). The impact of this emphasis on non-discrimination is most 
visible in the global response to HIV/AIDS but its reach is also 
evident in, for example, the coordinated efforts by major charitable 
organizations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to 
combat neglected infectious diseases. Human rights norms are 
applicable in these instances because of the overwhelming 
evidence that health policies and programs in many countries risk 
discriminating against, for example, persons with AIDS.  China’s 
response to the prevalence of AIDS among its rural population is 
often held up as a case in point (Jacobs & Pitman, 2006). 
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  Combating gender discrimination has been one of the 
principal targets of the international human rights framework 
since the post WWII period. This commitment runs through the 
entire series of the United Nations treatises that constitute the core 
of the framework, including the 1980 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 
practice, human rights concerns with gender discrimination have 
been expressed in two types of measures (Jacobs, 2004, chs. 7-8). 
On the one hand, the concern has been with measures that 
challenge overt barriers for women that arbitrarily limit their 
freedom and opportunities. On the other hand, the concern has 
been with measures that dismantle systemic barriers for women. 
Concerns about systemic barriers often underlie measures that are 
designed to target women in a beneficial or affirmative manner.   
In the context of health policy and practice, both types of 
measures – challenges to overt barriers, targeted benefit programs 
– are readily evident for example in how the United Nations 
currently interprets the right to health in the international human 
rights framework. The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health has been interpreted by the United Nations as involving 
two distinct components, on the one hand, freedoms, and on the 
other hand, entitlements (UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), 2000, para. 8.). The essential freedoms at stake are the 
right to make one’s own decisions about health and body, 
including consensual medical treatment and the right to be free 
from interference and discrimination. Entitlements are held 
against an individual’s state or government. These entitlements do 
not include good health because that cannot be ensured by a state. 
Thus, observes the UN Economic and Social Committee, “the right 
to health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a 
variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for 
the realization of the highest attainable standard of health” 
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(ECOSOC, 2000, para. 9). The right to health is seen, on this 
interpretation, as providing grounds to protect women from 
infringements on their basic freedom to make choices about 
medical treatment and care. But it is also interpreted as providing 
grounds for special provisions that give priority to women’s health 
issues such as reproductive health care, given the unfair treatment 
and neglect of women’s health issues in the past. By gender-
specific health provisions, I mean both of these types of measures. 
 
 
 
From a health risk perspective, smoking affects men and 
women in many ways that are similar, for example, in terms of 
heart disease, lung cancer, bronchial and digestive tract cancers, 
stroke, vascular diseases, bronchitis and emphysema. Men who 
smoke also risk distinctive sexual and fertility problems. Women 
risk increases in cervical and breast cancer, cardiovascular disease, 
infertility, pre-mature labour, low weight births, early menopause 
and bone fractures.  
The most important differences have to do, not so much 
with the effects of smoking, but with the prevalence of smoking 
among men and women. As Chart 1 above indicates, in the 
developed world, 35% of men smoke compared to 22% of women. 
The gap is steadily narrowing. Trends suggest that in advanced 
industrial countries like the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany and France socio-economic class is emerging as the most 
important variable identifying who continues to smoke (Feldman 
& Bayer, 2011). The dramatic difference, however, is in the 
developing world where on average men smoke at more than five 
times the rate of women. China currently has more smokers than 
any other country in the world and it is estimated that at least one 
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million deaths a year are caused by smoking. There, the gap 
between smoking men and women is especially pronounced. In 
the Global Adult Tobacco Survey for 2010, it was found that 
smoking rates for men in China was 52.9%, but only 2.4% for 
women (WHO, 2011). What is disturbing is that deaths caused by 
smoking do not correspond to this gender gap in smoking, as the 
deaths caused by second-hand smoke are significantly higher in 
women (WHO Representative Office in China, n.d.). 
  What follows from these differences in smoking rates in 
developing countries like China? There are two important 
implications for tobacco control pertaining to women. The first is 
that it suggests that the overwhelming harm done to women in 
China regarding tobacco usage at present is a consequence of 
second hand smoke. The second important implication is that from 
a marketing perspective there is a huge potential for the tobacco 
industry to expand their customer base by encouraging the 
increase of smoking among Chinese women. There are also 
important implications pertaining to men and tobacco control. The 
first is that smoke cessation efforts in China are predominately 
about ending tobacco addiction among men. Likewise, curtailing 
smoking behaviour in China means in effect changing when and 
where men smoke.   
 From a human rights perspective, it would be wrong to 
ignore the differences between men and women when developing 
tobacco control law and policy. Fair treatment of men and women 
demands sensitivity to differences in their situations regarding 
tobacco usage and exposure of its health risks. Gender-neutral 
tobacco control measures may not, in other words, always be 
consistent with the core values of non-discrimination and equality.   
 The FCTC provides a clear expression of this sort of 
reasoning. It identifies women as especially vulnerable to the 
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harmful effects of globalization and trade liberalization in the 
tobacco industry. Member States are said to be “alarmed by the 
increase in smoking and other forms of tobacco consumption by 
women and young girls worldwide” (WHO, 2003, p. 1). In 
response to this “alarm,” the huge differences in smoking 
prevalence among men and women, and the gender differences 
between how tobacco usage causes harm, the WHO FCTC 
embraces as a matter of guiding principles, “the need to take 
measures to address gender-specific risks when developing 
tobacco control strategies” (WHO, 2003, p. 6). 
 It remains an open question whether or not a global 
convention on tobacco control would have embraced gender-
specific risks if it was not grounded in the international human 
rights framework. The reality is, however, that the very idea of 
using international treaty law to address the global tobacco 
epidemic only came into view when the WHO began to take 
seriously human rights and health linkages. And I believe that it is 
doubtful that there would now be anything like the FCTC if this 
paradigm shift did not take place. 
 
 
 
How has this embrace of gender-specific tobacco control 
measures in the FCTC affected China? From an international 
human rights perspective, international non-governmental human 
rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch have a long history of pressuring countries, including 
China, to improve their human rights performance through 
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naming, blaming, shaming and praising exercises.1 The WHO in 
China appears in my view to have learned from these human 
rights organizations and is pursuing similar strategies to improve 
China’s public health performance on global health issues. This is 
already clearly evident in the WHO’s treatment of China in the 
context of emerging infectious diseases (Jacobs, 2011). Likewise, I 
think the WHO has effectively pursued the same strategy to 
improve China’s tobacco control performance. A clear example of 
the praise strategy came on July 18, 2012, when the WHO awarded 
Professor Chen Zhu, Minister of Health of the People's Republic of 
China, with a Director-General's Special Recognition Certificate for 
his commitment to tobacco control (WHO Representative Office in 
China, 2012). Presumably, this praise is viewed by the WHO 
leadership as an effective way to ensure China’s embrace of 
measures like the two described below. 
Gender-specific tobacco control measures provide two 
concrete illustrations of the WHO’s strategy. For example, in May 
2010, the WHO Representative Office in China released a special 
initiative titled Protect Women from Tobacco Marketing and Smoke. 
The initiative is linked to China’s obligations under the FCTC’s 
provision for gender-specific tobacco control measures and has a 
two-fold focus, a comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising and 
smoking in public places. The rationale for the first ban is 
explained in the following way: “Advertisements falsely link 
tobacco use with female beauty, empowerment and health. In fact, 
addiction to tobacco enslaves and disfigures women” (WHO 
Representative Office in China, n.d.). The rationale for the ban on 
smoking in public places has a similar tone: “the bigger threat to 
women is from exposure to the smoke of others, particularly men... 
in China more than 97% of smokers are men. Yet more than half of 
                                                     
1 In the case of China, of course, this approach has not always been 
effective.  See Jacobs & Potter, 2006.    
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Chinese women of reproductive age are regularly exposed to 
second-hand smoke, which puts themselves and their unborn 
babies at risk” (WHO Representative Office in China, n.d.). 
From a different angle, the WHO in China is also focusing 
on smoke cessation among men. The challenge, explains Douglas 
Bettcher, Director of WHO’s Tobacco Free Initiative, is that 
“among men [in China], there is enormous social pressure to 
smoke, and this is facilitated by the policy environment” (WHO 
Representative Office in China, 2010). This pressure comes in the 
form of business practices as well as socializing with friends. 
Bettcher’s point is that tobacco control requires at some level 
addressing the social pressure on men to smoke and changing the 
business and social culture for men in China. The WHO in China 
holds that this change can come with the sort of tobacco control 
measures mandated in the FCTC, but these should be 
implemented with a particular view to changing male norms 
around tobacco usage, in effect, gender-specific measures. The 
long-term health benefits of this WHO gender-specific tobacco 
control initiative, as well as the one targeting women, remain to be 
seen.  
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The human rights and gender impacts of international 
investment treaties are often not taken into consideration when these 
treaties are negotiated and ratified. Moreover, international investment 
tribunals often do not consider the impact of their decision on human and 
women’s rights in the global South. Likewise, the defending state often 
does not raise these issues in its defense. The focus of international 
investment tribunals is usually only on whether there has been a 
violation of the investment treaty. International investment tribunals 
lack transparency, accountability and independence, and undermine 
democratic processes that are important for the realization of human and 
women’s rights. This paper examines the international investment case 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona and Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentina from a human and women's rights perspective. In particular, 
this paper discusses how the Aguas Argentinas case involved the human 
right to water and impacted the lives of women.   
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The human rights and gender impacts of international 
investment treaties are often not taken into consideration when 
these treaties are negotiated and ratified. Moreover, international 
investment tribunals often do not consider the impact of their 
decision on human and women’s rights in the global South. 
Likewise, the defending state often does not raise these issues in its 
defense. The focus of international investment tribunals is usually 
only on whether there has been a violation of the investment 
treaty. The unforeseen consequences of international investment 
law on human rights and women’s rights include public protests 
and civil unrest, security and police force brutality against the 
public and greater economic inequality, particularly between men 
and women in the global South. International investment tribunals 
lack transparency, accountability and independence, and 
undermine democratic processes that are important to the 
realization of human and women’s rights (Choudhury, 2008; 
Choudhury, 2009; Odumosu, 2007; Sornarajah, 2008a; Sornarajah, 
2008b; Van Harten, 2005; Van Harten, 2007, Schneiderman, 2008). 
This essay examines the impact of an international investment 
decision involving the privatization of a municipal water and 
sanitation system on the lives of women and the right to water in 
Argentina. This case of Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona 
and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina (2010) – hereinafter referred to as 
the Aguas Argentinas Case - demonstrates the need for integrating 
principles that respect gender and human rights in international 
investment arbitration. The investment arbitration regime must 
integrate basic human rights into its decision-making process and 
become more transparent, independent and accountable in order 
to adequately address issues that affect the daily lives of women in 
the global South. 
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Investment tribunals and investment treaties have often 
been criticized for not taking into account the public interest and 
focusing solely on the investor’s interests. For example, Gus Van 
Harten (2007, p. 5) explains that arbitrators and adjudicators are 
biased towards the foreign investor because the system only 
allows a foreign investor to bring a claim. Sornarajah (2008a, p. 51) 
calls this scheme ‘arbitration without privity’ referring to the fact 
that the consent of the state to arbitration is general (through 
ratification of the investment agreement) rather than being 
required for the initiation of arbitration in each case. In effect, as 
Van Harten (2007 p. 5) points out, arbitrators and adjudicators rely 
financially on foreign investors to bring international investment 
claims against States. Therefore, “arbitrators may reasonably be 
perceived as having a financial stake in interpreting investment 
treaties so as to expand the system's compensatory promise for 
investors” (Van Harten, 2007, p. 5). Another investment rule that 
potentially contributes to a lack of impartiality in the international 
investment regime is the dual function of investment lawyers as 
both advocate and arbitrator in investment disputes (Van Harten, 
2007, p.5). Luke Eric Peterson (2004, p. 24) states where “practicing 
council for investors may serve as arbitrators in other investment 
treaty disputes, thereby having a first-hand influence in fleshing 
out key treaty obligations.” The dual function of investment 
lawyers as both arbitrator and advocate arguably contributes to a 
lack of impartiality in international investment arbitration.   
The lack of transparency and public participation in the 
investment arbitration process is also a concern for many 
academics. Investment tribunals are not required to make 
proceedings transparent or accept amicus curiae submissions. 
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Tribunals have become increasingly open to the public in recent 
years, however, none of these advances in transparency apply 
uniformly and the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions is at 
the discretion of the investment tribunal (VanDuzer, 2007, p. 706). 
Moreover, the increasing inclusion of non-disputing parties to 
investment proceedings remains largely closed to marginalized 
groups in the global South (Odumosu, 2007c). Odumosu (2007c) 
explains that this is because grass-roots social movements in the 
global South often do not have the resources or specialized 
knowledge of the investment regime to participate in the 
investment arbitral process. More often, grass-roots movements 
take the form of public protest. However, the investment 
arbitration regime does not acknowledge the relevance or 
legitimacy of public protests and does not take them into 
consideration during the resolution of investment disputes. 
Therefore, many women in the global South who are affected by 
the decisions of international investment tribunals are voiceless 
within the investment tribunal’s decision-making process.  
Scholars argue that international investment arbitration 
contributes to the power imbalance between foreign investors and 
citizens in the global South because international investment 
arbitration undermines core principles of public international law 
and democracy (Choudhury, 2008; Choudhury, 2009; 
Schneiderman, 2008; Sornarajah, 2008). International investment 
arbitration is rooted in private commercial arbitration between 
corporations and therefore is an unsuitable institution for the 
resolution of disputes that involve regulations in public interest, 
including for the protection of basic human rights. Van Harten 
(2007, p. 4) states that “the system's unique use of private 
arbitration in the regulatory sphere conflicts with cherished 
principles of judicial accountability and independence in 
democratic societies; in effect, it taints the integrity of the legal 
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system by contracting out the judicial function in public law.” The 
state's democratic functions and obligations to protect human 
rights conflict with the private commercial nature of investment 
arbitration. David Schneiderman (2008, p.4) argues that 
international investment agreements are constitution-like treaties 
that protect the interests of foreign investors from the democratic 
authority and laws of the state. “More than 2,000 international 
investment agreements exist, yet their purpose remains singularly 
limited to protecting foreign investors while ignoring many other 
critical aspects of the relationships surrounding FDI [foreign direct 
investment]” (Mann & von Moltke, 2005, p. 3).  
Many scholars argue that the substantive provisions in 
investment agreements also contribute to an unwillingness or 
inability of states to implement human rights and environmental 
regulations (Mann, 2008; Mayeda, 2007; Seck, 2010; Sornarajah, 
2008a; Suda, 2006; Waelde & Kolo, 2001). Foreign investors are 
able to bring a state to international arbitration for implementing 
regulations protecting the environment or human rights. For 
example, the foreign investors in the Aguas Argentinas Case (2010) 
had a concession agreement for the management of the water 
supply of Buenos Aires and the surrounding area.1 The foreign 
investors brought Argentina to international arbitration for 
allegedly violating the fair and equitable treatment, expropriation 
and full protection and security provisions of Argentina’s 
international investment agreements with France, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. The foreign investors argued that Argentina 
violated these investment provisions by de-pegging the peso from 
the US dollar, denying the company’s request to raise the water 
                                                     
1 This case is significant because international investment tribunals rarely 
comment directly on the human rights obligations of states although this 
is becoming more common because Argentina is increasingly raising 
human rights arguments in its defense. 
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tariff and forcing a renegotiation of the concession agreement 
(Aguas Argentinas Case, 2010, para 232-248). However, Argentina 
asserted that these measures were required to protect its citizens 
right to water in light of its economic crisis from 2001 to 2003 (para 
252). Arguably, the outcome of the Aguas Argentinas Case 
influences the lives of women, particularly poor women, in 
Argentina. 
 
 
 
There is a deep connection between the right to water and 
the lives of women. Globally, the majority of water collection is 
done by women (UNDP, 2006, p. 23). General Comment 15 on the 
Right to Water, written by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, describes the right to water saying water must be 
available, be of healthy quality, be accessible without 
discrimination, be physically proximate, and be affordable (UN-
CESCR, 2002).2 Unfortunately, these principles are often not 
achieved. According to the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), it is estimated that women in the global 
South often spend up to four hours a day collecting water; they are 
also usually responsible for taking care of family members that get 
sick from water-borne diseases (UNDP, 2006, p. 23). These 
situations contribute to inequality between the sexes because 
women in poorer communities have less time for participating in 
wealth-generating activities, education and decision-making 
processes including water management (UNDP, 2006, p. 7). The 
                                                     
2 General Comment 15 says that the right to water, while not expressly 
written in the ICESCR, is protected under Article 11 on the right to an 
adequate standard of living and Article 12 on the right to health. The 
Committee says that these rights in the Covenant cannot be fully attained 
without including water as a human right in the Covenant as well. 
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more powerful groups in society are better able to protect their 
water-related interests, especially transnational corporations.  
Unfortunately, in the Aguas Argentinas Case, the tribunal 
rejected Argentina’s claim that its actions were protecting the right 
to water stating, “Argentina and the amicus curiae submissions 
received by the Tribunal suggest that Argentina’s human rights 
obligations to assure its population the right to water somehow 
trumps its obligations... and that the existence of the human right 
to water also implicitly gives Argentina the authority to take 
actions in disregard of its... obligations... Argentina’s human rights 
obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not 
inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive... Argentina 
could have respected both types of obligations” (Aguas Argentinas 
case, 2010, para 262). The analysis of this tribunal is troubling from 
a human rights perspective because it essentially ruled that the fair 
and equitable treatment of foreign investors cannot be 
compromised for the purpose of protecting human rights even 
during an economic crisis. The tribunal also ruled that Argentina’s 
defense of necessity for the purpose of protecting the right to 
water in light of its economic crisis is invalid because Argentina 
contributed to the creation of the economic crisis and because less 
invasive means of protecting the right to water were available to 
Argentina at the time. This ruling is in direct opposition to the 
decision of the tribunal in LG & E v. Argentina (2006) that upheld 
Argentina’s defense of necessity for its acts during the same 
economic crisis discussed in the Aguas Argentinas Case.3  
The tribunal came to the conclusion that, while Argentina 
did not violate the expropriation or full protection and security 
                                                     
3 The contradictory opinions of different investment tribunals are another 
cause for the perceived lack of legitimacy of international investment 
arbitration (Suda, 2006, p. 159; Choudhury, 2009, p. 988). 
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provision, it violated the fair and equitable treatment provision of 
the investment agreement (Aguas Argentinas Case, 2010, para 247). 
The tribunal interpreted the fair and equitable treatment provision 
as requiring the state to protect the legitimate expectations of the 
foreign investor. The tribunal for the Aguas Argentinas Case (2010, 
para. 237) stated that “the Claimants, as participants in any 
regulated industry, had the legitimate expectation that the 
Argentine authorities would exercise that regulatory authority and 
discretion within the rules of the detailed legal framework that 
Argentina had established for the Concession.” The finding of a 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment provision on the 
grounds that it violated the investor’s legitimate expectations is a 
rather expansive interpretation of this provision. The full 
protection and security provision, the fair and equitable treatment 
provision and the expropriation provision are derived from 
international law on the minimum standard of treatment of aliens 
(Sornarajah, 2010, p. 346). Sornarajah (2010) states that the content 
of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in international 
law is not clearly defined and that it is unclear whether this 
standard even exists in customary international law regarding 
foreign investment. Nonetheless, investment arbitral tribunals are 
charged with the task of applying the minimum standard of 
treatment to the context of protection for foreign investment with 
the understanding that this standard evolves over time and 
depends on the context of a case.  
Mayeda (2007, p. 288) disagrees with the tribunal’s decision 
and argues that the fair and equitable treatment provision should 
not be interpreted as a requirement to meet the investor’s 
expectations of predictability and stability. Mayeda states that 
international investment tribunals are not equipped to assess the 
appropriateness of the host state’s laws in this manner, especially 
in light of an economic crisis. These are highly subjective 
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standards and could cause states to refrain from protecting human 
rights or implementing regulations that could be deemed to have 
violated the 'legitimate expectations of foreign investors' by an 
investment tribunal. Instead, Mayeda (2007, p. 286) argues that the 
fair and equitable treatment provision should be interpreted as the 
protection against procedural unfairness. This entails an inquiry 
into whether the state acted in good faith, with due process, 
transparency, in accordance with its democratic norms and in light 
of the economic crisis that Argentina faced (Mayeda, 2007). This 
assessment is less subjective and does not evaluate the actual 
decisions of the state, rather, the way that the state made these 
decisions. Therefore, the state's right to regulate is respected. The 
fair and equitable treatment provision is the most relied upon 
provision and most successful basis for a claim against a host state 
in international investment arbitration (Malik, 2009, p. 12). 
The Aguas Argentinas Case illustrates the major concern of 
many academics and international lawyers regarding a bias in 
international investment law against the host state. The decision of 
the tribunal in the above case reflects the overall purpose of 
international investment agreements to protect the investor’s 
interests from host state actions (Schneiderman, 2008). Most 
international investment agreements contain numerous vaguely 
worded provisions that protect the foreign investor but very few 
or no provisions that assert the right of the host state to implement 
legitimate social or environmental regulations in the public 
interest including in the interest of protecting human rights 
(Mann, 2008). As mentioned above, General Comment 15 on the 
Right to Water describes the right to water, saying water must be 
available, be of healthy quality, be accessible without 
discrimination, be physically proximate, and be affordable (UN-
CESCR, 2002). According to a report by Rights and Democracy, 
Aguas Argentinas violated the right to water by: unequally 
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expanding the water and sewage system by as much as 70% in 
richer neighbourhoods and as little as 10% in poorer ones, 
overflowing septic tanks and long line-ups for communal water 
taps in poor neighbourhoods, insufficient quantity of water, and 
not informing the public of high levels of nitrates affecting the 
health of the population (Argentina, 2007, p. 7, 11, 14, 17). 
Recognition by the investment tribunal of these alleged human 
rights violations by Aguas Argentinas in light of the economic crisis 
in Argentina may have created a different outcome in this case. 
 
 
 
As illustrated by the Aguas Argentinas Case, states arguably 
become increasingly unable or unwilling to implement human 
rights and environmental regulations due to international 
investment agreements and international investment arbitration. 
The legal uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of investment 
agreement provisions by investment tribunals, combined with the 
exorbitant amount of compensation for foreign investors is a heavy 
burden for many countries, especially in the global South. 
Argentina's government alleges that the amount of compensation 
it is required to pay if it loses every investment case caused by its 
economic crisis from 2001 to 2003 would amount to 17 billion 
dollars which is more than its annual budget (Shan, 2008, p. 285).  
Investment tribunals often do not consider the impacts of 
foreign direct investment relationship on the protection of human 
rights and gender equality in the global South. The provision of 
water and sewage treatment services by private entities is a prime 
example of this. As illustrated above, the decisions of investment 
tribunals inevitably affect the lives of women, particularly in the 
global South, because women are usually the most involved in the 
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activities that require water including household activities, 
agriculture and child-raising. Consideration of the human rights 
impacts of foreign investments by international investment 
tribunals would greatly improve the lives of women because they 
would be more able to raise their concerns and participate in 
decisions that affect their lives. Investment tribunals should also 
take into consideration circumstances including public protests, 
riots and economic crises that threaten basic human rights in their 
decisions. International investment arbitration requires more 
transparency and arbitrator expertise in public international law 
and human rights law so these tribunals appear as more legitimate 
forums for assessing human rights and gender issues. 
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Human rights impacts assessments (HRIAs) could be an 
important tool to illuminate the challenges and potential for trade 
agreements to contribute to gender equality, if part of a genuine 
commitment to address human rights in economic and human 
development. There is a growing interest in HRIAs and new guiding 
principles in the United Nations human rights system are now available 
to support efforts on the part of States or civil society organizations. 
HRIAs can also become a check box exercise with limited value. More 
practice and experience with actual HRIA exercises are needed. 
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The potential contribution of human rights impacts 
assessments (HRIAs) to help ensure trade and investment 
agreements support gender equality rights must be understood in 
the context of the need for a sharp return to rights-based 
approaches to development. This paper explores current trends in 
development discourse, and then turns to the question of HRIAs. 
The paper reviews what HRIAs are and why there is a growing 
interest in this tool, including summarizing the recent conclusions 
of an international experts’ seminar on this topic. The paper ends 
with a discussion of the application of HRIA for illuminating the 
requirements and achievement of gender equality objectives in 
trade policy work, including trade and investment agreements. 
 
 
 
A major trend in current development discourse is a focus 
on investing in women and girls as “smart economics” or “good 
for growth” (World Bank, 2006; Plan, 2009). In 2006 the World 
Bank's gender unit coined the slogan: "Gender equality is smart 
economics." Rosalind Eyben at the Institute of Development 
Studies has tracked this trend. Eyben (2008) notes it represents a 
kind of throw back to a 1980s focus on growth as the goal of 
development, and market dynamics as the driver.  
In April 2008, World Bank president Robert Zoellick 
said: "Young girls should have the exact same 
opportunities that boys do to lead full and 
productive lives… studies show that investments in 
women yield large social and economic returns." An 
accompanying promotional video presents a graph 
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showing the positive econometric correlation 
between increasing a mother's income and 
increasing her child's height.  
 
The Bank is not alone in this discourse. Other major donors 
and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also 
emphasize this approach, which directs investments and energy 
into building women’s capacity for undertaking economic activity 
as an end in itself, or as a means to achieve ends for others, such as 
reaching development targets for children. It’s an approach which, 
perhaps overly crudely characterized here, instrumentalizes 
women’s economic power/potential, and side steps the issue of 
enabling women to transform their lives for themselves as well as 
others. In particular, it seems to sidestep the need to address the 
terms of women’s participation in the economy or the 
interventions that would allow women and men to help transform 
the economic structures and relationships that perpetuate their 
poverty and the poverty of their families, communities and 
countries.  
This is not to say that women do not play an enormous role 
in economic development or that their productive potential should 
not be understood and recognized. But the global economy is 
problematic for women mainly because women are not 
participating in it enough and because of how power and profit is 
controlled and distributed in it. 
We need to put human rights as a framework for 
transformation back at the centre of strategies for gender equality. 
This means investing in women and girls not for their contribution 
to economic output, or to ensure they merely have employment in 
the global economy, but to support their ability as citizens and 
actors in social movements to, among other things: 
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 organize and challenge the conditions, remuneration rates 
and precariousness of work in global supply chains; 
 press for State regulation of corporate actors whose 
practices of repatriating or hiding profits bleed public 
budgets of needed resources for health and education; 
 argue for new trade and investment regimes that do not 
leave their economies exposed to price volatility and 
unable to withstand the shocks that undermine their 
livelihoods, and force them into migrant labour. 
 
This is the terrain of challenge that human rights 
approaches should bring to policy discussions on trade and 
investment. It is in this context that it is important to talk about the 
modest tool of human rights impact assessments (HRIAs). Not 
because HRIAs are a means to get around or neutralize powerful 
interests that are the determining factors in trade deals. They are 
not a means for this. But HRIAs can be a tool to democratize 
debate and open discussion about how human rights and gender 
equality goals are addressed, or not, in different policy options. 
 
 
 
There have been increasing calls from the United Nations 
(UN) system and from civil society organizations for States to 
prepare HRIAs for trade and investment agreements. What are 
such assessments? A human rights impact assessment of a trade 
agreement seeks to assess the impact of a trade/investment 
agreement on the enjoyment of the human rights of people in the 
States concerned, based on an explicit evaluation of how the trade 
law obligations of the agreement affect the capacity of people to 
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enjoy their rights, and how these affect the legal and moral human 
rights obligations of duty-bearers. The latter are mainly States, but 
the private sector and international organizations also have 
obligations with respect to human rights. 
There are at least three key purposes or objectives in 
undertaking such an assessment:  
 
1. To help avoid human rights violations from happening in first 
place through poorly thought out commitments in the agreement. 
 
This as an obvious good in itself, but it bears repeating 
since the power differential between the human rights and trade 
regimes is greatly weighted against human rights. Once conflict is 
apparent, human rights obligations always risk being set aside 
because of the stronger enforcement mechanisms in trade and 
investment regimes. This underscores the need to identify and 
head off potential conflicts upstream. 
 
2. To maximize the contribution of trade and investment to the 
fulfillment of human rights. 
 
It is important to underscore that a HRIA exercise does not 
assume there is only conflict between trade and rights. HRIAs are 
a tool to ensure that trade and investment can stimulate the kind of 
economic development that enables the fulfillment of human 
rights—to livelihood, to food etc.  
 
3. To democratize and shift the terms of the debate on trade.    
 
A human rights approach brings a different emphasis and 
set of concerns or questions to those that traditionally dominate 
trade negotiations. For example, a human rights approach shifts 
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the policy maker’s perspective from aggregate values –the benefits 
of trade for the country as a whole – to distributional issues, and 
the impacts of trade on the most vulnerable and insecure.  
 
 
a) The value added of a human rights impact assessment 
 
The specificity and value added of human rights impact 
assessments, as distinct from social impact assessments or 
sustainability impact assessments, is that they must be based 
explicitly on the human rights obligations of the States in question.  
All states have obligations to respect (not violate), protect (against 
the actions of other actors) and fulfill (create an enabling 
environment for) human rights including, political civil, economic, 
social and cultural rights.  These obligations relate to States’ own 
populations and also include obligations relating to populations 
beyond their borders —including the obligation to avoid causing 
harm to human rights enjoyment through actions, omissions, or 
international agreements.  
Importantly, human rights standards are not neutral. They 
have normative content, which would drive the approach taken in 
a HRIA. For example, key human rights principles such as non-
discrimination, non-retrogression, transparency, and participation 
would inform the assessment of impacts.  
Consider the core issue of trade-offs in economic policy. 
Trade and investment agreements typically will benefit certain 
groups and make others more vulnerable. Difficult choices have to 
be made about the priorities of States. Human rights impact 
assessments seek to clarify the nature of such choices and inform 
the democratic process. 
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For example as laid out in recent draft UN Guidelines on 
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements, “the principle of equality and non-discrimination rules 
out any trade-offs which would result in or exacerbate unequal 
and discriminatory outcomes, e.g., giving priority to providing 
health and education services to the more affluent parts of society, 
rather than to the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups, 
particularly women.” Also, “…any trade-off that results in a 
retrogressive level in the protection of a human right would be 
treated as highly suspect” (Guiding Principles, 2011, p.8). 
Thus HRIAs may limit the extent to which trade-offs can be 
acceptable by setting a minimum social protection floor that trade 
policies must respect (Walker, 2009). The HRIA approach refuses 
to accept “losers” as inevitable. It may force the issue of 
compensatory measures, or identify ‘no go’ or ‘not yet’ zones until 
enabling conditions for empowerment are in place.  
 
b)  A growing interest in human rights impact assessments  
 
There is a growing interest in HRIAs for trade and 
investment agreements. This includes not just calls by UN 
Specialized bodies and civil society organizations, but 
governments, including in developing countries. Countries as 
diverse as Thailand, Brazil, Vanuatu, Argentina and Bolivia are 
using human rights obligations as a defensive strategy to minimize 
commitments in the implementation or negotiation of investment 
and trade agreements, particularly those marked by asymmetrical 
power relations. Whether to resist application of certain 
intellectual property measures (in the case of Thailand–US FTA), 
reject compensation payments to foreign investors (in the case of 
Argentina), Southern governments have been structuring their 
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arguments against the implementation of certain trade and 
investment measures and obligations with reference to the higher 
legal and moral obligation of their human rights commitments. 
Consequently HRIAs are increasingly seen as a possible process to 
crystallize and validate the growing concerns about the human 
costs of trade agreements. 
 
 
 
In response to this growing interest, in June 2010, a special 
expert seminar on HRIAs and trade and investment agreements 
was held in Geneva with about 40 participants from North and 
South. The seminar was convened under the auspices of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, and 
organized by the Berne Declaration, the Canadian Council for 
International Co-operation, Misereor, the South Centre, 3D, FIAN, 
the Heinrich Boll Foundation and others.  
The seminar explored the potential and role of HRIA for 
trade and investment agreements as well as the risks of the 
process, drawing on lessons from past experiences and other 
assessment approaches. The seminar reviewed and developed 
further ideas for methodologies for such HRIAs related to the 
challenges of assessing the impacts on specific human rights and 
the challenges of assessing impacts of various aspects of trade and 
investment agreements, including the negotiation process.  
Some of the key messages of the seminar include:  
 HRIAs are an essential step of due diligence for States in 
discharging human rights obligations. For example, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires 
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States to enable every citizen to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs. No trade or investment agreement should thus 
be concluded in the absence of a public debate, which human 
rights impact assessments serve to inform. Also, States are 
prohibited from concluding any agreements that would 
impose on them conflicting obligations. Therefore, there is a 
duty to identify potential conflict, and to refrain from entering 
into such agreements where conflicts are found to exist. HRIAs 
can be an important tool to address this obligation. The 
Maastricht guidelines on extra territorial rights, footnoted 
earlier, also clearly spell out an obligation on States to 
undertake HRIAs for trade and investment agreements in its 
Principle 14. 
 States need directions and guidelines on how to undertake 
such assessments. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food has recently tabled draft Guiding Principles on Human 
Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements (2010) in UN special bodies. In doing so, the 
Rapporteur highlighted that once information on the 
methodologies for such assessments is known, there can be a 
clearer focus on the need for creating the political will to 
undertake them.  
 HRIAs should address the process and provisions of trade 
agreements.  How does the process of trade negotiations 
respect human rights principles? In other words, how 
transparent, consultative and participatory is the process? How 
do the substantive provisions and commitments contemplated 
affect the enjoyment of rights (positive and negative impacts)? 
 A practice of both ex ante and ex post HRIAs is needed. 
Given the obligations for States to maximize the fulfillment of 
rights and avoid conflicts, HRIAs must be conducted PRIOR to 
termination of negotiations (ex ante). However, because not all 
the impacts of an agreement can be anticipated, ex post HRIAs 
have undertaken following implementation, when impacts can 
be more empirically measured. Ultimately, HRIAs should be 
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conceived of as an iterative, cyclical process, taking place on a 
regular basis to inform policy decisions. 
 
Further information on the methodologies and challenges 
of undertaken HRIAs for trade and investment agreements is 
available in the Seminar’s report. But by way of quick overview, 
the Seminar spoke to key standards / international benchmarks 
for what constitutes a credible HRIA process. These include: 
 
i. Independence:  the HRIA must be prepared by a body 
or group of experts that is independent from the 
Executive who is negotiating the trade or investment 
agreement. 
 
ii. A fair and transparent process: the HRIA should be 
based on sources of information that are made public; 
work on the basis of a clear methodology defined in 
advance. And it should be open to receiving 
submissions, in order to ensure that its information 
basis will be as broad as possible. The final HRIA report 
should also be made public. 
 
iii. Relevant expertise:  The HRIA team must contain or 
commission inter disciplinary and relevant expertise for 
the countries in question, including in human rights, 
economics and trade law, linked to the particular areas 
of concern, as well as social science expertise 
particularly in participatory methodologies. 
   
iv. Adequate financing: The HRIA must have adequate 
financing that includes allowing for meaningful 
participation of civil society organizations and of the 
most affected rights-holders. 
 
v. A channel to feed recommendations into official 
processes: The HRIA must have recommendations, 
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which must feed into the decision-making process that 
leads to the conclusion and approval of the treaty 
concerned.  
 
 
 
The actual undertaking of HRIAs for trade and investment 
agreements is still quite limited in practice. If they were to be taken 
up in a more consistent manner, how might such HRIAs help 
ensure trade and investment agreements support gender equality 
rights?  
Human rights impact assessments could be used by States 
or civil society organizations (CSOs) for a range of human rights 
objectives including: 
 to expose empirically whether growth generated by trade and 
investment flows is changing women’s equality and 
substantive enjoyment of human rights in practice; which 
women, and how deep the gains or losses are; 
 to consider the impact of specific trade provisions such as 
liberalization measures, or intellectual property rights; 
 to consider whether the safeguards and side accords that are 
often nominally built into bilateral agreements have been 
effective or adequate; 
 as a mobilization tool for women’s organizations and CSOs, to 
participate in trade policy debates. 
 
There are also significant challenges and pitfalls with 
HRIAs as a tool for gender equality that must be considered. 
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 The potential illumination role of HRIAs’ empirical work relies 
on gender-disaggregated data, which is limited. In particular, 
there is a chronic lack of data in economic spheres where 
women’s work is concentrated, including in the informal sector 
and the care economy. 
 More in-depth HRIA work will also require some consensus on 
the human rights indicators for measuring gender equality, 
though some good work on indicators has been started by the 
Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR, 
n.d.). 
 There is a risk that the work of HRIAs will be captured by 
experts alone. This would be a mistake. Strategies for 
expanding the use of HRIAs must intentionally link such 
processes to support the active role of women’s groups and 
social movements. As a part of this, HRIA processes must 
display a commitment to human rights principles through 
participatory methodologies. 
 There is a danger of HRIAs falling victim to a check box 
mentality, which, rather than opening the discussion on the 
human rights obligations of States in trade agreements, could 
close the space for such discussion once a HRIA has been 
perfunctorily undertaken. Such assessments can also be an 
instrument for the rationalization of existing agreements rather 
than a means to substantively change them. Some experiences 
with environmental impact assessment (EIA) have led to this 
outcome (including the Canadian government’s EIA process 
for trade agreements).  
 
In Canada, there is a new precedent setting provision for a 
human rights assessment as part of the Canada-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement, which came into effect in August of 2011.  The 
new treaty requirement is for an annual report on the human 
rights effects of the trade agreement in both Canada and 
Colombia, to be prepared by both governments and tabled in their 
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respective parliaments. The first report is due in May of 2012. Will 
the report be a tool for a more open debate on the human rights 
impacts of the trade agreement, including the gendered 
dimensions of gains and losses? Or will it be a report and process 
that pays lip service to the goals of human rights impact 
assessments? As an annual event, the report could also be a 
dynamic tool, which improves in its capacity to support human 
rights goals over time. The first report will be an important 
indication of whether the process warrants greater or less 
investment by human rights defenders in Canada or Colombia.   
Ultimately HRIAs, whether undertaken by civil society 
organizations or governments, will be a tool for greater human 
rights accountability, when driven by actors who are motivated to 
improve human rights outcomes, including boosting the capacity 
of citizens to claim rights and the capacity of States to fulfill their 
obligations. 
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